"But, for one thing, my
sincerity definition is only for use with my criteria, not for evaluation of
voters and their motivations. For another thing, that voter shouldn't
entirely blame my definition. Surely she would have to admit that she
contributed at least partly to the definition-mismatch
See below.
> -Original Message-
> From: Rob Lanphier [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Sunday, October 09, 2005 2:08 AM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: 'MIKE OSSIPOFF'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Why truncation resistance is important (RE: [EM] Re:
> Rob: MDD
All of the gobblydegoog aside, to Rob - we don't care what you want, us
voters want to NOT have to rank all altertantives. I want to list only the
ones I find acceptable in the order I prefer them. Any method that
"encourages" me to rank all alterntatives whether I know anything about them
or care
Forest suggests:
For each pair of candidates X and Y, let F(X,Y) be the number of ballots on
which X is ranked equal first with Y, plus the number of ballots on which X
is ranked ahead of Y.
Similarly, let L(X,Y) be the number of ballots on which X is equal last with
Y (i.e. on which neither i
If you think B "should" win, the point is made that Range voting won't pass.
Anybody who loses 90-10 in plurality but wins in another system is just an
argument against the other system.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
] On Behalf Of Abd ulRahma
I wish you guys would stop bringing politics into this.
I like Nader, but frankly would never want him as President. Beatpath is as
good as any method that counts from the pairwise matrix instead of ballots,
but I would never want it to be used to count my ranked ballot.
I was really hoping this
All of this notwithstanding, no one has ever explained to me how including
an extraneous "+" is different from
my_preferred>all_others_could_live_with>>those I think would save me some
problems by having a heart attack.
I repeat, if I can say A+=B> then you shold be able to infer that from that
m
-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
> Subject: RE: [EM] Re: worldwide survey on democracy (Abd
> ul-Rahman Lomax)
>
> Anybody on this list who wants me to email them the Ethics article
> about the will of the people, by Saari, as an attached PDF file
> should let me know.
>
> SB
&
"
A>>>BC>>>D>E>F>>G
does not imply that A is preferred over B with three times the intensity of
the D over E preference. It only means that the strongest preference is B
over C, then next strongest is A over B, which is about the same as the C
over D preference, etc."
I don't want a bal
Title: [Condorcet] Re: why the Schulze Method is a Better Proposal
Regarding:
Jeff wrote ...
> [ Note: Voters will
execute almost the same ballot regardless of what> ranked voting method
we choose. -- JRF ]
I feel this is undoubtedly true. I think it is very important to keep the
idea of
Steve Barney said:
>
> Try accessing that EBSCO database URL from your local library.
To which I say (living in the middle of Katrina debris) there's no local
library to try it from. And even if there were, it probably isn't a
registered user.
I'll bet I'm not the only one on the list not affil
"Important User Information: Remote access to EBSCO's databases is
permitted to patrons of subscribing institutions accessing from remote
locations for personal, non-commercial use. However, remote access to
EBSCO's databases from non-subscribing institutions is not allowed if the
purpose of the u
September 27, 2005 5:16 PM
> To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
> Subject: [EM] Re: Bucklin
>
> > Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2005 18:45:11 -0500
> > From: "Paul Kislanko"
> > Subject: [EM] RE: Bucklin
>
> > I still don't see why A+=B>others is
Title: [Condorcet] Re: why the Schulze Method is a Better Proposal
As a novice in the EM field but as a literate lay-person I
think I can explain the logical argument below (see
below).
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf
Of Simmons, Forest Sent: Tuesd
Title: Election-methods Digest, Vol 15, Issue 50
I still don't see why A+=B>others is any different
from A>B>others.
I'm sorry, but A+=B is the same as A>B and A=B+ is
the same as B>A. If a method uses the "+" to break ties it is only because it
is a flawed method.
From: Simmons,
I have no idea what this is. What does "collapse" something mean?
