Hi Liz
The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each outcome, even though he
knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and that in reality he will
see both But there seems to be a lot of trouble with the comp version
for some reason.
Bruno has a meeting in washington
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, September 30, 2013 6:12:45 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Fri, Sep 27, 2013 at 7:49 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com
wrote:
On Friday, September 27, 2013 8:00:11 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
Hi Liz,
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 1 October 2013 08:44, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
On 9/30/2013 5:05 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
Even under functionalist assumptions, I still find the Turing test to
be misguided because it require the machine
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in the fact that all machines have that problem. More
exactly: all persons
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:00, Pierz wrote:
Yes indeed, and it is compelling. Fading qualia and all that. It's
the absurdity of philosophical zombies. Those arguments did have an
influence on my thinking. On the other hand the idea that we *can*
replicate all the brain's outputs remains an
On 30 Sep 2013, at 15:56, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
Not exactly. And that depends on what we call as science. Many
called sciences are pure rubbish, while some other disciplines
outside of what is now called science are much more interesting. I´,
in favor of good science and good
On 30 Sep 2013, at 16:50, John Clark wrote:
On 9/28/2013 12:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I have few doubt that 9/11 is an inside job, and the evidences
are rather big that this is the case,
How the hell did this thread turn into a showcase for looney
conspiracy theories? The level of
On 30 Sep 2013, at 22:25, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/30/2013 7:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 29 Sep 2013, at 20:15, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/29/2013 12:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
As he knows in advance that he will feel, whoever he is, live
only one (again, from The 1-pov).
But that sentence
On 30 Sep 2013, at 22:40, John Clark wrote:
Personal identity has nothing to do with prediction, and there is a
100% probability the the Washington man and the Moscow man remember
being the Helsinki man, and that is all you need to know to say that
the Helsinki man had more than one
Hi Bruno
You might quote mùe, but I make clear and insist, at each step of the UDA,
that the question is addressed before the duplication.
You insist but you do not make clear. Even in this reply you state: On the
contrary, it is very simple. After the duplication
The confirmation or
On 01 Oct 2013, at 01:30, Russell Standish wrote:
On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 04:22:13PM -0400, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Professor, Standish,
Speaking about Wolfram, some ten years ago, Wolfram opined that
why listen for ETI's when we can use computers to generate all we
need to know about
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could* reproduce the
brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they say. But a challenge to
Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It seems to me that Bruno has
convincingly argued that *if* comp holds, then consciousness
Sorry to hear Professor Standish's experience with Wolfram. Some people can off
the deep end, or capture and idea without analyzing it enough.
CA are local. The universe cannot be a CA if comp is correct, and the
empirical violation of Bell's inequality confirms this comp feature.
Bruno
I
Sorry, this list behaves strangely on my iPad. I can't reply to individual
posts. The post above was meant to be a reply to stathis and his remark that
it is possible to prove that it is impossible to replicate its observable
behaviour (a brain's) without also replicating its consciousness.
On 30 Sep 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
But it really all comes down to the confluence of these various
factors that allows us to have this conversation in the first place,
Numbers can't have a confluence though. It's not sensation that is
primary, but sense. Sensation is a kind
On 01 Oct 2013, at 08:30, chris peck wrote:
Hi Liz
The scientist naturally assigns a 50% chance to each outcome,
even though he knows that he's duplicated by worlds splitting, and
that in reality he will see both But there seems to be a lot
of trouble with the comp version for
On 01 Oct 2013, at 14:47, chris peck wrote:
Hi Bruno
You might quote mùe, but I make clear and insist, at each step of
the UDA, that the question is addressed before the duplication.
You insist but you do not make clear. Even in this reply you state:
On the contrary, it is very simple.
On 1 October 2013 13:47, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
You certainly failed to provide a flaw, in case you think there is one.
may be you can elaborate.
I've provided the same flaw other people have and I have elaborated at
length. There is no point in elaborating much further
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Sorry to hear Professor Standish's experience with Wolfram. Some
people can off the deep end, or capture and idea without analyzing
it enough.
CA are local. The universe cannot be a CA if comp is correct, and
the
empirical violation
A Platonic, singularity theory of mind.
Current philosophies of mind debate whether mind and body are a dualism
(mind and body) or a monism (mindbody). But these do not address the
nature of mind itself. As the pragmatics of language demonstrate,
Mind (first person singular) must be a
On 01 Oct 2013, at 15:31, Pierz wrote:
Maybe. It would be a lot more profound if we definitely *could*
reproduce the brain's behaviour. The devil is in the detail as they
say. But a challenge to Chalmer's position has occurred to me. It
seems to me that Bruno has convincingly argued that
A Platonic, singularity theory of space
Plato envisioned the One, a singularity from which the pluralistic world
emerged(s).
Big Bang theories of Creation point back to such a singularity
from which space emerged, and black hole or white hole theories
also point to singularities possibly
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Every one know that if we assume that if the Helsinki man can survive
digital teleportation, in each of those futures he will feel to be unique,
and living in only one city,
Digital teleportation is not necessary, with existing
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in
On 01 Oct 2013, at 16:36, Roger Clough wrote:
A Platonic, singularity theory of mind.
Current philosophies of mind debate whether mind and body are a
dualism
(mind and body) or a monism (mindbody).
