James Green-Armytage a écrit :
> Forest writes, about DMC:
> >17. It is resistant to the burying strategy that plagues some Condorcet
> >methods.
I just asked if DMC was effective against order reversal, so if it is,
please let me read about DMC !
How does it work ? Who made it and when ?
Steph
I let Rob give his own answer, but I give you mine:
I agree. But the question is "are they more order reversal resistant too?"
If more is lost by order reversal than what is gained by resistance
to truncation, wv or DMC are not an improvement.
I am still hoping for any esperance calculation of ga
Actually as many people will tell you,
this claim is wrong.
I see that Rob already gave you a counter example.
Maybe you would like to know that using winning vote as
criteria to make pairwise comparison instead of margins
can make your claim true for strong Condorcet winners
(ones which have a m
> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a écrit :
>
> > [...] You may
> > increase meeting efficiency by excluding minority factions, but at the cost
> > of potentially excluding them in deliberations toward consensus.
This is not necessary. The efficiency aspect can be treated after the
representation exercise. Ma
ead),
> but this would anyway be one way of dealing with the fractioned
> electorate.
>
> BR, Juho
>
> P.S. To increase proportionality one could even consider n terms of
> different lengths.
>
> On May 27, 2005, at 13:25, James Gilmour wrote:
>
> > Stephane Rouill
t multiple-winner electoral system among the ones actually
used in the world. It should not stop us to search for a better one.
James Gilmour a écrit :
> Stephane Rouillon Sent: Friday, May 27, 2005 5:44 AM
> > Criterias and electoral methods hare not meant to
> > cope for a fractionated
This is exactly the point.
For Mike it is obvious, that burying-strategy is riskier.
For me, offensive truncation can be as much dangerous.
Yes burying as a double weight compared and it should hurt
more when your strategy comes back right against your favorite,
but it is easier to predict, becaus
Pirates should, after some repetitive election,
see the wisdom of defining a mandate length before
knowing who wins...
Criterias and electoral methods hare not meant to
cope for a fractionated electorate. An electoral system
goal is to get the electorate will, whatever it is. Stability
is a furth
Using winning vote as criteria offers the guarantee that truncators
cannot elect another candidate instead of a strong condorcet winner.
Although, as Blake argued, it seems winning votes could increase
the tendancy of using a burying-strategy instead to achieve the same goal.
It is not clear to m
Relative margins were an attempt to obtain a behaviour
between margins and winning votes ( relative margins are thus
relative to the number of expressed ballots).
As the result was not the one expected, maybe weighted
margins would lead to some truncation resistance using
a margin-based criteria.
M. Siffert, you are totally right.
This is why such a partitioning can only be applied to proportional
systems (real PR systems, not semi-proportionals nor quota defined systems).
The idea is to obtain equivalent samples of the electorate in order to rank
different pairs of debate-position. This is
candidate.
At the end every voter will have voted for only one candidate, the one most
voters
wanted among its acceptable ones.
Pleased to be of any help,
Stephane Rouillon, ing.
PS: I think Forest built another alternative too.
Curt Siffert a écrit :
> I know many of us are here to work on
I read something similar when promoting non-geographical districts on fair vote
canada's billboard. The main point of the author (Daniel if I remember) was
that
if ecologist were allowed to regroup they would be able to gather enough
support
and get some representation.
Although this comes from
-based electoral system could not provide.
Please do not forget that even if you a representative is not anymore
elected by a region, he/she still comes from somewhere and thus
have an intimate knowledge of that region.
Stephane Rouillon.
"Dr.Ernie Prabhakar" a écrit :
> Congratulations
Steph
Brian Olson a écrit :
> On Sep 1, 2004, at 6:18 AM, Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>
> > Towns, cities and every geographical organisation already have
> > representatives
> > at a local level:
> > mayors and city councils.
>
> Different scope of issues ...
&g
Hello friends,
I conducted a little secret poll with an organization in Quebec.
We wanted to establish our priorities subjet order.
Nine persons filled preferential ballots, I would like
to know a site where I can solve this.
