Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I have come back from Bergen (it was very nice) and I have read the
> last posts and I will make some comments in order.
>
> Peter D. Jones said some time ago, after I said that I will identify
> "(digital) machines" with number; he said:
>
> "You can't".
>
> Of co
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> If you prefer I should
> have said "associate" instead of "identifying".
Hi Bruno, welcome back.
The terminological distinction you now make above is important - maybe
it's another case of Franco-English faux amis (false cognates), but
when you say 'identify' I think it s
David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > If you prefer I should
> > have said "associate" instead of "identifying".
>
> Hi Bruno, welcome back.
>
> The terminological distinction you now make above is important - maybe
> it's another case of Franco-English faux amis (false cognates), but
>
1Z wrote:
> This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
> court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
> EVERYTHING?
Touché!
> If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
And if the materialist isn't reifying the observables, he's right in
there with him. Ta
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
> > court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
> > EVERYTHING?
>
> Touché!
>
> > If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
>
> And if the materialist isn't reifying the observa
Le 18-oct.-06, à 16:41, David Nyman a écrit :
> Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive
> computations (like the UD), not theorems. In terms of comp, is there
> any necessary distinction between a UD and a parallel distributed
> 'architecture'?
I am not sure what the
> David Nyman:
>
>> Point taken. The EC 'axioms' may be better conceived as primitive
computations (like the UD), not theorems. In terms of comp, is there any
necessary distinction between a UD and a parallel distributed
'architecture'?
>
>
> I am not sure what the EC axioms are. The UD is both ma
Peter Jones writes:
> > Yes, of course. All such discourse is metaphysics, what else could it
> > be? It is a question of faith if we wish to go beyond this
> > acknowledgement and ascribe 'ultimate reality' in the direction of our
> > metaphysical gestures.
>
> When I say metaphysical, I don't
Bruno Marchal writes:
> The UD is both massively parallel
> and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> executes them all together, but one step at a time. The "D" is for
> dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially.
Given that no actual ph
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>
>>The UD is both massively parallel
>>and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
>>executes them all together, but one step at a time. The "D" is for
>>dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism se
>
> Empiricism as a philosophical movement has traditionally been opposed
> to metaphysics. It hasn't just been a mild disagreement either, but an
> at times vicious dispute (well, as vicious as philosophers get). David
> Hume suggested that the best place for books on metaphysics was
> in the fi
Colin Hales wrote:
>>Empiricism as a philosophical movement has traditionally been opposed
>>to metaphysics. It hasn't just been a mild disagreement either, but an
>>at times vicious dispute (well, as vicious as philosophers get). David
>>Hume suggested that the best place for books on metaphysics
> >
> >
> > It's one of my favourite lines from Hume! but the issue does not
> live
> > quite so clearly into the 21st century. We now have words and much
> > neuroscience pinning down subjective experience to the operation of
> small
> > groups of cells and hence, likely, single cells. It's
Le 19-oct.-06, à 13:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>
>>> This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
>>> court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
>>> EVERYTHING?
>>
>> Touché!
>>
>>> If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
>>
>
Le 19-oct.-06, à 01:14, 1Z a écrit :
> If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
>
> He might be able to reduce an existent physical universe
> to existent numbers, but he certainly can't reduce it
> to non-existstent numbers.
Obviously. But there is no existent physical universe, if co
Le 19-oct.-06, à 22:57, Colin Geoffrey Hales a écrit :
> Is the UD process
> a) UD generating all programs
> then
> b) UD executes all of them
No. The UD is one program, it cannot generate all programs and *then*
begin to run them.
That would be like condemning a thief to perpetuity and then
Le 20-oct.-06, à 06:46, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
>> The UD is both massively parallel
>> and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
>> executes them all together, but one step at a time. The "D" is for
>> dovetailing which is a technic f
Le 18-oct.-06, à 16:27, 1Z a écrit :
>
>> Bruno: In computer science, a
>> fixed universal machine plays the role of a coordinate system in
>> geometry. That's all. With Church Thesis, we don't even have to name
>> the particular universal machine, it could be a universal cellular
>> automaton (
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 19-oct.-06, à 13:58, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> >>
> >>> This *is* ecumenicism. The buck stops here. What higher
> >>> court of appeal is there , than consideration of the nature of
> >>> EVERYTHING?
> >>
> >> Touché!
> >>
> >>> If Bru
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 19-oct.-06, à 01:14, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > If Bruno isn't reifying numbers, he's in trouble.
