Sorry,
It took me a bit to realize that I was the OP.
This has been tremendously useful for me, because it has given me a sense of
what you all agree on and what is controversial. Author of the book, of
course, writes as if everything he says would be agreed upon by everybody in
theworld,
I agree completely!
On 07/07/2016 03:11 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
I'm claiming that a universal computer is a good way to normalize the forms and
to check that the manipulations between the forms are sound. The point is to
track what the special purpose machines are doing, not to do it. The
"It's interesting and meaningful to ask whether or not computers can do the
math humans do. I think the answer keeps coming up "yes" ... but people
smarter than me are not convinced. So, we shouldn't be stubbornly
reductionist. It hurts nobody to let them have the distinction ... at least
fo
On 07/07/2016 02:11 PM, Marcus Daniels wrote:
I don't understand why you connect special purpose devices with paper math vs.
computation. I claim the problem with paper math is that 1) the former does not carry
or enforce correctness checks, 2) it is not put in context -- things are pulled ou
"OK. But you did express that you thought the distinction (between paper math
and computation) isn't meaningful (at least not in perpetuity). Yet you admit
that (in perpetuity) we should preserve the distinction at least for the sake
of efficiency/performance. You have to admit that can seem
OK. But you did express that you thought the distinction (between paper math
and computation) isn't meaningful (at least not in perpetuity). Yet you admit
that (in perpetuity) we should preserve the distinction at least for the sake
of efficiency/performance. You have to admit that can seem
I don't think special purpose devices should be replaced by universal
computers. Universal computers are slow for some things. However, universal
computers should have as high of fidelity models of those devices as possible.
It should be possible "in the future" to understand, with the p
But what you're arguing for is essentially the idea that all special-purpose
devices (should not can) be replaced by universal computers. That's
unreasonable. It makes good engineering and scientific sense to divvy up types
of computation. The distinction in the question of whether the kind
Heh, to be as clear as possible, there were 4 questions in the OP and several
follow-up questions, summarized below. I think the additional ideas on
computation were (mostly) addressing the follow-up questions, particularly the
_exploration_ of the idea that not all inference is computational.
Nick,
Owen asks:
> has the OP (original post) been satisfied?
Has the this email thread answered your original question what an Accept
state is? And why it is called an Accept state?
Are we in an accept or reject state. Or like many threads is this
non-halting?
-S
___
``Hence, we'll end up with at least 2 types of computation, anyway, the one
called "living systems" versus the purely mechanical ... even if, in full
reduction, they are fundamentally the same kind. So, we may as well allow the
distinction now and see where it takes us. ''
When the result
Just to calibrate: has the OP been satisfied?
I *think* so, we discussed FSM's discussing their input string and their
final state and whether that was the designated accept state.
And tho a Turing Machine is more than a FSM, the vocabulary of states,
input strings and so on should answer the OP.
All computers are analog at their base. The only thing that distinguishes
so-called analog computers from typical computers is their lack of
universality. The analogies/models these analog computers implement are simply
more obvious than those of the more universal, general purpose, computers
Hm. I can't shake the feeling you're relying on some ambiguity in "meaningful
distinction". If you admit distinctions in things like domain knowledge,
correctness, verified code, tolerances, sensitivities, etc., then why not admit
there are meaningful distinctions in _types_ of computation?
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