How about this, I'm going for writing the law such that the elections
official in charge can choose from a few approved, good enough,
election methods. So, you pass this law once, and various places try
Condorcet, IRNR, even IRV, and it's a simple thing for state or
county elections officia
Given that there's potentially more information in a ratings ballot than in a rankings ballot, one should be able to construct an election method based on rankings ballots that better serves the voters than anything that only uses ratings ballots. I'd guess that's the attraction to 'range voting',
On Jul 15, 2005, at 9:52 AM, Stephen Turner wrote:Mostly, but not only about Diebold. I wonder how these companies stay in business.HAVA, the Help Americans Vote Act, ensures that there will be nice shiny new voting machines in every precinct in the US by November 2006. That's a few billion dollar
-
cname&cand=5&seats=1&data=A1%3EA2%3EA3%3EB%3EC%0D%0AB%3EC%3EA2%3EA3%3EA1
%0D%0AC%3EA3%3EA1%3EA2%3EB&systems=all
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
posed changes to it.
Bart
Thank you for the proposal.
Assuming the Committee found something like this acceptable, there
might be little more for them to do, beyond existing.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
g for clarification on what exactly it is
about the process of these other methods that you don't like. For
example, I have a negative gut reaction to any non-deterministic method
and I'll back it up with rhetoric like "people should vote, not random
number generators".
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
t you may as well just move to rankings or
many-valued-ratings (as opposed to the two-valued-rating of Approval)
ballots.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
han
Condorcet by SU under actual conditions.
My simulations found something similar, except under conditions of
error (counting error, candidate lies, voter confusion). Under such
conditions Approval degrades less rapidly than Borda. I didn't test
Black. These where honest/non-strategic voters.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
hat majority voting a less-liked candidate over a more-liked one.
I think IRNR has this. I think IRNR is a strict improvement on straight
Cardinal Rating summation, except for the computational burden.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ion times, elect the most probable winner. If
you've gone and added non-determinism to some method, we've now wasted
a million minus one election calculations.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
candidate? Or is the philosophical objection to
the fact this this veto comes at the cost of a dishonest, strategic
vote?
Oh well, back to the drawing board in search of a social utility
maximizing, singularity free, strategy free election method. I'm going
to implement Gradual Approval a
:
Date: Wed, 15 Dec 2004 20:30:19 -0800
From: Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: [EM] Is range voting the panacea we need?
Straight rating summation is vulnerable to strategic voting. Perhaps
in
this study people voted honestly because it obviously didn't matter
and
so there was n
methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
info
Brian Olson
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Since its my pet method, I made a slideshow explaining Instant Runoff
Normalized Ratings.
PDF (219KB)
http://bolson.org/voting/IRNR_explaination.pdf
QuickTime (2.3MB)
http://bolson.org/voting/IRNR_explaination.mov
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http
On Nov 15, 2004, at 8:42 AM, Eric Gorr wrote:
At 12:13 AM -0800 11/14/04, Brian Olson wrote:
Using the same engine as the Election Calculator I ran the
preliminary data through a collection of election methods. It turns
out that no race was close enough to wind up with different results
when a
counts, or whatever, here are the results:
http://bolson.org/voting/sf2004/
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
=/chronicle/archive/2004/
11/06/BAG9G9MO0L34.DTL
the biggest race had 32144 votes.
Between this story and all of the snafu going on with the DRE voting
machines, my appraisal of the quality of software engineering in this
country is going down. Even Microsoft could do better.
Brian Olson
http
On Oct 18, 2004, at 7:09 AM, Bill Clark wrote:
On Fri, 15 Oct 2004 11:03:28 -0700, Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so
I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
The unique appealing feature of random
l and fair to me. I
may need some convincing of other variations.
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
l and fair to me. I
may need some convincing of other variations.
I think I'm allergic to the use of randomness in election methods, so I
don't plan on implementing such an option.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
s it averages out and represents their cumulative true feelings
with reasonable accuracy.
It strikes me that this reform will involve a lot of discussions with
citizens about what "fairness" means in a single-winner election.
I naturally gravitate towards a Utilitarian measure of "fairn
would like your election method added, there's a
pretty simple abstract class with just a couple methods to implement.
See the javadoc:
http://bolson.org/voting/vote_util/doc/org/bolson/vote/VotingSystem.html
Happy Hacking!
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list
actually implemented in the computer I dug myself a
hole I didn't need to.
Also, "IRV-P" annoys me. But maybe that's just because IRV annoys me.
:-P
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
On Sep 16, 2004, at 3:26 PM, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
(ii) such names don't tell anything about t
or some other choice not detract from the favorite.
I would guess that IRV is a good fit to Kislanko's desires from a
voting system.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
minimizes "behind-the-scene deals". As far as I can tell,
the best fix is a responsive participatory democracy where people at
whatever level (voter, representative) are paying some attention to
what goes on in the parts they have a vote over and they vote the bums
out as neede
in a forthcoming
multi-seat Election Calculator ( http://bolson.org/v/vote_form.html ).
Although, I'll also have a similar Instant Runoff Normalized Ratings
for PR there.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
oter turn out? (That
could only be workable for PR, districts have to be worked out in
advance.) What if PR was such that any 200,000 votes elected a
candidate? That number would have to be tuned based on expected turn
out, and desired size of legislative body.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
-
for the same party.
