On 26/03/2013 14:21, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
And if you get a recursive lookup for www.ebay.com from a hotel network,
I'm struggling to understand why it's necessary to hard-code dns servers
into the ip networking configuration of a portable device. By definition,
these devices will
On Mar 26, 2013, at 10:51 AM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
The problem here is, of course, one of externalities and the Common Good,
hard sales to make in a business environment.
Common Good situations are readily dealt with, but generally not on a
voluntary basis. You establish how
Well,
On 03/27/13 07:20, Nick Hilliard wrote:
On 26/03/2013 14:21, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
And if you get a recursive lookup for www.ebay.com from a hotel network,
I'm struggling to understand why it's necessary to hard-code dns servers
into the ip networking configuration of a
On 27/03/2013 12:40, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
It's necessary because many operations are screwing with DNS results in
order to advance/suppress political agendas, impose their moral code
via censorship, profit via redirection to search portals, etc. If we
could actually trust that J. Random Hotel
Getting reports from a third party vendor that there's been a line cut in the
Mediterranean that is affecting some Internet traffic. Anyone have any details?
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 10:40 PM, Mark Andrews ma...@isc.org wrote:
Surveying which connections are open to address spoofing may or may
not be a criminal activity. It all depends on intent of the person
gathering the data.
Such is the nature of law. When a dead body shows up shot, intent
Hello James,
2013/3/27 James Smith thepacketmas...@hotmail.com:
Getting reports from a third party vendor that there's been a line cut in the
Mediterranean that is affecting some Internet traffic. Anyone have any
details?
SMW4 :
On 27/03/2013 12:49, James Smith wrote:
Getting reports from a third party vendor that there's been a line cut
in the Mediterranean that is affecting some Internet traffic. Anyone
have any details?
smw4 is down, off the north coast of egypt:
Getting reports from a third party vendor that there's been a line cut in the
Mediterranean that is affecting some Internet traffic. Anyone have any
details?
See the outages list:
https://puck.nether.net/pipermail/outages/2013-March/005386.html
Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting,
Thanks for the quick responses, great information!
From: thepacketmas...@hotmail.com
To: nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Line cut in Mediterranean?
Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2013 08:49:10 -0400
Getting reports from a third party vendor that there's been a line cut in the
Mediterranean that is
Little bit of fun with http://bindguard.activezone.de/
This little example with an open resolver with only 200 queries a
minute...
The following list show the # of queries made followed by the query
in question.
False positive:
69.x.x.x
2 a1.mzstatic.com IN A +
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 9:18 PM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
From: William Herrin b...@herrin.us
Indeed. But it isn't achievable. $Random_SOHO will continue to be
hacked on a regular basis. He doesn't have someone working for him
with the skill to prevent it. Further victimizing him
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 10:07 PM, Tom Paseka t...@cloudflare.com wrote:
Authoritative DNS servers need to implement rate limiting. (a client
shouldn't query you twice for the same thing within its TTL).
Right now that's a complaint for the mainstream software authors, not
for the system
On 2013-03-27, at 09:47, William Herrin b...@herrin.us wrote:
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 10:07 PM, Tom Paseka t...@cloudflare.com wrote:
Authoritative DNS servers need to implement rate limiting. (a client
shouldn't query you twice for the same thing within its TTL).
Right now that's a
On Mar 27, 2013, at 8:47 AM, Nick Hilliard n...@foobar.org wrote:
then use a vpn and/or provide that service to your users. Sure, hotels and
public access wifi does all sorts of stupid and obnoxious stuff, but the
way to work around this is not by hardwiring your dns to some open resolver.
On 3/27/2013 8:47 AM, William Herrin wrote:
On Tue, Mar 26, 2013 at 10:07 PM, Tom Paseka t...@cloudflare.com wrote:
Authoritative DNS servers need to implement rate limiting. (a client
shouldn't query you twice for the same thing within its TTL).
Right now that's a complaint for the mainstream
- Original Message -
From: John Curran jcur...@arin.net
On Mar 26, 2013, at 10:51 AM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
The problem here is, of course, one of externalities and the Common
Good, hard sales to make in a business environment.