_
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of
Simmons, Forest
Sent: Saturday, September 24, 2005 6:04 PM
To: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
Subject: [EM] A better Bucklin flavored FBC sa
Regarding "For those who don't think the plus is important, consider these
two cases:"
All I have to say is those of us who are just stupid voters who will have to
select some method don't want no more stinking cases. The + is irrelevant
if the method is designed correctly.
_
From: [
That was my understanding of Bucklin. I'm not sure
exactly what "empty slots" means in this context.
I don't thank of it as "rounds", by the way. I just say
"assign for each alternative the best rank for which a majority (= the integer
part of #voters/2 + 1) and order the alternatives by ra
everybody seems to dismiss Bucklin, but if the
program that implements the counting is the same for both, they must be
equivalent.
------
Paul Kislanko
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
tool to find the level of "majority support" for an
alternative.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Kevin Venzke
> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 3:53 PM
> To: em
> Subject: RE: [EM] FW: ? about
everybody seems to dismiss Bucklin, but if the
program that implements the counting is the same for both, they must be
equivalent.
------
Paul Kislanko
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
posite - a
"false ballot" might be needed in some methods to achive one's sincerely-desired
result.
Sorry if that's more
confusing than the previous discussions
--
Paul Kislanko
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Forest wrote: >>Suppose that ...
1. there are three candidates A, B, and C,
2. ballot rankings are strict,
3. in each ordinal faction second ranked candidates are distributed
uniformly between the other two,
and
4. there is a beat cycle A>B>C>A .
<<< end of quote
To which I reply, "sup
Warren Smith wrote in part:
> The "graph partitioning" problem is NP-complete:
I didn't express myself very well. Yes, the "graph-partitioning problem" is
NP-complete, but my suggestion was that we didn't need the full power of
that result. Instead we could reformulate the problem into a disecti
Warren wrote, in part:
>
> I believe the brute force approach of just solving the
> NP-hard redistricting problem
> perfectly, is not feasible. There are probably ten-thousands
> of census blocks
> and exponential runtimes with that much input just do not
> happen, even with
> all the computer
"Imagine the drama we would have had in the Perot, Bush, Clinton election
that was referred to recently by Rob Lanphier. Any one of the three would
have had enough assets to make either of the others the winner. That's a lot
of political leverage! No responsible representative should or would bac
"Shortest computer program" is not a criterion that any voter would care
about.
"Rules for voters" and "specification for counting programs" are two
different things.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Warren Smith
> Sent: Satur
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > --Actually, as a math PhD, what I understand is that the
> > Condorcet criterion is NOT "already well-defined"
>
> This mystifies me. I've long understood the Condorcet criterion
> to mean that if one candidate would defeat all others in one to one
> contests, that ca
MAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Rob Lanphier
> Sent: Thursday, August 11, 2005 12:59 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com; 'Warren Smith'
> Subject: RE: [EM] Center for Range Voting Formed
>
> On Thu, 2005-08-11 at 12:42 -0500,
Rob, please lose the invective and the misleading statements:
"Your tactic a very similar tactic to one used by many Condorcet
advocates which I also object to. Condorcet fails the "Independence
from Irrelevant Alternatives" criterion (IIAC), made famous by Kenneth
Arrow in his Nobel prize winnin
James Green-Armytage wrote:
> Hi folks.
> I have two questions:
>
> 1. Does the majority criterion plus the independence of
> clones criterion
> imply the mutual majority criterion?
> 2. Does the Condorcet criterion plus the independence of
> clones criterion
> imply the Smith criterion?
Eric Gorr wrote in response to Dave Ketchum:
> I fail to see the significance of these examples. Pretend, for the
> moment, that the odd voter did not exist and the election ended in a
> genuine tie.
>
> I fail to see how a randomly selected winner (the most common tie
> resolution method) co
sigh
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Ketchum [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2005 4:20 PM
> To: Paul Kislanko
> Cc: 'Juho Laatu'; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: Re: [EM] Margins vs. Winning Votes
>
> On Tue, 26 Jul 2005
Dave Ketchum wrote
>
> I think we should charge Paul with throwing mud.