> >
> > He might be able to reduce an existent physical universe
> > to existent numbers, but he certainly can't reduce it
> > to non-existstent numbers.
>
> Obviously. But there is
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 18-oct.-06, à 16:27, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >> Bruno: In computer science, a
> >> fixed universal machine plays the role of a coordinate system in
> >> geometry. That's all. With Church Thesis, we don't even have to name
> >> the particular universal machine, it could be a
Colin Hales wrote:
> >
> > Empiricism as a philosophical movement has traditionally been opposed
> > to metaphysics. It hasn't just been a mild disagreement either, but an
> > at times vicious dispute (well, as vicious as philosophers get). David
> > Hume suggested that the best place for books o
Colin Hales wrote:
>>>
>>>It's one of my favourite lines from Hume! but the issue does not
>>
>>live
>>
>>>quite so clearly into the 21st century. We now have words and much
>>>neuroscience pinning down subjective experience to the operation of
>>
>>small
>>
>>>groups of cells and hence, like
Brent Meeker wrote:
> So you want an explanation in terms of the "underlying physics" - the physics
> of the really > real reality. And how will you know when you've found it?
It seems to me that comp precisely asserts (and can putatively prove)
such a 'really real reality' from which observab
David Nyman wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>>So you want an explanation in terms of the "underlying physics" - the physics
>>of the really > real reality. And how will you know when you've found it?
>
>
> It seems to me that comp precisely asserts (and can putatively prove)
> such a 'reall
Brent Meeker wrote:
> But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the
> only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it
> corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general
> relativity, and every other theory. It *might* be the
Bruno Marchal writes:
> >> The UD is both massively parallel
> >> and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> >> executes them all together, but one step at a time. The "D" is for
> >> dovetailing which is a technic for emulating parallelism sequentially.
> >
> > Given t
Peter Jones writes:
> I have no problem with the idea that algorithms can be identified
> with abstract structures consisting of relations. (As opposed, for
> instance,
> to Stathis's identification of algorithms with inteprretations by
> virtual interpreters).
We don't have a problem until we
David Nyman wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the
>> only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it
>> corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general
>> relativity, and every other
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Suppose that theory X predicts there are some things we'll never figure out.
> And there are > some things we haven't figured out. That's at best extremely
> weak support for theory X.
I would agree were that the case. But surely the potential power of
comp qua Theory X
David Nyman wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> > But it's still a model, one based on arithmetic rather than matter, and the
> > only way to > judge whether it is a good model to see how it
> > corresponds with "mere appearance"; just > like we test QM, general
> > relativity, and every ot
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> > >> The UD is both massively parallel
> > >> and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> > >> executes them all together, but one step at a time. The "D" is for
> > >> dovetailing which is a technic for emulating par
Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
>
> Bruno Marchal writes:
>
The UD is both massively parallel
and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
executes them all together, but one step at a time. The "D" is for
dovetailing which is a t
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> > computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> > and highly significant.
>
> It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
> remarked, our agenda here is more ecume
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > > concerned, in an entirely 'relatio
1Z wrote:
> Computationalism doesn't imply that. a conflict between
> computationalism and physicalism would be be astonshing
> and highly significant.
It certainly would be astonishing to a 'physicalist'. But, as you have
remarked, our agenda here is more ecumenical.
> A conflict between physi
1Z wrote:
> Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
propose as the relata (i.e. when you've gone
1Z wrote:
> > 1) 'Computationalism', a theory (implicitly or explicitly) based on
> > materialism, although in a manner which (witness our recent dialogues),
> > at least so far as its putative association with consciousness is
> > concerned, in an entirely 'relational' manner which is extremely
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Maybe physics is relations all the way down.
>
> Hmm... I think this is pretty close to what Bruno is saying, using
> AR+CT+UDA as the 'placeholder' for the universe of relational
> possibility. But, to differentiate your own views, what would you
> propose as
Bruno Marchal writes:
>
> Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> >
> >
> > Bruno Marchal writes:
> >
> The UD is both massively parallel
> and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> executes them all together, but one step at a time. T
Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
> As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> prove Platonism.
By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
Do you recall the proof I have
Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
logic is sound for arithmetic. I use often the expression "
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 20-oct.-06, à 17:04, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> > prove Platonism.