Common Good situations are readily
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
On 3/27/2013 8:47 AM, William Herrin wrote:
Right now that's a complaint for the mainstream software authors, not
for the system operators. When the version of Bind in Debian Stable
implements this feature, I'll surely
On 3/27/2013 9:34 AM, William Herrin wrote:
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
Tracking the clients would be a huge dataset and be especially complicated
in clusters. They'd be better off at detecting actual attack vectors rather
than rate limiting.
I
On 3/27/2013 9:23 AM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
Is BCP38 *not* well enough though out even for large and medium sized
carriers to adopt as contractual language, much less for FCC or
someone to impose upon them? If so, we should work on it further.
BCP38 could definitely use some work. It is correct
In message 51530632.3020...@brightok.net, Jack Bates writes:
On 3/27/2013 9:34 AM, William Herrin wrote:
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 10:00 AM, Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
Tracking the clients would be a huge dataset and be especially complicated
in clusters. They'd be better off at
Outside of needing more details and examples, BCP38 could use more
advertising.
The best option, if they would accept it, is to have all RIRs mention
BCP38 as well as require that mention of BCP38 be included in all IP
justification requests to customers (so that those who receive netblocks
In message 515309ec.4070...@brightok.net, Jack Bates writes:
On 3/27/2013 9:23 AM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
Is BCP38 *not* well enough though out even for large and medium sized
carriers to adopt as contractual language, much less for FCC or
someone to impose upon them? If so, we should work
On Mar 27, 2013, at 10:23 AM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
Indeed, but I have an even better example of how that's already done, that
is probably pertinent.
The National Electric Code is assimilated law now, I think, in every
state in the US. It is promulgated by the National Fire
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
It's also not a bad idea for an ISP to deploy EGRESS filters if they do not
offer BGP Transit services.
Nor is it a bad idea for their upstream to inquire as to whether the
downstream offers BGP transit services and apply
On 3/27/2013 10:25 AM, Mark Andrews wrote:
Technologies change. Concepts rarely do. BCP38 is technology neutral.
If we follow that, we should just state Don't allow spoofed IP
Addresses! and leave it to the individual to figure it out. BCP38
leaves that premise by mentioning ingress
It's been available in linux for a long time, just not in BIND…
Here is a working ip6tales example:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s 2620:0:930::/48 -m state --state NEW -m udp -p udp
--dport 53 -j ACCEPT
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s 2001:470:1f00:3142::/64 -m state --state NEW -m udp
-p udp --dport 53
On 3/27/2013 10:40 AM, William Herrin wrote:
Build a web page where a downstream can set the filters on his
interface at his convenience. Apply some basic sanity checks against
wide-open. Worry about small lies from a forensic after-the-fact
perspective. This problem has a trivial
Yes smw4 issues across Egypt.
In India (and Pakistan also) services are badly impacted.
Here in India most of traffic from major networks is going via East Asia
route and we are experiencing latency of over 700ms with US and Europe from
last few hours.
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 6:50 PM, James
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Cisco IOS Software IP Service Level Agreement Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20130327-ipsla
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2013 March 27 16:00 UTC (GMT)
+-
Summary
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Cisco IOS Software Protocol Translation Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20130327-pt
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2013 March 27 16:00 UTC (GMT)
+-
Summary
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Cisco IOS Software Smart Install Denial of Service Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20130327-smartinstall
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2013 March 27 16:00 UTC (GMT
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Cisco IOS Software Network Address Translation Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20130327-nat
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2013 March 27 10:00 UTC (GMT)
+-
Summary
bcp38.org coming soon =D
-
Alain Hebertaheb...@pubnix.net
PubNIX Inc.
50 boul. St-Charles
P.O. Box 26770 Beaconsfield, Quebec H9W 6G7
Tel: 514-990-5911 http://www.pubnix.netFax: 514-990-9443
On 03/27/13 11:20, Jack Bates wrote:
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Cisco IOS Software Internet Key Exchange Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20130327-ike
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2013 March 27 16:00 UTC (GMT)
+-
Summary
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA256
Cisco IOS Software Zone-Based Policy Firewall Session Initiation
Protocol Inspection Denial of Service Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20130327-cce
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2013 March 27 16:00 UTC (GMT
Please reference:
http://openresolverproject.org/
http://spoofer.csail.mit.edu/
http://blog.cloudflare.com/deep-inside-a-dns-amplification-ddos-attack
...and anything else to raise the awareness level.