>
> Juho has created a couple examples packaged as basic tie
> elections, with
> one extra vote added in that gives the odd voter full control
> as to winner
> under wv rules.
>
> Paul notes - as a big deal - that by
Juho Laatu wrote in part:
> (P.S. Number of "1000 supporter parties" could be also higher
> than two,
> and number of candidates in each party could be higher than two, and
> the results/problems would stay the same.)
I'd be very careful with generalizations like this one. The
three-alternativ
Kevin Venzke wrote:
> This seems like a new interpretation. I believe both this
> interpretation and
> ERB(fractional) satisfy monotonicity, since in neither method
> can raising
> a candidate cause any other candidate to get their votes earlier.
Actually, this is the only interpetation I've eve
I agree. Fruit Basket Constructions are really easy to do.
But "FBC" and "PT" are just collections of letters. Add enough letters and
nobody can keep track of any.
PLEASE, people, if you have anything to say about something spell out your
abbreviations in their first use. If you can't do that, y
> It is not reasonable to force a party not to choose an official
candidate. Is this what you want? For example, do you think you
should have been able to vote for McCain as well as Bush in 2000?
McCain would've been a better choice.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.
I am not entirely sure who said what because of the way Mike constructs his
emails, and I don't really care anymore about what you "experts" think one
way or another, but Mike (or somebody) wrote:
> Set S is a clone set if, for every particular voter, and for
> any candidate X
> outside S, if th
>>They might also trust a uniform voting method science community telling
them that some certain method is the best one.<<
ROTFLMAO
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Mathematically, this is sort of an application of Borda. Which begs several
questions that should be obvious to list-readers.
This is from the Word-a-Day mailing list:
Apgar score (AP-gar skor) noun
A method of assessing a newborn's health.
[After anesthesiologist Virginia Apgar (1909-19
Simmons, Forest wrote:
"Notice that the question, "Which is the best city for this purpose?" has
different answers for different voters, as opposed to some voters being
right and some being wrong."
OK, this is an impoortant distinction. All voters are "right", or else it
isn't an election method.
What Mike doesn't understand is that messages whose sole point is to attack
another poster obscure whatever it is he's trying to say.
OK, Paul says "it is none of Mike's business what Paul didn't understand
that Mike wrote."
It was an observation that did not call for rebuttal.
Can we get a mode
Mike writes:
> I didn't say that Kenneth Arrow is a simpleton. I merely said
> that most
> voting system academics do a very poor job of saying what
> they mean.
It has been several months now since I've understood any of Mike's rants.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electo
Mike, if you haven't read the paper, don't complain that you don't know what
Arrow meant by IIAC.
If you think IIAC is unimportant, fine. Then quit with all the "strategy"
complications, since those are heavily dependent upon the degree to which a
method complies or doesn't comply with IIAC.
>
Bart Ingles wrote in respone to
> Paul Kislanko wrote:
> >
> > I would go a little farther. Since Arrow's was a PROOF in
> which no one has
> > found a flaw in over 50 years, I would say that anyone who
> has found fault
> > with it is not a "vote t
Q wrote
>
> Just a thought, but stating "many vote theorists" without providing
> supporting links to referreed articles might have led to the
> bias decision.
>
> I'm not saying that your argument is like those supporting Intelligent
> Design or denying Global Warming, but perhaps as a resul
James Green-Armytage wrote eloquently about the feelings of most of us
who've watched the personal argument. I would like to add this, if I may be
permitted.
I came to this list to learn from folks who knew more about a subject in
which I had developed an interest, and I appreciate the help that
"There isn't a list moderator. There have been postings to EM that make
that
abundantly obvious."
Yes. And you keep on providing examples.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dave Ketchum wrote
> For the whole district (state in this case) we need an array
> with a column
> and row for each candidate.