There are three kinds of monism:
- matter only (and mind is a sort of illusion)
- mind
According to Max Tegmark, a Swedish-American MIT cosmologist, “only
Godel-complete (fully decidable) mathematical
structures have physical existence” http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646v2.pdf
Here is his abstract:
I explore physics implications of the External Reality Hypothesis (ERH)
that there
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 8:42 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also many
different futures,
Yes.
but as Everett explained, the indeterminacy remains, it just become
first person
Forget Everett, forget Quantum Mechanics,
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:07, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Every one know that if we assume that if the Helsinki man can
survive digital teleportation, in each of those futures he will feel
to be unique, and living in only one city,
Digital
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 1:13 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I had a similar thought about a chameleon brain (I call a p-Zelig instead
of a p-zombie), which would impersonate behaviors of whatever environment
it was placed into. Unlike a philosophical zombie, which would have no
personal qualia but seem like it does from the outside, the chameleon brain
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Digital teleportation is not necessary, with existing technology I can
make a real experiment, not just a thought experiment, that incorporates
all the philosophical implications, such as they are, as your hi-tech
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:43, Richard Ruquist wrote:
According to Max Tegmark, a Swedish-American MIT cosmologist,
“only Godel-complete (fully decidable) mathematical
structures have physical existence” http://arxiv.org/pdf/0704.0646v2.p
df
Here is his abstract:
I explore physics implications
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 7:13:17 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 14:05, Telmo Menezes wrote to Craig:
The comp assumption that computations have
qualia hidden inside them is not much of an answer either in my view.
I have the same problem.
The solution is in
On 01 Oct 2013, at 17:48, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 8:42 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be
wrote:
Your reasoning would show that in Everett QM, where we have also
many different futures,
Yes.
but as Everett explained, the indeterminacy remains, it just
become
On 10/1/2013 4:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that the expression computation have qualia can be misleading. A computation
has no qualia, strictly speaking. Only a person supported by an infinity of computation
can be said to have qualia, or to live qualia.
Why an infinity of
On 01 Oct 2013, at 18:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Bruno's UDA eventually removes the requirement for a copy being
primitively real. That's one of the things that impressed me about the
argument. I think your position requires that you find a way to refute
the UDA.
I think that it does so by
On 10/1/2013 5:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
CA are local. The universe cannot be a CA if comp is correct, and the empirical
violation of Bell's inequality confirms this comp feature.
?? But CA are Turing universal, which means they can compute any computable universe. I
think there is an an
On 10/1/2013 7:13 AM, David Nyman wrote:
However, on reflection, this is not what one should deduce from the
logic as set out. The logical structure of each subjective moment is
defined as encoding its relative past and anticipated future states
(an assumption that seems consistent with our
On Tuesday, October 1, 2013 9:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 30 Sep 2013, at 01:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
But it really all comes down to the confluence of these various factors
that allows us to have this conversation in the first place,
Numbers can't have a confluence though.
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:59 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Forget Everett, forget Quantum Mechanics, even in pure Newtonian physics
subjective indeterminacy exists because of lack of information. If you knew
the exact speed things were moving at and the coefficient of friction and
On 2 October 2013 04:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Richard Ruquist: This is not Bruno's comp because of the assumption of
ERH. My paper http://vixra.org/pdf/1303.0194v1.pdf, based on Tegmark's
Hypotheses, conjectures that only a holographic Metaverse containing many
holographic
On 1 October 2013 18:34, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote:
But then it seems one needs the physical, or at least the subconscious. If
one conceives a subjective moment as just what one is conscious of in a
moment it doesn't encode very much of the past. And in the digital
simulation
On 1 October 2013 22:47, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
A child recently saw by himself that even God cannot predict to you (in
Helsinki) the outcome felt after such duplication.
I can imagine a child being fooled by the idea. Obviously I would disagree
with this child.
I tend
I have never seen a Beckenstein bound derived for a MWI universe.
Perhaps one on this list has.
Richard
On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 5:11 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote:
On 2 October 2013 04:43, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote:
Richard Ruquist: This is not Bruno's comp because of the
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 02:54:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Oct 2013, at 01:30, Russell Standish wrote:
The real universe is likely to be 11 dimensional, nonlocal with around
10^{122} states, or 2^{10^{122}} possible universes, if indeed it is a
CA at all. Needles in haystacks is
Hi David
Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and a pleasure
to read.
Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.
I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an 'infinite
plenitude of numbers' or my favorite, an infinite pattern of
On 2 October 2013 14:56, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
There is no particular requirement for CAs to be local, although local
CAs are by far easier to study than nonlocal ones, so in practice they
usually are (cue obligatory lamp post analogy).
Thanks, I was looking for that
On 2 October 2013 14:51, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote:
I also don't think he should ride on the back of Everett. It seems that
there is an argument now that Brunos' conclusions are similar to Everett's,
therefore lets be forgiving about his informal proof. Lets not.
Sorry, I
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 01:51:01AM +, chris peck wrote:
Hi David
Thanks for the response. It was by far the best response Ive had and a
pleasure to read.
Lets distinguish between conclusions and arguments.
I can entertain many bizarre conclusions. I often wonder about an
On Wed, Oct 02, 2013 at 03:18:34PM +1300, LizR wrote:
On 2 October 2013 14:56, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote:
There is no particular requirement for CAs to be local, although local
CAs are by far easier to study than nonlocal ones, so in practice they
usually are (cue
On 10/1/2013 9:56 PM, Pierz wrote:
Yes, I understand that to be Chalmer's main point. Although, if the qualia can be
different, it does present issues - how much and in what way can it vary?
Yes, that's a question that interests me because I want to be able to build intelligent
machines and
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