I am searching for the best internet available program that
would mini
Jan Kok a écrit :
> Bryan,
>
> I applaud you for thinking about, writing about, and promoting a mechanism
> that encourages grass-roots activism. However, I see a couple of problems
> with the indrep idea in its present form:
>
> 1. Why do you recommend allowing each voter to vote for only one c
I so agree with you Bryan that I developped a mathematical criteria
to mesure what follows for different electoral system. I call that
individual approbation rate (residual individual approbation rate in the case
of transferable voting methods). To simplify it measures the proportionality
of an el
nstead receives quantifiable democratic "credentials" from the
election"
I keep saying an election should be a representation exercise, not a battle...
So
we should
obtain representatives, not winners or losers. I agree totally.
Stephane Rouillon
Bryan Ford a écrit :
> OK, here
This double physical voting system should be the norm nowadays,
whatever the electoral system chosen.
I can't see a system that would suffer of computers speed
and paper safety.
Does anyone?
Steph
Alex Small a écrit :
I heard that Nevada experimented with touch-screen
machines that include a prin
To the possible exception of how one counts truncated ballots...
If you assume all ballots are full rankings Steve is right.
However, some treatments proposed on this list for
truncated ballots could produce different winners in case of equal ranks
or partial rankings...
I promote treatment of such
I compared margin, relative margin, winning votes and relative winning votes.
If we assume votes are either in Favor, Against or Without opinion those criteria
are defined like that:
Total votes = F + A + W (a more detailed case would consider Equal votes)
margin = F - A
relative margin = F - A / (
First I am a man: Stephane is the french equivalent to Steve.
Second, I never meant that "the diagram
on the right is equivalent to the diagram on the left."
I say that your left diagram is not equivalent to Jobst's left diagram.
Stephane.
Steve Eppley wrote :
> Hi,
>
> Stephanie R a écrit :
>
Maybe I am wrong, the two diagram sets I saw are not "equivalent" in my
eye.
Can someone provide a better term than "equivalent"...
It's OK for the right ones, but not for the left ones.
(A=C) > B and (A=C) > D is "equivalent" to (A=C)
> (B=D)
A > B and C > D is not "equivalent" to A > B, A >
I agree with Rob.
All the different unusual pairwise preferences sets (disjoint, cyclic or containing
equal
preferences or any combinations) are a contribution to the election. It only
uses other votes to precise its linear ccomplete ranking equivalent.
Is that a good choice for a voter? Personnal
Dear bunch of electoral reformists,
I am now (it seems so) officially Doctor Rouillon.
And I got a job interview for tomorrow.
So I have more time to look at those EM-list messages I kept...
In some time I should get back to the "small case" study,
relative winning votes which seems a candidate f
Again,
not only multi-member districts can produce proportional results.
It can be done with single-member districts using nominative ballots if one treats
the information in a proper way to obtain a fully proportional representation
(SPPA is only one example).
In fact several multi-member method
opinion,
Stephane Rouillon.
Brian Olson a écrit :
> My justification for bicameral is that there should be one
> geographical-representation body and one ideological-representation
> body. That is, one districted and one at-large proportional
> representation.
>
> I think ther
I understand very well people want to have someone to defend their interest
and demand in the name of their community some money or favors to an upper
government for local projects. What I do not understand, is that apparent
necessity
that it has to be a representative from that same level of gove
"small case" is more a huge work...
Adam Tarr a écrit :
> Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>
> >Maybe I need more mathematical support on this but, even if I agree with
> >Mike, I evaluate the number of time I would have to bury my favourite in
> >order to get it elected
Hello,
I corrected SPPA acronym, added a definition and redirections...
Steph
===
Jargon Dictionary for the Election Methods list
__
AERLO:
Approval voting: Voters can give each candidate a score of either 1 of
0.
The candidate w
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I wrote:
>>What I'm interested in at the moment
is going beyond IRV, Condorcet and
>>Approval towards a single winner
system that gives high utility,
>>generally preferred winners.
James Armytage-Green replied:
>Sounds interesting. What do you have
in mind specifically
to be based more on the way the votes are read, than the
> results. To drive the point home, I presented a sequential way of working
> through the ballots so that both IRV and Approval eliminate candidates by
> taking two candidates, pairing them off, and eliminating one of them.