>
> The ballots do not come in in this format. Makes sense, at
> or near the
> polling place, to convert them to array format, for the array
> format is
> efficie
Curt Siffert wrote
>
> And this is something that Condorcet methods cannot do. You cannot
> derive, from a Condorcet ballot collection, how much
> percentage support
> each candidate got. You can't give each candidate a share of
> 100% in a
> way that all candidates would agree on. If y
Russ Paielli <6049awj02 sneakemail.com> writes:
>
> So now the parties will need to have their own "private pre-primaries"
> before the official so-called "primary." And the general election will
> almost surely exclude minor parties.
>
> Or will the "we'll-tell-you-how-to-run-your-party" Naz
Mike, if you don't have anything new to say, please stop repeating yourself.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Friday, April 22, 2005 9:20 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] James, 4/22/'05, 0220 GMT
Mike wrote:
>In a recent posting I defined preference versions of both of those
criteria,
better because they're universally applicable.<
I'd say, universally incomprehensible. Like the rest of this post.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On
> -Original Message-
> From: James Green-Armytage
> Commentary:
> I think that Paul is right about the number of possible
> arrangements
> given 100 children and 4 classes, which means that I am most
> likely wrong.
> My second guess at the magic number is (100!)/((25!)^4)... is
Boy did that get mangled somehow in the writing at different times and the
cutting and pastings.
My apologies, I'll go back to the original and send a better explanation.
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
James G-A wrote,
> Michael,
> I think that you're problem is very interesting and
> fun! I remember that
> when I was a kid, it was always a big deal who was in class
> with whom, and
> there were plenty of hurt feelings over the years as a
> result. Here is the
> first of what might be mu
I still say if you use that sentence on the public, nobody will know what
you mean. Least victory? Least Defeat? Just translate that sentence into
English if you want me to know what it says.
All I'm saying is most people don't talk that way and even us bourbakians
only point out that it's ambigou
Mike, I mean no offense, but if you didn't know to whom you were writing a
letter, why do think it's important for voters to know strategies and such
when considering which voting methods to employ?
C'mon. If you cared enough to cc the list, either you were cc'ing the list
or making something up.
"The winner is the candidate whose greatest vote against him/her in a
pairwise comparison (defeat or victory) is the least."
If there's anything that's going to keep an improvement in election methods
from being accepted by the people who have to vote for a change it is
language like this.
I had
We're mixing terms and contexts again.
One can define majority to include all eligible voters, in which case it is
entirely possible that no alternative achieves a majority because fewer than
50 % of elegible voters participate in the election. No matter what method
is used to pick the selection o
It "feels like" at first touch Proportional approval. But here's the
thing...
You use the term "pairwise matrix" with cells = 0 or 1 depending upon
whether the alternative is approved or not. But the approval status is by
voter (= by ballot), so are you suggesting a pairwise matrix for each
ballot
>
> The term "defeat-dropper" is a self-explanatory
> newly coined (perhaps slang) reference to the pairwise
> methods that "drop defeats", such as Ranked Pairs,
> Beat Path, River etc.that are all equivalent when
> there are three candidates. SCRIRVE and Raynaud are
> examples of Condorcet meth
At the risk of both complicating the discussion and (again) showing some
ignorance, I think the analogies are not quite precise and possibly not as
intuitive as it may seem.
Everybody understands the concept of grades, but in the classroom situation
all "alternatives" are in the same category an
t level of competition? If a version of that "cycle resolution"
method can be formulated for public elections and it doesn't have any
egregiously awful flaws (no method is perfect, after all), I'd be just as
happy to offer that as a public proposal. It would have the vi
Actually, all Paul said is that the analogy is not
perfect.
Condorcet methods are "like" as in "similar to" a
round-robin tournament in sport. The analogy is not identical because in sport
there is a well-determined outcome when team A plays team B, namely either A or
B wins.
Where the
In sport, there are no "cycles" in a round-robin. In a
3-team round-robin there's only 2-0, 1-1, and 0-2 as possible outcomes for each
team, and if one team is 2-0 there's no "cycle". The only possible "cycle" is a
3-team tie with all teams going 1-1 in the tournament.
The cases are:
2-0 i
The only problem is that there are many "Condorcet" methods and none of them
are "round-robin" methods if they are based upon translating a ranked ballot
into a pairwise matrix.
