Markus--
You say:
In my opinion, the statement "If p(z)[A,B] > p(z)[B,A], then
candidate B must be elected with zero probability" defines a
_method_ and not a _criterion_ because:
[...]
I reply:
Fine. You don't have to convince me. If you say that that defines Schulze's
method, then it defines Sch
Bart--
You wrote:
This doesn't seem possible for more than one dimension-- don't Merrill's
models show sincere Borda yeilding slightly higher SU than the CW in two
dimensions, and Approval higher than both when there are only three
candidates?
I reply:
I don't know; I'd have to check.
But it can be
Curt,
--- Curt Siffert <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Operating from the following assumptions:
>
> 1) There is never a viable reason to select a candidate other than the
> Condorcet Winner if a CW exists
> 2) Any voting criterion that is inherently incompatible with electing a
> Condorcet Winner
Curt Siffert wrote:
Then the population could be told that the election will select a
Condorcet Winner if one exists, and if not, one of the tiebreaking
methods would be selected randomly. It would be better if they all met
the Smith or Schwartz criteria.
It remove the motivation for targetted
You've kept insisting that SSD is Schulze's method. And it's true that, as
you've been defining Schulze method, SSD is a special case of Schulze's
method, which is a classification of methods rather than a method.
But SSD isn't a special case of BeatpathWinner. SSD and BeatpathWinner are
two di
Operating from the following assumptions:
1) There is never a viable reason to select a candidate other than the
Condorcet Winner if a CW exists
2) Any voting criterion that is inherently incompatible with electing a
Condorcet Winner should be discarded
3) All Condorcet "tiebreakers" pass some cr
On Mar 30, 2005, at 02:53, Gervase Lam wrote:
Should I thus read your comment so that you see MinMax (margins) as a
sincere method (the best one, or just one good sincere method) whose
weaknesses with strategic voting can best be patched by using Raynaud
(Margins)?
Roughly speaking yes, but not ex
From: Jobst Heitzig <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: Definite Majority Choice, AWP, AM
The following proves that the only immune candidate is the least
approved not strongly defeated candidate, assuming no pairwise defeat or
approval ties:
Let A be that candidate, with approval a.
To prove tha
Mike, thanks for the excellent summary of Approval strategies.
I wasn't trying to be all inclusive, because my goal was limited to
automatic computation of approval cutoffs for insertion into ranked and
rated ballots in some kind of Declared Strategy Voting scheme.
This scheme, in turn, was for
Date: Fri, 1 Apr 2005 01:25:36 +1000 (EST)
From: Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [EM] Re: DMC,AWP,AM
Forest,
You wrote:
"I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort
(AMS) is equivalent to your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with
highest approval
On Mar 31, 2005, at 03:38, Gervase Lam wrote:
Schulze(Margins) (also known as Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping
and Beatpath etc...) is possibly another reasonable method. See the
recent "LNHarm performance" thread.
Thanks, I'm already familiar with this one. My opinion briefly: nice
design
Forest,
You wrote:
> "I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort
(AMS) is equivalent to your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with
highest approval at the top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of
order pairwise ... among al
Dear Mike,
I wrote (29 March 2005):
> In 1997, I proposed the following method (Schulze method,
> Schwartz sequential dropping, cloneproof Schwartz sequential
> dropping, beatpath method, beatpath winner, path voting,
> path winner):
>
>If p(z)[A,B] > p(z)[B,A], then candidate B must be
>e
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