Or at least, So it is defined in California elections code (a pedantic
document full of gaps and yet taking up over two megabytes of plain
text).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
t,Anything!).
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Jun 23, 2004, at 12:42 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
Whee, a bit more hacking and now Condorcet is implemented with both
Winning-Votes beatpath and Margins beatpath.
A recent example can be seen as:
*49 A
*24 B
*27 C>B
http://bolson.org:8080
from B to C. Margins-Beatpath is unaffected
and always choses A.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
04, at 11:40 PM, Brian Olson wrote:
The Election Calculator now includes three different behaviors of IRV:
duplicate a vote across choices it ranks equally ( aka "whole" )
split a vote across choices it ranks equally
disqualify a vote so long as it has a tie for first place (it can come
re the voter to try
again. I included it for some sort of "completeness", and because my
front end makes no enforcement against casting tied-ranking ballots.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
It might make it easier to compare Approval
against other methods, instead of having to shuffle ratings around zero
to use the fixed approval cutoff.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
e same as "equal voting power". You are
expressing "equal opportunity to vote" but I think I've seen more usage
of 1p1v as "equal voting power".
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
mum rating
allowed. If that is even at all representative of my sincere
preferences then it's much more important to get one of those I approve
(and not get one of those I don't approve) than to distinguish within
them.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ds exclusively NOT used, why is this
distinction so apparently controversial?
Because we're idealists and we think that the BEST system should be
used, even in politics. I disagree that that all the methods under
"Multiple Vote" {Borda, Bucklin, Coombs, Cardinal Ratings, Approval,
MC
On Jun 4, 2004, at 8:28 PM, Brian Olson wrote:
Automatic Equivalence on Loss Option (AERLO, but now I know I'm
misremembering this a bit because it doesn't match the acronym)
Automatic Truncation on Loss Option (ATLO)
Oi, I missed by meters. And it's right there in the mid
lection method to
generalize it to multiple seats.
As for Wiki, wouldn't it be awesome if it were a sort of
proposing/voting system like was mentioned a few weeks ago, with
instant proxy representation and the works? Yeah, I think I'll write
one of those. Mmm, web toy.
Brian
t's where I'm going with my simulations. I just need to
add a bit more complexity on the strategy side.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ocates use "You
understand what a runoff is, but those are expensive. Now you can have
(ta dah!) Instant Runoff!"
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ballot, you can represent your
uncertainty about the candidate by placing a lower and higher rating.
So, on a scale of 0 to 10, I'm pretty unsure about Ralph Nader though
he seems pretty good, so I'll give him a [4,8].
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On May 23, 2004, at 7:59 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Brian Olson--
You wrote:
Latest web toy: a poll on Election Methods, Ballot Styles, Voting
Technology and Representation Systems.
http://bolson.org:8080/v/t?poll=em
As I am wont to do, it's a Rated ballot. :-)
I reply:
Why only ratings?
Of c
m working on adding an AI/ALife system to learn the best
strategy against each election method. If the AI learns that honest
votes are most likely to get it what it wants, we win.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
sed election
method or its strategy.
My simulator has a mode where the population is split up into equal
sized chunks and each uses a different strategy to modify their votes.
I count an Election Method as good when the group that votes honestly
has the highest average happiness (over several thou
On May 22, 2004, at 9:54 AM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
--- Brian Olson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : >
Well said. This argument goes back at least as far as the canonical
work by Kenneth Arrow. In laying the axioms on which his conclusions
lay, he argued that you can't compare utility _b
ble to claim that straight Cardinal Rankings (no
shifting, no scaling, simple summing) is equivalent
(psychological/anthropological effects aside) no matter what the scale.
Some rated systems behave differently if signed numbers are used or if
positive-only numbers are used.
OK so far?
Brian Ols
can_ compare utilities between people, Rating systems
become the natural basis, rather than Ranking systems.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ough, One around here seems oblivious to having
lost the popular vote.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
3433370.573728578
NameAvg. Happiness(higher better)Reliability Std.(lower better)Consensus Std.(lower better)
I suppose it's similar overall, but I think I see more variation in the
primary statistic "Average Happiness", which makes me wonder if there's
some artifact in your simulator.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
everyone has the same voting strategy for CR, which adds a measure of
fairness. This particular variation can still be taken advantage of.
The proper vote is 1.0 for all choices with positive utility and -1.0
for all others. That maximizes my expected utility. But, the experiment
as I understand
ty singularities, is this one of them? IRNR is my pet, why should
any of you like it?
Breakfast for thought, good day. :-)
(results calculated with http://bolson.org/voting/vote_form.html )
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
order) voted? have theirs? ...)
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
vote in the other house, not even a millionth of a vote. I'd rather
keep it that way. I think such a system has more "Purity". Of course,
they can speak all they want, and they'll have their vote in their own
house. That's enough influence.
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ates their whole vote to their favorite-at-the-time.
(Never mind that IRV might miss the compromise choice and jump straight
to what some opposing faction prefers.)
Brian Olson
http://bolson.org/
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
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