Thanks,
- ferg (co-perpetrator of BCP38) :-)
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 9:48 AM, Alain Hebert
Maybe it was because of this: Global Internet Slows after 'biggest attack
in history'
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21954636
Huasong Zhou
Associate
Kalorama Group, LLC
1000 Potomac Street, NW, Suite 350
Washington, D.C. 20007
Mobile: +1 763 221 6784
Email: huas...@kalorama.com
And do not forget
http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38
:)
-as
On 3/27/13 2:17 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote:
Please reference:
http://openresolverproject.org/
http://spoofer.csail.mit.edu/
http://blog.cloudflare.com/deep-inside-a-dns-amplification-ddos-attack
...and
Well, it's not just SMW4 outage, we've been witnessing serious issues on
IMEWE for couple of weeks now and this outages just made it worse.
So, right now most of the traffic taking east bound routes.
Who needs DDoS at this stage, these links are already chocked up :)
Maybe it was because of
But of course. :-)
Also, just saw this:
http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-almost-broke-the-internet
- ferg
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 11:02 AM, Arturo Servin arturo.ser...@gmail.com wrote:
And do not forget
http://tools.ietf.org/html/bcp38
:)
-as
On 3/27/13 2:17
http://blog.cloudflare.com/the-ddos-that-almost-broke-the-internet
Yes: 120 gigabits/second, primarily of DNS amplification traffic.
Still think it's optional to implement BCP38 pervasively?
Cheers,
-- jra
--
Jay R. Ashworth Baylink j...@baylink.com
Op 27-03-13 16:54, Owen DeLong schreef:
It's been available in linux for a long time, just not in BIND…
Not entirely true:
http://www.redbarn.org/dns/ratelimits
Here is a working ip6tales example:
Tricky...
There is also the 'hashlimit' module (at least for v4, not sure about
v6), that may
On Wed, 27 Mar 2013 10:51:35 -0500, Jack Bates said:
They are not, and I can think of quite a few people who would stare
blankly at you for making such a statement. Of course, I can think of
plenty of people who we'd like to see implementing BCP38 concepts that
would need you to define
On Mar 27, 2013, at 11:54 AM, Owen DeLong o...@delong.com wrote:
It's been available in linux for a long time, just not in BIND…
Here is a working ip6tales example:
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT -s 2620:0:930::/48 -m state --state NEW -m udp -p udp
--dport 53 -j ACCEPT
-A RH-Firewall-1-INPUT
- Original Message -
From: Valdis Kletnieks valdis.kletni...@vt.edu
On Wed, 27 Mar 2013 10:51:35 -0500, Jack Bates said:
They are not, and I can think of quite a few people who would stare
blankly at you for making such a statement. Of course, I can think
of plenty of people who
On 2013-03-27, at 14:52, Jared Mauch ja...@puck.nether.net wrote:
I am very concerned about examples such as this possibly being implemented by
a well intentioned sysadmin or neteng type without understanding their query
load and patterns. bind with the rrl patch does log when things are
Is someone pissed off at Spamhaus, or was the intention to packet them so
hard their entire network ceased to exist so they can no longer offer
DROP/RBL/xyz service?
Seldom do hax0r nations target things without some type of
justification. I don't really care who is being internet murdered, I
On (2013-03-27 11:05 -0500), Jack Bates wrote:
I'm not arguing that the process can't be done. The problem is,
there are a number of networks that don't know it needs to be done
and why, or they don't know how to do it. There are a number of
networks that have no concept of scripting changes
That was a really big attack.
The scary part is that it's all DNS reflection, meaning the attackers only need
3Gbps of bandwidth to generate 300Gbps of DDoS.
Imagine if they compromised some of the medium sized corporate networks along
with these Botnets. I don't know if the exchanges could
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 3:09 PM, Warren Bailey
wbai...@satelliteintelligencegroup.com wrote:
Is someone pissed off at Spamhaus, or was the intention to packet them so
hard their entire network ceased to exist so they can no longer offer
DROP/RBL/xyz service?