A round-robin would have a ballot format that allows the voters to enter
their pairwise preferences pairwaise, as Jobst
Shut up already.
WHO could possibly have "requested the networks" to do ANYTHING?
Your "FYI" does not fit the facts. It is true that the panhandle is
overwhelmingly Republican, but it is also just as true that the population
of Florida in the Central Time Zone is a very small fraction of the st
Some
methods meet condition 1 and not condition 2, and those are necessarily NOT
"preference preserving" (which may not be a bad thing, it is just a
fact).
I don't
suggest that this is the only or best way to axiomatize the definition of
"sincere preference", but
I'll try again to make the point that non-specialists need specialists to be
very precise in the use of language when talking about election methods. A
very good example is the phrase "sincere preferences." From reading posts on
this list I have come to the conclusion that the phrase has two differ
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Tuesday, March 01, 2005 1:06 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Russ, 1 March, ´05, 1850 GMT
>
> I´d said:
>
> >Markus doesn´t like the mention of preference in a
Mike wrote, quoting where necessary:
>
> Markus doesn´t like the mention of preference in a criterion,
> and implies
> that it´s somehow necessarily imprecise. I don´t agree.
If a term is used in a universally applicable criterion, it must be defined,
or be dependent upon a pre-defined axion (
See below.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern
> Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 1:47 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Re: Condorcet package
>
> On 23 Feb 2005 at 11:42 PST, Dave Ketchum wrote:
> >> On 23 Feb
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern
> Sent: Thursday, February 24, 2005 1:05 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Re: Condorcet package
> I used 'relative margins' when what I meant to say was 'margins'.
Well, than
I have suggested this enough times that I think we should just abbreviate
it to
IWBUFNTHHTASOTFTTAUIEE.
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Jim & Mary Ronback
> Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2005 4:12 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
Unfortunately, it doesn't matter whether there's a good way to do
redristicting or not, because the US Constitution says that a state
legislature can do it however they want, and left to themselves the party in
control of the legislature will avoid at all costs the "best" way to do it
(see Texas, w
Russ brings up an important point.
Again, it is a different thing for a candidate to withdraw befoe the ballots
are cast than for a candidate to withdraw during counting of ranked ballots
with all candidates ranked worse on any ballot moving up 1 spot.
This gets to the question of whether withdra
> The same language is used in both cases
>
> I reply:
>
> Well the wording is different.
If you say so.
>
> You continued:
>
> , so it can be confusing when is
> concerned about the latter but finds the former irrelevant.
>
> I reply:
>
> Surely you´re not saying that you believe that how
At the risk of showing my ignorance again,
>
> Choice of Approval strategies depends largely on what you prefer to
> estimate.
Somehow I think there should be a way to label posts that are about
"strategies that voters should employ for a given election method" as
opposed to "this election metho
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> About the hypothetical polling with verifiable results: For
> one voter to
> deceive another voter about things like who will have a
> majority or who will
> outpoll whom, it would be necessary to for him to know
> something that the
> other voter doesn´t know. I can´t
Mike, if you were going to post another annoying reply to Russ, why did you
do it in the "Can't we all get along?" thread?
There isn't anything useful on this list anymore, so I guess "who cares?".
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf
EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Paul Kislanko
> Sent: Thursday, January 20, 2005 1:49 PM
> To: 'Forest Simmons'
> Cc: election-methods-electorama.com@electorama.com
> Subject: RE: [EM] Re: Counting Time
>
>
> Forest Simmons wrote (Thur
Forest Simmons wrote (Thursday, January 20, 2005)
> Here's a quick way to find the Condorcet Winner if there is one:
>
> Use Rob LeGrand's ballot by ballot approval idea, but instead
> of ballot by
> ballot, use voter by voter.
>
> For fairness, either randomize the order of polling the
> vo
Would you guys both take the discussion offlist? Please?
