Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 10:00, Jason Resch wrote: On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri,

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 09:30, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:34 PM, meekerdb wrote: convoluted with periods of amnesia, Amnesia = gap in the chain. Memories are not a necessary requirement for experience and thus are not a requirement for subjective continuation and

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 08:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 11:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11

Re: For John Clark

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 1:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb

Re: For John Clark

On Sat, Oct 19, 2013 at 12:52 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch w

Re: For John Clark

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 6:09 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the >>> physical - at lea

Re: For John Clark

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:56 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> >> *On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM*, meekerdb wrote: >> >>> On 10/17/2013 6:0

Re: For John Clark

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 5:34 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even >> say in trut

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:59, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:56, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Oct 17,

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 11:06 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 07:52, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Note: I do believe w

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 9:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:56, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: *On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 9:49 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Note: I do believe we exper

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 01:09, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:56, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote: On 18 October 20

Re: For John Clark

On 19 Oct 2013, at 00:34, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 22:45, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem. Could you do me a

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 1:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 1:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: *On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM*, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM,

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 21:22, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The key result is that incompleteness makes the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (the only one I know capable of doing justice to the metaphysical antic dream argument) given a classical theory of kn

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 1:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I"

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and rai

Re: For John Clark

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:37 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > >But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the >> physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem. >> >> > Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis probl

Re: For John Clark

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:27 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > *On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM*, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch wrote: >> >>> The basis problem is no different fr

Re: For John Clark

On Fri, Oct 18, 2013 at 11:23 AM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: > > Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even > say in truth there is only one "I" > > > In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => > differ

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The key result is that incompleteness makes the Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (the only one I know capable of doing justice to the metaphysical antic dream argument) given a classical theory of knowledge (S4Grz) which X1* is an important "physic

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 19:48, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/18 meekerdb On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.o

Re: For John Clark

2013/10/18 meekerdb > On 10/18/2013 10:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2013/10/18 meekerdb > >> On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: >> >> On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I see your reference and raise you a

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 11:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 10:48 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2013/10/18 meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a ref

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 18:55, meekerdb wrote: On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From t

Re: For John Clark

2013/10/18 meekerdb > On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of >> >> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 >> > > From

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper: "What of the crucial quest

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 12:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote: But that's not compatible with Bruno's idea of eliminating the physical - at least not unless he can solve the basis problem. Could you do me a favor and explain what the basis problem is in a way that a 6th grader could understand? I've

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 12:26 AM, Jason Resch wrote: *On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM*, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote: On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: The basis problem is no different from

Re: For John Clark

On 10/18/2013 12:18 AM, Jason Resch wrote: Note: I do believe we experience all possible outcomes, and you can even say in truth there is only one "I" In your theory a person is a chain of experiences, so different chain => different person. It seems more accurate to say there is no "I". Br

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 01:23, meekerdb wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper: "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a go

Re: For John Clark

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:27 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb wrote: > >> On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of >>> >>> http://a

Re: For John Clark

*On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:03 PM*, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch wrote: > >> The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under >> special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we >> fi

Re: For John Clark

On 18 Oct 2013, at 04:17, LizR wrote: On 18 October 2013 15:04, chris peck wrote: Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for

Re: For John Clark

ity, or sending you to both > locations? * > > I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me > to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. > > Yes, but the question is if you were not told the protocol, whether the machine would send

Re: For John Clark

The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. >> Could you be more specific regarding what you consider the problems to be? Not at the moment. As i said, Im not sure what to make of any of it. regards. Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 14

Re: For John Clark

e of the axioms chosen. Best, Bruno From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: For John Clark Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 02:04:27 + Hi Jason >> Subject refers to the I, the indexical first-person. The word 'I' is indexical, like 'n

Re: For John Clark

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 8:04 PM, LizR wrote: > On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch wrote: > >> The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under >> special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we >> find ourselves in this particular "now"? >> >> I do

Re: For John Clark

On 10/17/2013 5:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb > wrote: On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312

Re: For John Clark

On 10/17/2013 7:04 PM, chris peck wrote: Interestingly, Everett was allegedly certain of his own immortality. One of the reasons he specified in his will that his ashes should be ditched alongside the trash. I can't imagine a more morbid yet expressive demonstration of subjective certainty abou

Re: For John Clark

On 10/17/2013 6:04 PM, LizR wrote: On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch > wrote: The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find ourselves in this particu

RE: For John Clark

static, worse still, 80 minutes of movie with the ending just static, I wouldn't let you do it to me. I hate missing the ending of movies and I would be certain that I would experience that exact fate. Regards. From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject:

Re: For John Clark

On 18 October 2013 15:04, chris peck wrote: > Immediately after teleportation there will be uncertainty because you are > no longer sure of your location but are sure that you have been duplicated > and sent to one place or the other. This gives room for doubt. Before > teleportation there is no

RE: For John Clark

ding you to one >> of two locations with a 50% probability, or sending you to both locations? I think we're going around in circles here. The transporter is sending me to both locations and it is axiomatic that I survive in both locations. >> Could you be more specific regarding