>
&
MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
> Chris said:
>
> ...
>
> Approval is based on the assumption that all the voters strategise, and in
> effect invites them to
> do so; because it doesn't even give voters who have a strict ranking and who
> want to vote sincerely
> a clear-cut instruction on how to do so.
Adam Tarr a écrit :
> Steph wrote:
> >If your ballot is exhausted it is because you decided not to provide a
> >full ranking.
> >It is your choice not a fact inherent to the electoral method.
>
> Approving of both or neither of the final two candidates in approval is a
> choice not inherent in th
is analysis. But maybe it's my
understanding which is erroneous...
Let me precise:
Adam Tarr a écrit :
> Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>
> >I read Olli's mail last time but I am sorry that I have to disagree with
> >Adam.
> >
> >Olli showed that putting some restrictions
I read Olli's mail last time but I am sorry that I have to disagree
with Adam.
Olli showed that putting some restrictions (by the mistress) allows
to obtain an equivalent to approval that
is conducted as several FPTP rounds. However, these restrictions muzzle
some voters at some rounds (read wel
Elections are a way to take a decision for several people.
when looking to categorize elections, I suggest to split the process
into three components:
choice type, decision type, ballot type.
The first element is the kind of election those people want to have.
The second element is the way those
Hello bunch,
I am just an honest citizen fed up with politicians always bribing their
electorate to get elected.
I do not know how elections go on in your countries but this pattern of
promises and investment
toward ambivalent circumscriptions (districts) is the eternal result of
FPTP here in Cana
I agree with the predicted behavior to determine where to candidates
will run.
But I disagree with your last conclusion, maybe because I did not
express myself clearly. Every candidate in every "astrological" district
would come up with his/her personal matter. So the referendum are not
about one
Personally,
this is really great.
Steph
>
> De: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: 2004/05/22 sam. PM 06:43:21 GMT-04:00
> À: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Objet: [EM] Grand EM poll
>
> Latest web toy: a poll on Election Methods, Ballot Styles, Voting
> Technology and Representation Systems.
This amazes me.
You are not the first to tell me Borda and Condorcet are "equivalent".
It could be the case in term of determining the winner when there is a
Condorcet winner.
However, Borda is not cloneproof and I always believed Condorcet methods were.
So, does a susceptibility to cloning affect
Among the several ideas I proposed in SPPA,
one consists in using the plurality result to determine the mandate length.
Above 50% the elected person receives a full mandate.
But do you think a president winning with 25% of the votes could be limited
to a two-years mandate instead of four years?
S
Quotas are an artifice that sacrifices some part of representation to increase
the probability
of electing a majoritarian government. Some people argue that coalitions are
stable enough.
I founded that some bipartite coalition are always stable. So if you prefer an
approach that
accepts to sacrifi
Sorry, but I won't have time to do all I wanted.
There are 9 ballots sent between 19/02/2004 (Forest) to 01/03/2004
(James G-A).
You can find them in the electorama archive...
I will attach the job I begun to do with the 5 first ballots in a excel
file, but maybe starting all over would be better.
I heard about a meeting held to discuss different options to reform
the Netherlands electoral system. They would be searching for
a model that gives a better individual link between voters and
elected persons, but not necessarily geographic representation.
This meeting is supposed to be held in Sa
Nice, and I suppose you could generalize it
to cycles using the Condorcet ranking to get your normalizing scheme.
For example:
A>B: 30/20
B>C: 35/15
C>A: 32/28
Using ranked pair (margin): A>B>C
Thus: A(30), B(20), C(8,1...)
Using ranked pair (winning votes): B>C>A
Thus: B(35), C(15), A(1,8...)
The
If you ask voters to add an approval cut-off, you could use residual approval
weights
to obtain a bijection mapping between voters and candidates, thus your 100%
distribution.
The idea is the following:
1) Solve your Condorcet method to obtain a ranking;
2) Process like with IRV but eliminate the l
Forest,
how can a chamber manage the continuous adding or departure of
representatives that generate a proxy method. Would there be a threshold
or a representative of 15 persons
would still have the opporunity to stay in the chamber.
