On 28 Sep 2013, at 16:58, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Everett mention what you call feeling of identity, which is a
consequence of modeling the observer by a machine
It doesn't matter if modeling the observer by a machine is
On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/28/2013 12:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
...
Prohibition is only a technic to sell a lot of drugs, without
quality control, nor price control, + the ability to directly
target all kids on all streets, making huge black markets, and
leading to
On 28 Sep 2013, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/28/2013 12:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 27 Sep 2013, at 19:55, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Sep 25, 2013 Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
wrote:
I do remember a conversation you had with Bruno about 5 years
ago when you were
On 28 Sep 2013, at 21:53, LizR wrote:
On 28 September 2013 21:15, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 28 Sep 2013, at 09:44, LizR wrote:
So not an ongoing computation performed by the universe,
What does that mean?
Actually I think I got confused, it isn't Max T who suggested that,
I knew yesterday that the reason why Percival Lowel (and many others) saw
canals -and life- in Mars is because at this time the Panama Canal was
being constructed, and this novelty captivated the imagination of the
people. everithing had a solution with a canal. And everything could be
solved
Hi Bruno, and thanks for the reply.
Precisely: the expectation evaluation is asked to the person in Helsinki,
before the duplication is done, and it concerns where the person asked will
feel to be, from his first person point of view.
---
Hi Alberto
Were there ever genuinely naked questions? ie. Was there really a time when
ideas were not framed by the exciting possibilities offered by the contemporary
technology?
All the best
--- Original Message ---
From: Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com
Sent: 29 September 2013 7:59 PM
Yes. That naive uthopianism is quite recent in history. And it is local to
the western world, because it is a deformation of the chirstian concept of
salvation.
2013/9/29 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com
Hi Alberto
Were there ever genuinely naked questions? ie. Was there really a time
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/28/2013 7:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
For me, my stopping point is step 8. I do mean to summarise the
intense
On the other hand, is there is a great plan, if this is all a great program,
with biological recursion, imitating cosmological performance, then does this
work well for you? Or, better stated, what benefit does being aware of this
observation, benefit yourself, or the rest of humanity? I may
On 29 Sep 2013, at 04:20, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
For me, my stopping point is step 8. I do mean to summarise the
intense discussion we had earlier this year on
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
And cause is a complex high level notion.
A cause is complex and at a high level only if the effect is complex and at
a high level. If Z is at the fundamental level (assuming there really is
such a level and causes and effects aren't
On Sat, Sep 28, 2013 at 2:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
Does comp mean every event must have a cause? That question has a
simple yes or no answer, and you made up the word so you must know the
answer, what is it? If it's yes then I don't believe in this thing you call
comp.
On 9/29/2013 12:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As he knows in advance that he will feel, whoever he is, live only one (again, from The
1-pov).
But that sentence is hard to parse. Whoever he is implies there is only one he, as if
he is a soul that goes to either Moscow or Washington but not
On 9/29/2013 4:05 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Yes. That naive uthopianism is quite recent in history. And it is local to the western
world, because it is a deformation of the chirstian concept of salvation.
The Greeks thought they had declined from a golden age - long before heard of
On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/28/2013 7:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
For me, my stopping point is
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/28/2013 7:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 12:47:28PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 23 September 2013 13:16, Russell Standish
li...@hpcoders.com.au
The danger is to think that all questions are seen through a filter of
culture and language, *therefore* we don't get any closer to the truth.
This is the mistake that makes postmodernism (as a philosophy) useless, and
is of course what science is designed to avoid, as much as is humanly
possible,
2013/9/29 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
On 9/29/2013 4:05 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Yes. That naive uthopianism is quite recent in history. And it is local to
the western world, because it is a deformation of the chirstian concept of
salvation.
The Greeks thought they had declined
But it really all comes down to the confluence of these various factors
that allows us to have this conversation in the first place,
Numbers can't have a confluence though. It's not sensation that is primary,
but sense. Sensation is a kind of sense and computation is a kind of
sensemaking, but
On 30 September 2013 12:15, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote:
Although this is lateral to what I wanted to say,... the decline
standpoint is just the opposite of the the heaven is coming of the
uthopians. The latter is genuinelly western and postchristian (I would say
puritan)
On 30 September 2013 12:48, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
Sensation is a kind of sense and computation is a kind of sensemaking, but
computation by itself can have no sensation.
So on this view the brain can't be an organic computer because it
experiences sensations?
--
You
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity.
It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or
duplication, as this only would only made the will more slave, to
randomness, instead of of pondering
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction
between the will and the random source.
I don't see this. The random source here
On 9/29/2013 2:03 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net:
On 9/29/2013 6:26 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
...
Also, you can run the copy inside a virtual environment and then the copies will never
diverge.
?? I don't think so. Insofar as they are classical objects
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 02:03:15PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction
between the will and the
On 30 September 2013 14:26, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
I'm complete missing your point here??? The self-other distinction is a
1p thing, not part of physics at all. There are no persons in
physics. Even when talking about the self-other distinction in (say)
bacteria, it is
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption
from the one that computationalists take for granted. It's evident that if
we make a flight simulator, we
Fascinating post. The illusion of qualia is perhaps something like the
illusion of consciousness - who is being fooled? (Who is the Master who
makes the grass green?)
My 2c on the Turing Test is that ELIZA passed it, so if you're being
pernickety that was solved in the 60s (I think it was) - but
On 9/29/2013 5:58 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Sep 29, 2013 at 07:33:08PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I agree that free-will is related to a lack of predictibity.
It is not related to any indeterminacy due to superposition or
duplication, as this only would only made the will more
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no self-other distinction
between
On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to randomness, is that the
will is random in its essence. There is no
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 04:39:28PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote:
The reason it doesn't make the will a slave to
On 9/29/2013 8:39 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 16:18, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/29/2013 6:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 13:58, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
The
On 30 September 2013 16:59, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
Throwing dice inside my head is part of me, part of the entity
making the decision, using a dice thrown externally to me is just
abrogating my free will to an external agent.
Sorry I still don't see the diference, if
On 30 September 2013 16:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
I think it's just definitional. What constitutes you. If you see
someone else throw dice and you're bound to follow different actions
depending on how they fall then you're a slave to randomness. If you
decide to throw the
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 02:30:59PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 30 September 2013 14:26, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
I'm complete missing your point here??? The self-other distinction is a
1p thing, not part of physics at all. There are no persons in
physics. Even when
On 30 September 2013 11:36, Pierz pier...@gmail.com wrote:
If I might just butt in (said the barman)...
It seems to me that Craig's insistence that nothing is Turing emulable,
only the measurements are expresses a different ontological assumption from
the one that computationalists take for
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