>
> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Bruno Marchal writes:
> >
> > Le 21-oct.-06, à 06:02, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal writes:
> > >
> > The UD is both massively parallel
> > and massively sequential. Recall the UD generates all programs and
> > execut
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 22-oct.-06, 1Z ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
>
> > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
>
>
> You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
> Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
> logic is sound for arithm
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
>
> Computationalism entails COMP.
Bruno, could you distinguish between your remarks vis-a-vis comp, that
on the one hand: a belief in 'prima
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> > prove Platonism.
>
> By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
>
Lest we go yet another round in the '
David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > > As usual, the truth of a mathematical existence-claim does not
> > > prove Platonism.
> >
> > By Platonism, or better "arithmetical realism" I just mean the belief
> > by many mathematician in the non constructive proof of "OR" statements.
> >
>
Hi Stathis,
I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
successfully.
(Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
will wait a whole and resend them: it was message for Peter and D
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I answer you, but it is at the same time a test, because most of my
> yesterday (sunday 22 october) posts seems not having been send
> successfully.
> (Some arrived at the archive, but not in my mail box, others nowhere, I
> will wait a whole and resend them: it was message
Peter Jones writes:
> > > Bruno's versions of COMP must embed Platonism (passim)
> >
> >
> > You keep saying that, and I keep telling you that I need only
> > Arithmetical Realism, which is defined by the belief that classical
> > logic is sound for arithmetic.
>
> You need a UD -- a UD which e
In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes:
> Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
> matter add to a merely abs
Bruno Marchal writes:
> >> Church thesis just assert that a universal turing machine can compute
> >> all computable functions from N to N.
> >> It relate a mathematical object with a human cognitive notion. It does
> >> not invoke physical machine at all.
> >
> > In a sense that is true, but a
Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
>> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
>>
>> Computationalism entails COMP.
>
> Bruno, could you distinguish between your rema
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
>
> >
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
> >>
> >> Computationalism entails COMP.
> >
> > Brun
1Z wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> > >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argument by:
> > >>
> > >> Computationali
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> In an excellent and clear post Peter Jones writes:
>
> > Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
> > may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
> > dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- wh
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > Le 23-oct.-06, à 15:58, David Nyman a écrit :
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Here I disagree, or if you want make that distinction (introduced by
> > > >> Peter), you can sum up the conclusion of the UD Argu
Hi,
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
>
> I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> mathematical
> structures are exemplified, the structure corresponging to (me up till
> 1 second ago)
>
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > mathematical
> > structures are exemplified, the structure corresp
1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >
> > David and 1Z:
> >
> > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> > successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisions in the
> > linear accelerator)
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > reality, because there are no random gaps in Platonia. Since all
> > > mathematical
Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
> > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > Hi,
> > >
> > > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a mathematical
> > > > reality, because there are no random gaps in
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > >
> > > David and 1Z:
> > >
> > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> > > successively approach the accuracies needed for the collisi
Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 21:00, 1Z a écrit :
> Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 19:25, 1Z a écrit :
> > > Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> > > > Hi,
> > > >
> > > > Le Mardi 24 Octobre 2006 18:29, 1Z a écrit :
> > > > > I've never seen an HP universe. Yet they *must* exist in a
> > > >
1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > >
> > > > David and 1Z:
> > > >
> > > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> > > > successively approach the accura
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>> Tom Caylor wrote:
>>> 1Z wrote:
Tom Caylor wrote:
> David and 1Z:
>
> How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> successively approach the accu
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > 1Z wrote:
> >> Tom Caylor wrote:
> >>> 1Z wrote:
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > David and 1Z:
> >
> > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed t
Peter Jones writes:
> > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > It could be a contingent natural law th
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> Peter Jones writes:
...
>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in the
>>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
>>> future.
>
Brent Meeker writes:
> >>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> >>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> >>> the
> >>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> >>> future.
> >> That's the whole problem.
Tom Caylor wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > 1Z wrote:
> > > > Tom Caylor wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > David and 1Z:
> > > > >
> > > > > How is exploring the Mandelbrot set through computation any different
> > > > > than exploring subatomic particles through computation (needed to
> >
Brent Meeker wrote:
> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead. Given
> some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can reach are those of
> the form "It is true that axioms => theorems".
For formalists, all mathematical truths are of this form.