Do you limit the number of candidates? How do you install a remu
Ken Taylor a écrit :
> And finally, as IRV is immune to this particular strategy (a claim made both
> by you and by the author of the article I was responding to), using IRV as a
> completion method would also be immune to this particular strategy. And so,
> my argument against the contention that
I just wanted to point out that I support
James (Armitage) analysis that any cycle breaking method applied to a
Condorcet method makes it subject to the unsincere ranking strategy
called
burying (not "digging" as I previously said) independently of the
criteria used
(winning votes, margins or relat
The answer is no.
Clearly if a and b are eliminated,
the ballot of your voter had no impact on it
(a>b) or (a>b>c>d).
So those last preferences kick in only once a and b are eliminated co you are better
with the full preferences to
avoid at least d over c.
However their is an incentive for unsinc
James Gilmour a écrit :
> Stephane, sorry if I sounded a little harsh in my one-word response. My problem is
> that, as an
> active campaigner for practical reform, I encounter comments about the complications
> and "problems"
> of STV-PR counting almost every week from those who are opposed
le by hand in a reasonnable time, with enough persons knowing
what they do.
Sorry, Stephane.
At least I learned what "rubbish" means...
James Gilmour a écrit :
> Stephane Rouillon a écrit :
>
> > STV is hard to resolve without a computer.
>
> Sorry, Stephane, but I ju
James Gilmour a écrit :
> > >James Gilmour had written:
> > >As you are also a citizen of Ireland, I am surprised you did not
> > >recognise the potential benefits of changing the Knesset voting system
> > >to STV-PR, as used in Ireland. The only two changes from Dáil
> > >Éireann I would suggest
James Gilmour a écrit :
> > >James Gilmour had written:
> > >As you are also a citizen of Ireland, I am surprised you did not
> > >recognise the potential benefits of changing the Knesset voting system
> > >to STV-PR, as used in Ireland. The only two changes from Dáil
> > >Éireann I would suggest
Two provinces of Canada are moving a step closer toward proportional representation.
Quebec and British-Columbia are both making available on internet public proposals to
reform their electoral system and sometimes further their democratic institutions. In
addition Ontario, New-Brunswick, PEI
Ballot:
If you want to have an Approval cutoff, below what rank position do you
want it? [8]
If you want to have an automatic equal ranking line, below what rank
position do you want it? [8]
CandidatesRanks Approval CR
Georges Bush[41]
I will produce IRV result while making the variation...
Steph
> As for the methods being used, I noticed that plain ole IRV wasn't on
> Mike's list. I suppose that's not too important, though, since the raw
> data will be publicly available, and anyone who wants to can run an IRV
> tally. S
I nominate those three methods just to show how different they work on:
Ranked Pair (relative margins),
Ranked Pair (winning votes) with an extended graph,
IRV with residual approval weights.
The last method picks the same winner as IRV but can have different
results for
other places...
Have fun
James Green-Armytage a écrit :
> "MIKE OSSIPOFF" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> >No need to pick a method first, because we don't need one winner. Nothing
> >wrong with getting different winners by using different methods. In fact,
> >that's better, because it tests more methods and compares their
I stopped reading several of the last e-mails on the EM list,
especially some of Markus and Mike...
But I am glad I read this one.
I conducted a contest for the best electoral single-winner and
multiple-winner
systems many months ago on a parallel list, the
electoral_systems_designers list.
Summ
power
> > away from the parties to the voters.
Open list is rather good too. James, please can you justify?
> I'll look into STV-PR, then. Stephane Rouillon has also suggested to me
> that I examine SPPA, which I believe may be a variant of (or at least
> similar to) STV-PR.
SPPA is available in english on the the British-Columbia citizen assembly
website
as a public submission:
http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public
Click on "get_involved" and then "view submissions", ID 0065
Stéphane Rouillon, ing.
Bill Lewis Clark a écrit :
> > Would you like to read about a P
James,
The problem is not that we seek "pure" proportionality, we seek decision makers that
can take the best
decisions with the limited ressources they have.