Re: For John Clark

On 18 October 2013 13:42, Jason Resch wrote: > The basis problem is no different from the "present" problem under special > relativity: If we exist in many times across space time, why do we find > ourselves in this particular "now"? > > I don't know about the basis problem, but the now problem i

Re: For John Clark

On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 6:23 PM, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of >> >> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 >> > > From the paper: > > "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncer

Re: For John Clark

On 10/16/2013 11:55 PM, Jason Resch wrote: I see your reference and raise you a reference back to section 4.1 of http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0312136 From the paper: "What of the crucial question: should Alice1 feel uncertain? Why, Alice1 is a good PI-reductionist Everettian, and sh

Re: For John Clark

On 17 Oct 2013, at 18:07, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2013, at 08:04, chris peck wrote: Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? The uncertainty is objective (indeed provable) but it bears on set of alternative *subjective* experiences. It is an obje

Re: For John Clark

On 17 Oct 2013, at 16:53, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. > The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic. As I've said m

Re: For John Clark

On 17 Oct 2013, at 08:04, chris peck wrote: Also, in what way could uncertainty be anything other than subjective? The uncertainty is objective (indeed provable) but it bears on set of alternative *subjective* experiences. It is an objective probability on subjective experiences, not t

Re: For John Clark

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" >> and plain old fashioned uncertainty. >> > > > The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic. > As I've said many times, being deterministic and being p

Re: For John Clark

2013/10/17 John Clark > On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > >> And I don't understand the difference between "first person >>> uncertainty" and plain old fashioned uncertainty. >>> >> >> > The difference is that from 3rd POV it is deterministic. >> > > As I've said many t

Re: For John Clark

On 16 Oct 2013, at 19:48, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that b

Re: For John Clark

s is enough to explain the appearance of uncertainty/unpredictability/randomness from the viewpoint of the subject. > > Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself > tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly > dream argument a

Re: For John Clark

00% seeing spin down ? And so, that proves your theory is wrong (MWI true or not)... no need to go further. Quentin > Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself > tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly > dream argument and fur

RE: For John Clark

Nevertheless, I am not Clark, and have already raced ahead. I find myself tracking dropped pens through UD*, wallowing in a morass of an unseemly dream argument and furrowing my brow over strange interpretations of modal logic. Im not sure what to make of any of it but Im certain Bruno is happy t

Re: For John Clark

On 17 October 2013 09:49, Jason Resch wrote: > On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark wrote: > > > And I don't understand the difference between "first person uncertainty" > and plain old fashioned uncertainty. > > The difference arises when you are the system which is behaving probablis

Re: For John Clark

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:48 PM, John Clark wrote: > On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I >> obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) >> > > Did Everett use the word "non-denumera

Re: For John Clark

On 10/16/2013 10:48 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch > wrote: > It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) Did Everett use the w

Re: For John Clark

2013/10/16 John Clark > On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > > It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I >> obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) >> > > Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have

Re: For John Clark

On Wed, Oct 16, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I > obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) > Did Everett use the word "non-denumerable" in that book? I must have missed it. What page? > So if y

Re: For John Clark

It was from the book "The Many Worlds of Hugh Everett III", a book I obtained and read in a large part based on you glowing review. :-) So if you agree that the branching wave function structure, which creates many copies of observers in different states, can lead to first person uncertainty, I do

Re: For John Clark

When I saw the title of this thread I was in a quandary over if I should open it or not. It said it was for John Clark so it must be for me, but it can't be for me because it said it was for those "who ignore the importance of first person views" and subjectivity is the most important thing in the

Re: For John Clark

tured and distinct because there is no communication between the decohered worlds. In any event, you have at least seen how the appearance of subjective randomness can appear through duplication of continuation paths, which is enough to continue to step 4 in the UDA. Jason From: marc...@ul

Re: For John Clark

practitioner. Quentin > She would know that each outcome would occur and she would know that she > would become each observer. And she would know that there was nothing else > to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective > uncertainty to arise. > >

RE: For John Clark

ould know that there was nothing else to know. That being the case it would be impossible for subjective uncertainty to arise. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: For John Clark Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 09:15:51 +0200 On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote:

Re: For John Clark

On 16 Oct 2013, at 05:10, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch wrote: "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the stro

Re: For John Clark

On Oct 15, 2013, at 11:09 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch wrote: On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch wrote: "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite o

Re: For John Clark

On 16 October 2013 16:58, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch wrote: > >> "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and >> Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and >>

Re: For John Clark

On Oct 15, 2013, at 10:10 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch wrote: "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on the subjective level...it is probabilistic in th

Re: For John Clark

On 16 October 2013 16:01, Jason Resch wrote: > "Our theory in a certain sense bridges the positions of Einstein and Bohr, > since the complete theory is quite objective and deterministic...and yet on > the subjective level...it is probabilistic in the *strong sense* that > there is no way for obs

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