> Brent
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
> > > > properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
> > > > distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
> > > > It co
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > >>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > >>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> > >>> the
> > >>> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> > >>>
- Original Message -
From: "Brent Meeker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, October 24, 2006 7:21 PM
Subject: Re: Numbers, Machine and Father Ted
>
> Tom Caylor wrote:
> > Discovery is not simply a matter of seeing where a particular set of
> > a
1Z wrote:
> The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
contradict your own experience, but I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> the
> future, then ipso facto you would find yourself a trillion years in the
> futu
Brent Meeker wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >
> >
> > Brent Meeker writes:
> >
> > If you died today and just by accident a possible next
> > moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
> > the
> > future, then ipso facto you would find yourself
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > The problem is not that there would be gaps, the problem
> > is that they would all be conscious simultaneously.
>
> Peter, I know from the above and previous comments you have made that
> this notion of multiple compresent consciousness seems to you to
> cont
Tom Caylor wrote:
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> Brent Meeker writes:
>>>
>>> If you died today and just by accident a possible next
>>> moment of consciousness was generated by a computer a trillion years in
>>> the
>>> future, then ipso facto you wou
1Z wrote:
...
>> And
>> surely this is what prevents us from having the kind of 'multiple'
>> experiences you have in mind. In fact, it illustrates the fundamental
>> intension of the indexical term 'I' - other 'versions' of ourselves,
>> informationally separated temporally and/or spatially, coul
1Z wrote:
> Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> are not, it must be rejected.
I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad -
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > Why are POV's divided temporally?. If the BU theory predicts that they
> > are not, it must be rejected.
>
> I don't think this is what needs to be at issue to resolve this point.
Well, I think it is. Perhaps you could say why it is not.
> The key aspect is
1Z wrote:
>
> David Nyman wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
...
>>> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
>>> the same consciousness.
>> Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
>> consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - just not the same
>> consciousness.
>
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > David Nyman wrote:
> >> 1Z wrote:
> ...
> >>> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> >>> the same consciousness.
> >> Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
> >> consciousness of all OMs in which you are present - ju
1Z wrote:
>
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>> 1Z wrote:
>>> David Nyman wrote:
1Z wrote:
>> ...
> We *do* have simultaneous consciousness -- just not
> the same consciousness.
Which is precisely my point. Just as you *do* have simultaneous
consciousness of all OMs in which you are p
Peter Jones writes:
> > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
> > > > virtual
> > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible, for
> > > > the sake
> > > > of this part of the argument). The successive moments of your conscious
> >
Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
> > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
> > available information and *respond
1Z wrote:
> I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> How can I fail to have similar information content
> to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> spatially? Why doensnt each neuron have its own
> co
Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
> Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
>> Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
>> reach are those of the form "It is true that axioms => theorems".
>
> For formalists, all
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only experience
> being one at
> a time.
Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I wonder if
you have a view on the follow
Le 23-oct.-06, à 00:12, 1Z a écrit :
> Huh? Computationalism is no more able to account for
> qualia than physicalism.
Computationalism (the standard one) through my work (don't hesitate to
criticize it) gives a precise account of qualia.
It is even a refutable theory of both quanta and qual
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-oct.-06, à 13:57, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >> It's even more than seeing where axioms and rules of inference lead.
> >> Given some axioms and rules of inference the only truths you can
> >> reach are those of the form "It is true that axioms => the
David Nyman writes:
>
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > (b) can't be right. However many copies of you there are, you only
> > experience being one at
> > a time.
>
> Stathis, I concur with this view, and for the reasons you give.
> However, much as I hate to complicate this issue further, I
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
>
> > > > > I don't see how a physical multiverse would be distinguishable from a
> > > > > virtual
> > > > > reality or a mathematical reality (assuming the latter is possible,
> > > > > for the sake
> > > > > of this part of the argument). The
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an unnecessary
> complication.
> As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
> content. If the seconds
> of your life were sliced up, shuffled and thrown to the wind, (t1) 3:
David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
>
> > I don't see why. Are you saying they are still closed
> > even if their information content is similar? Why should that be?
> > How can I fail to have similar information content
> > to myself five minutes form now? Why doesn't it apply
> > spatially? Why doen
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes (quoting David Nyman):
>
> > > The key aspect is that the structure of each OM is inherently what
> > > might be termed a perceiver-percept dyad - that is, it must contain
> > > whatever process or structure is involved both in *representing* the
>
David Nyman wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> > As for memory being encoded in or accessible to an OM, that is an
> > unnecessary complication.
> > As you said previously, the OM's are related solely by their information
> > content. If the seconds
> > of your life were sliced up, shuffle
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