If they invest in a useless hospital to gain votes, the money to build a more useful
bridge elsewhere
won't be available. The only tip we
James,
The problem is not that we seek "pure" proportionality, we seek decision makers that
can take the best
decisions with the limited ressources they have.
If they invest in a useless hospital to gain votes, the money to build a more useful
bridge elsewhere
won't be available. The only tip we
Sincerely,
I believe any geographic linkage is source of clientelism (favourism)
between elected officials and their electorate.
I keep thinking that one of the chamber should use non-geographical districts.
For an example using 40 seats you could use the day and month of birth.
Seat number
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote :
(David Gamble I think) continued:
Thus in a four-way race, for a block of voters with identical preference
orders, I would assume that 1/3 approve of three candidates, 1/3 approve
two candidates, and the final 1/3 bullet vote. I believe this would
give
results identical to
Anyone with his latest email adress?
Host condorcet.org is not responding.
The following recipients did not receive this message:
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
-
Thanks,
Steph
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Finally, someone with a serious subject.
I have no idea of what is an exact definition of the Later-no-harm criteria.
So please tell me, so I can help you in your search.
You have owned it.
Steph
Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> Does anyone have any idea if for the following ballots:
>
> 11 C>A
> 7 A
Dear Ernest,
> Yes, Stef, time to finish that thesis,
> all this math really is the same.
>From an algorithmic point of view, yes.
But from a behaviour and result point of view,
"min" and "+" produce very different things...
And yes Markus and Mike promote both "min" and
"winning votes". They j
Markus Schulze a écrit :
> Dear David,
>
> you wrote (18 Dec 2003):
> > I know a few 'shortest path' algorithm like "Dijkstra" and
> > "Bellman-Ford". Dijkstra is having an 0(n*Log(n)) complexity (in time)
> > and for the other... I don't remember but it is a more distributed
> > algorithm.
If I
The last message I sent you about three month ago if I remember well
when you pop out back of retirement summarized all this.
I agree about winning-votes property for any strong Condorcet winner.
I just added that treated with an extended graph {G,Z} where Z represents
a virtual candidate for the
was... [EM] Electronic Voting Bill of Rights?
Anyone considering seriously to remove geographical definitions for
district should read:
http://www.fairvotecanada.org/phpBB/viewtopic.php?topic=8&forum=1&4
First post is in french, fourth is in english.
In summary, this model (SPPA) proposes to re
> There should still be mechanisms to voice dissent, which can come in the form
> of write-ins (also easy using a computer interface) or what should be
> required on every ballot line, the "None of the Above" option.
"None of the Above" is "White" or "Blanc" voting.
For single-winner method
I think like Anthony.
Let's use electronic speed and validation advantages,
paper copy safety and an election board
that knows statistics well enough to spot fraud and do random validations...
Steph
Anthony Duff a écrit :
> --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > A non-encrypted voting receipt that id
. Still independents can gather support in
only one
district...
The clone labelling problem described by Bjarke stays for now.
Steph
Alex Small a écrit :
> Stephane Rouillon said:
> > Or you could either:
> >
> > - forbid new parties for a by-election;
>
> That works f
Or you could either:
- forbid new parties for a by-election;
- suppose all party would have this behaviour so the vacancies are filled in proportion
of the last vote: Rep (+3), Dem(+4), Green(0).
Result for the new chamber:
Rep (52), Dem(41), Green(7).
The first solution seems somewhat anti-demo
I disagree with recounting methods of replacement from
next persons on closed list because the point of having a
vacancy election is not only to replace gone representatives,
but it aims toward an update of the electorate opinion.
So to take that form of recall element (on a governmental basis, no
IMHO, if you want to assign a single value to
every candidate to represent their "score" at the end
of a Condorcet ranking, you have to be able to construct
a bijection between voters and final scores.
We already discussed this issue when arguing about
the power of approval votes and its fairness.
could find somewhere in electorama's archives (date 16/10/02)
more details and other versions...
Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon a écrit :
> Objet:
> [EM] J)Ranked pairs using relative margins, sequential
> dropping...
