. But I guess I misunderstood.
Charles
> -Original Message-
> From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2001 4:33 a.m.
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject: RE: Conventional QTI = False
>
>
> Charles Goodwin wrote:
>
> >I think the only constrai
Charles wrote:
>(BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who
>"finds himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll
>live to be 80 is 1/80?)
This argument (against Leslie Bayesian Doomsday argument) has been
developped by Jean Paul Delahaye in the journal "Pour l
Charles Goodwin wrote:
>I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically
>possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave
>equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the
>constraining factor.
Why?
You postulate physicalism. Show me y
> -Original Message-
> From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the
> evolution of "superclusters" of galaxies. The theory predicts that the
> universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The
> s
I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the
evolution of "superclusters" of galaxies. The theory predicts that the
universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The
snippet I mentioned seems to be referring to our measured velocity of
ca 600km/s in the dire
> >
> > Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> > > Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole
> > > right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years
> > before we hit
> > > the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of
> > issue ago).
>
George wrote:
> >
> > To
Russell Standish wrote:
> Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole
> right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit
> the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago).
To avoid any scheduling conflict, I'll make sure to enter
The lines are too large for my screen to handle but I have fixed that by
setting my Netscape to wrap automatically (it does so at around 70
characters). The output is irregular but it's OK.
Charles Goodwin wrote:
>
> Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest
> -Original Message-
> From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> Except that it is possible to perform an infinite amount of
> computation in the big crunch due to Tipler's argument, and only a
> finite amount of computation with the open universe (Dyson's
> argument). Sort of
inking that, applying the SSA to a person who "finds
>himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll
> live to be 80 is 1/80?)
>
> Charles
>
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Wednesday,
o "finds
himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll
live to be 80 is 1/80?)
Charles
> -Original Message-
> From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m.
> To: Charles Goodwin
> Cc: "Everything-List (E-
The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's
list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I
originally posted this at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May
1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument
was poste
correct (evidence: quantum interference), and that
Platonia exists (evidence (?) : the weak
anthropic principle).
Charles
> -Original Message-
> From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 10:48 a.m.
> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject:
Charles Goodwin wrote:
> George Levy wrote
> > I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the
> > conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that
> > seems logical
> > to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically
> > consistent, because logical cons
> -Original Message-
> From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> >From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with
> >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
> >completely. Not that the argu
> -Original Message-
> From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 7:48 a.m.
>
> I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the
> conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that
> seems logical
> to me is that the consciousn
Hi Saibal,
I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the
conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that seems logical
to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically
consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for
consciousness.
I can
>From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with
>Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
>completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for
>the failure are also interesting.
What the
As I said, this is a completely new interpretation of QTI, one never
stated before. QTI does _not_ assume that memory is conserved. The
prediction that one may end up being so old as to not know how old you
are is based on the assumption that you total memory capacity remains
constant - it need no
> -Original Message-
> From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next
> experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations
> were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisel
> -Original Message-
> From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is
> supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with
> probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking.
To
I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next
experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations
were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this
that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being
infinitel
QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is
supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with
probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking.
I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there
is a finite
Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This
doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to
forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense.
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> According to the c
> -Original Message-
> From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>
> In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it
> is much more
> likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not
> diagnosed with the
> disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically
>
Hal Finney wrote:
> Saibal writes:
> > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
> > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a
> > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
> > long time ago.
>
> Right, but to
Saibal writes:
> According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
> also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a
> fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a
> long time ago.
Right, but to make the same argument against
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