On Oct 20, 1:51 am, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Hey Craig,
>
> Sorry for not answering sooner. I am very busy at the moment and
> realistically I cannot participate to the degree I'd like to. So this
> may be my last reply... I will try to keep it short.
No problem, I understand.
> > Emergent propert
On Oct 20, 1:51 am, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Hey Craig,
>
> Sorry for not answering sooner. I am very busy at the moment and
> realistically I cannot participate to the degree I'd like to. So this
> may be my last reply... I will try to keep it short.
No problem, I understand.
> > Emergent propert
Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>> >> The thought
>> >> experiment doesn't mean much in that case, it is simply neurons
>> >> determining
>> >> the behaviour of two brains. I don't see that it matters what the
>> outcome
>> >> of
>> >> the experiment is.
>>
>> > But the neurons are also having their beh
Hi,
Here is the abstract of Bostrom's "Infinitarian Challenge to
Aggregative Ethics"
Aggregative consequentialism and several other popular moral theories
are threatened with paralysis: when coupled with some plausible
assumptions, they seem to imply that it is always ethically
indifferent what y
On 10/20/2011 11:23 AM, nihil0 wrote:
Hi,
Here is the abstract of Bostrom's "Infinitarian Challenge to
Aggregative Ethics"
Aggregative consequentialism and several other popular moral theories
are threatened with paralysis: when coupled with some plausible
assumptions, they seem to imply that i
What about the idea that the choices you make are likely to reflect those of
an infinite number of "similar" individuals? It's sort of like the issue of
voting or trying to minimize your energy usage to help the environment, even
if your individual choice makes very little difference, if everyone d
On Oct 20, 11:06 am, benjayk wrote:
> Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> >> The thought
> >> >> experiment doesn't mean much in that case, it is simply neurons
> >> >> determining
> >> >> the behaviour of two brains. I don't see that it matters what the
> >> outcome
> >> >> of
> >> >> the experiment i
On 10/18/2011 11:30 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Oct 17, 2011 at 07:03:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This, ISTM, is a completely different, and more wonderful beast, than
the UD described in your Brussells thesis, or Schmidhuber's '97
paper. This latter beast must truly give rise to a
Thanks for your response. Bostrom considers just the idea you mention
in section 4.6 called "Class Action." He uses the term "YOU" to
represent all your qualitatively identical duplicates throughout the
(Level 1) multiverse. According to the class action selection rule,
"Even though your actions ma
Thanks for your response. Bostrom considers the idea you mention
in section 4.6 called "Class Action." He uses the term "YOU" to
represent all your qualitatively identical duplicates throughout the
(Level 1) multiverse. According to the class action selection rule,
"Even though your actions may hav
On 10/20/2011 6:37 PM, nihil0 wrote:
However, this class action argument assumes that the value-density
approach is an acceptable way to measure the value in a world. There
are a few problems with the value-density approach. First of all, it
seems to give up aggregationism (total consequentialism
Dear Stephen,
as long as we are not omniscient (good condition for impossibillity) there
is no TRUTH. As Bruno formulates his reply:
there is something like "mathematical truth" - but did you ask for such
specififc definition?
Now - about mathematical truth? new funamental inventions in math (even
I think most consequentialists, especially utilitarians, consider all
sentient beings to have moral status. Utilitarians say an action is
morally better to the extent that it produces more well-being in the
world.
Anyway I would prefer to focus on whether act consequentialism implies
that all acti
On 10/20/2011 7:20 PM, nihil0 wrote:
I think most consequentialists, especially utilitarians, consider all
sentient beings to have moral status.
But *equal* moral status? I cannot believe anyone has ever even attempted to live by such
an ethic.
Utilitarians say an action is
morally better
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 08:00:55PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind
> >that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat
> >into solipsism. I think it very much an open problem what that is.
> Hi Russell,
>
>
On 10/21/2011 1:05 AM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Thu, Oct 20, 2011 at 08:00:55PM -0400, Stephen P. King wrote:
There has to be some form of identity thesis between brain and mind
that prevents the Occam catastrophe, and also prevent the full retreat
into solipsism. I think it very much an open
16 matches
Mail list logo