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
] On Behalf Of MIKE OSSIPOFF
> Sent: Monday, January 17, 2005 4:18 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Very brief Russ reply
>
>
> Russ said:
>
>
ther N-1 candidates (when there is a Condorcet
winner) or 1 candidate (when there isn't a CW).
Or is there
something I'm missing?
The great tragedy of Science - the slaying of a beautiful
hypothesis by an ugly fact.
Thomas H. Huxley
--
Paul Kislanko
James Green-Armytage wrote in response to RLSuter, in part..
> > Another example was a board meeting of a national
> >organization with a dozen or so people present. A
> >decision had to be made about where to hold the next
> >meeting. Approval voting was used, and it went well, with
> >everyon
> -Original Message-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Ted Stern
> Sent: Thursday, January 06, 2005 4:52 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: [EM] Re: There is always a Condorcet Winner! (among
> all lotteriesof candidates :-)
>
> On 6 Jan 2005 at
On Behalf Of Paul Kislanko
Yes, I noticed I didn't add right and got the pairwise percentages wrong...
Blame it on trying to do too many things at once but wanting to get a point
in.
Probabilistically, A should not have twice the chance of winning as B and C
in the example. The a
Forest Simmons wrote:
> As Jobst recently pointed out, non-deterministic methods have
> not been
> adequately studied or promoted, considereing their potential
> contribution
> to fairness and to strategy free voting.
>
> Consider, for example the following cycle of three:
>
>34 ABC
>
Thank you very much! That is exactly the answer I was looking for, and
confimed my experience with playing around with it.
>
> Ah, I get it. This isn't like IRV so much as Bucklin. That is
> definitely
> an easier way to go. With IRV, in the above scenario, only
> the "votes for
> second" of th
Thanks very much. Let me clarify my question...
> > Which approach is right?
>
> The only non-PR way I can think to do IRV to obtain a ranking of the
> candidates is to
> 1. find the IRV winner
> 2. delete him from all the ballots as though he hadn't been an option
> 3. repeat.
>
> This seems li
in
step 10. Or not?
Which approach is
right?
The great tragedy of Science - the slaying of a beautiful
hypothesis by an ugly fact.
Thomas H. Huxley
--
Paul Kislanko
Computer votes counted by IRV8 Dec 2004
How to read the table
The number in each cell is the c
This is in fact, one of the great questions of mathematical logic.
Unfortunately, 20 years before Arrow's theorem, there was Godel's Theorem,
which proves that such an "axiom-checker" is as impossible as squaring the
circle or simultaneously finding the position and momentum of an electron.
You c
YES! That's what I didn't have the right words to say. ICC is a subset of
IIA is what I meant by "ICC is a weaker formulation of IIA". Something can
satisfy ICC but not satisfy IIA.
The original question was how to define the word "spoiler", and I've come to
the conclusion that it cannot be used
Eric Gorr asked a lot of questions
>
> So, you now believe there is such a thing as an IIA spoiler?
I never said I didn't. I just said I couldn't get that there was from your
definition:
"With IIA, the spoiler is a candidate that is either added or removed
from the ballots.
With ICC, the spo
Eric Gorr replied to my questions:
>
> At 3:14 PM -0600 11/16/04, Paul Kislanko wrote:
> >No one can be added or removed
> >from a ballot after the votes have been counted,
>
> Sure one can...just do it and recalculate.
>
> >so by this distinction
> >t
This is an incredibly confusing statement. No one can be added or removed
from a ballot after the votes have been counted, so by this distinction
there is no such thing as an IIA spoiler.
More precisely, the "adding and removing" of an alternative is an alytical
trick that helps prove attributes o
-
> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> ] On Behalf Of Kevin Venzke
> Sent: Sunday, November 07, 2004 5:20 PM
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: [EM] More easily hand-counting three-slot Condorcet
>
> Paul,
>
> --- Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECT
: [EM] More easily hand-counting
> three-slot Condorcet
>
> Paul,
>
> --- Paul Kislanko <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > > My intended strategy is to discard "noise"
> > > candidates. For example, again:
> > &
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