According to the New York Times it
You won't care who until the target is you. ;)
Warm Regards,
Jordan Michaels
On 03/27/2013 12:09 PM, Warren Bailey wrote:
Seldom do hax0r nations target things without some type of
justification. I don't really care who is being internet murdered, I
care why.
As cyberbunker stops killing spamhaus and goes after Gilmore.. I think
these are the guys who used to colo HavenCo after they burnt their
platform down? I'm not sure how I feel about Cloudflare comparing being
packeted to a nuclear bomb? After the packeting drys up, is there really
total
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 12:18 PM, Joshua Goldbard j...@2600hz.com wrote:
That was a really big attack.
The scary part is that it's all DNS reflection, meaning the attackers only
need 3Gbps of bandwidth to generate 300Gbps of DDoS.
Imagine if they compromised some of the medium sized
--- b...@herrin.us wrote:
From: William Herrin b...@herrin.us
According to the New York Times it was 300 gbps and Cyberbunker was the bad guy.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/technology/internet/online-dispute-becomes-internet-snarling-attack.html?pagewanted=all_r=0
The root cause of high scale directed amplification attacks is the failure
to assure the integrity of the source IP address. This failure leads to a
large set of directed amplification attack vectors.
BCP38 was written in 2000, coming up on its 13th anniversary. This root
cause, and various
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 3:55 PM, Scott Weeks sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
According to the New York Times it was 300 gbps and Cyberbunker was the bad
guy.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/technology/internet/online-dispute-becomes-internet-snarling-attack.html?pagewanted=all_r=0
Try this one:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21954636
On 3/27/13 3:55 PM, Scott Weeks sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
--- b...@herrin.us wrote:
From: William Herrin b...@herrin.us
According to the New York Times it was 300 gbps and Cyberbunker was the
bad guy.
At least they compared it to a traffic jam. ;)
From my Android phone on T-Mobile. The first nationwide 4G network.
Original message
From: Huasong Zhou huas...@kalorama.com
Date: 03/27/2013 1:00 PM (GMT-08:00)
To: sur...@mauigateway.com,nanog@nanog.org
Subject: Re:
In message 8da1853ce466b041b104c1caee00b3748fa4e...@chaxch01.corp.arin.net,
John Curran writes:
On Mar 27, 2013, at 10:23 AM, Jay Ashworth j...@baylink.com wrote:
Indeed, but I have an even better example of how that's already done,
that
is probably pertinent.
The National
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 1:54 PM, Mark Andrews ma...@isc.org wrote:
In message 8da1853ce466b041b104c1caee00b3748fa4e...@chaxch01.corp.arin.net,
John Curran writes:
Umm... How many North American ISP's/datacenters/web hosting firms were
aware of the BCP 38 development as it was on-going, and
--- b...@herrin.us wrote:
From: William Herrin b...@herrin.us
According to the New York Times it was 300 gbps and Cyberbunker was the bad guy.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/27/technology/internet/online-dispute-becomes-internet-snarling-attack.html?pagewanted=all_r=0
Joe Abley jab...@hopcount.ca wrote:
My assessment is that the implementations I have seen are ready for
production use, but I think it's understandable given the moving
goalpoasts that some vendors have not yet promoted the code to be
included in stable releases.
It is in the current stable
Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
Tracking the clients would be a huge dataset and be especially complicated in
clusters.
The memory usage is guite manageable: for the BIND patch it is at most
40-80 bytes (for 32 or 64 bit machines) per request per second. You're
doing well if you need a
...Sven Olaf Kamphuis, an Internet activist who
said he was a spokesman for the attackers...
I wonder is he'll ever post here again as he has in the past. It
probably would not go well for him if he did...
scott
Wasn't there a ton of drama with the SpamHaus guys a year or so ago
regarding RBL's on NANOG?
On 3/27/13 2:54 PM, Scott Weeks sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
--- b...@herrin.us wrote:
From: William Herrin b...@herrin.us
According to the New York Times it was 300 gbps and Cyberbunker was the
quite a few EU to India cables are impacted right now 4/7 down.
Sent from my iPad
On 27 Mar 2013, at 18:14, Aftab Siddiqui aftab.siddi...@gmail.com wrote:
Well, it's not just SMW4 outage, we've been witnessing serious issues on
IMEWE for couple of weeks now and this outages just made it
Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
You'll also find that [DNS RRL] serves little purpose.