> Renvoyé-Date:
> Wed, 1
Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> Markus gives this example in his paper:
> 11 AB
> 7 B
> 12 C
>
> According to Plurality, A must not be elected. Monotonicity may not be sufficient
> here, because of the role B may play in deciding the winner.
Another example where, even with no Condorcet winner, no tr
It seems my server got stuck...
Stephane Rouillon
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear John,
approval and ranked pair are not as described proportional methods,
but you are right they could be used as inner motor to produce proportional methods.
However, you have to be careful about how you do this.
The key into converting a single-winner method into a motor for
a proportiona
Mr. Hodges,
I understood you were proposing to use some single-winner method
applied to all candidates (across political parties) of a riding to
produce
a proportional method. This is something I advocate for a long time.
Markus showed me I was wrong, and you were only proposing to
rank candidates
Markus Schulze wrote :
> Dear Stephane,
>
> John proposes that open party lists should be used and that the voters
> should have the possibility to approve (resp. to rank) the candidates
> and that the candidates with the greatest number of approvals (resp.
> the candidates at the top of the ranki
You seem to assume that the approval or ranked pair vote
is taken among all candidates of the same party.
Reading back Mr. Hodges mail, you seem to be right!!
So you prefer case #3) and he was referring to case #2.
Understood. All I meant is STV is not the only way of
establishing a ranking acros
Markus,
you are not understanding what Mr. Hodges proposes.
1)A closed list is a list where the order of candidates for a party is
an order imposed by the party leader. Also called nominations.
...
3)An open list is a list where the order is determined from
the popular election results.
Betwee
Dear John,
approval and ranked pair are not as described proportional methods,
but you are right they could be used as inner motor to produce
proportional methods.
However, you have to be careful about how you do this.
The key into converting a single-winner method into a motor for
a proportion
Dear John,
approval and ranked pair are not as described proportional methods,
but you are right they could be used as inner motor to produce
proportional methods.
However, you have to be careful about how you do this.
The key into converting a single-winner method into a motor for
a proportional
Eric Gorr a écrit :
Care to provide the details? I would be interested.
...
>However, I have designed a RP(winning votes) method on an extended
>graph that I think can protect even a weak Condorcet Winner. This
>method like any Condorcet Ranking
>can be generalized to produce weights as an output
Ms. Galletly,
I find all of thiose criteria a bit extreme but I understand a rigorous
classification is needed. However I can tell you about the method I
prefer:
Tideman's Ranked Pairs.
5). ... I've read that Tideman's Ranked Pairs fails SDSC and
WDSC, but the other two completion methods meet
In the past, several people sent me some examples where
a week condorcet winner could get his victory stolen
by some strategical truncation behavior...
I was able to generate a family of problems to do so
even with Ranked Pair (winning votes) at the time:
11+2X votes:
--
2+X : A
2 : A
Anyone can tell me what is the fraction
of Irish deputies that are women ?
Stéphane
Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Dear Olli and Diego,
to measure discrepancies and correlations between two sets of measures,
mathematicians use norms. I will not give you the general form of norms
(I even though there are more complex than the ones I know), however
among these, three norms are usually used. The norm-1 (L1 also c
[EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
In a message dated
8/19/03 4:06:08 PM Central Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
writes:
This
can happen with plurality too in a three runners election...
Expected:
A: 34
B: 33
C: 32
D: 1
Reality:
A: 33
B: 30
C: 34
D: 1
Supposes I am a C>B>A fan.
If with a friend,
Markus Schulze a écrit :
> A voter who uses "compromising" is still voting "sincerely -- not
> strategically." This voter is "just making a rational decision
> based on the deficiency of the voting system." "Plurality is therefore
> beyond manipulation."
>
> Markus Schulze
>
> Election-metho
Dave Ketchum a écrit :
>
> In Ranked Balloting:
>I read above of "burying" - ranking a competitor at the bottom
> of the pack, BUT:
> If the competitor is that undesirable, this is normal voting.
> If this causes a less desirable competitor to win
I understand but why burial strategy would be more damageable that
any defensive strategy ?
because it can lead to your disastrous C elected result ?
When you do such a behavioral study, you need to take in account human
behavior. Information about vote distribution is biased. Some persons do not
e
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