In my experience it works extremely well. Yes it is possible to work
around it, but you still need to stop the attacks that are happening now.
It is good to make the attacker's job harder.
1) tcp
RRL
that article is absolute rubbish. take with large pinch of salt, rockstar in
hamster outfit type nonsense.
$dayjob didn't lose any traffic during the period, some guys where affected
because of the lottery of being on the same switch as couldfare.
regards,
Neil.
On 27 Mar 2013, at 18:45, Jay
On 3/27/2013 4:49 PM, Tony Finch wrote:
Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
3) BCP38 (in spirit)
That should be deployed as well as RRL.
Tony.
If BCP38 was properly deployed, what would be the purpose of RRL outside
of misbehaving clients or direct attacks against that one server?
We
On Wed, 27 Mar 2013 14:19:05 -0700, Paul Ferguson said:
And there may even be some stick approaches to accompany the carrot,
but some awareness is going to have to happen.
Sing it from the mountain tops.
http://www.sans.org/dosstep/roadmap.php
Note the date. Note the list of
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:19 PM, Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@gmail.comwrote:
Some people are going to have to step and add a few thousand more
frequent flier miles and get out to various geographic constituencies,
at various events, and start talking about this. And we need a lot
more people
Noted.
But today's contribution by Eric M. Caroll might end up on the front
page =D.
I got the domains... Now I just need a few free hours to setup
something useful.
As always, don't be shy to drop me contribution offlist.
-
Alain Hebert
On 3/27/13 2:46 PM, Warren Bailey wrote:
Wasn't there a ton of drama with the SpamHaus guys a year or so ago
regarding RBL's on NANOG?
There's always someone who publicly flips out over being listed by a
major DNSBL at least once a year.
~Seth
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 12:30:43PM -0700, Paul Ferguson wrote:
Consider this a call-to-arms, in all aspects. Please.
+1
No. Not enough. +10.
But...our collective track record in responding in a timely and effective
fashion to such calls is not very good. Twenty years ago we could have
On Mar 27, 2013, at 4:54 PM, Mark Andrews ma...@isc.org
wrote:
Umm... How many North American ISP's/datacenters/web hosting firms were
aware of the BCP 38 development as it was on-going, and participated in
some manner in its review? ...
I'd say enough were aware. :-)
8.
Hi all,
I just discovered a somewhat-exigent issue which affects
confidentiality for Verizon Wireless customers. (PSTN / Voice)
I'm failing at trying to find a Verizon Wireless security contact
through normal means. If someone can provide a contact off-list it
would be much appreciated.
Thanks,
I think the media fire about this will enlighten many c level executives. After
that, it's a matter of them saying go do this. You can't get any traction if
there isn't a perceived issue, from what I've seen anyways. I still think the
ipv4 to 6 transition will require media outlets running
Via renesys
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/egypt-naval-forces-capture-3-scuba-divers-trying-to-sabotage-undersea-internet-cable/2013/03/27/dd2975ec-9725-11e2-a976-7eb906f9ed9b_story.html
Sent from my iPhone
On 27 Mar 2013, at 21:53, Neil J. McRae
On Mar 27, 2013, at 6:25 PM, Rich Kulawiec r...@gsp.org wrote:
Or worse, before some government somewhere decides to solve this
problem for a value of solved involving (shudder) legislation.
In general, governments have avoided regulating various aspects of
the Internet, in part because of
Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
If BCP38 was properly deployed, what would be the purpose of RRL outside of
misbehaving clients or direct attacks against that one server?
If fictional scenario, irrelevant answer. Given the current situation,
efforts to deploy both RRL and BCP38 in
On 2013-03-27, at 17:59, Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
DNS is UDP for a reason.
Not a great reason, as it turns out. But hindsight is 20/20.
The infrastructure to switch it to TCP is prohibitive and completely destroys
the anycast mechanisms.
No.
Joe
In message CAA=cXfrO3c8=UYZDExpiYsEhFJDup=gUMvO+d=u34-djw0a...@mail.gmail.com
, Jason Ackley writes:
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 4:19 PM, Paul Ferguson fergdawgs...@gmail.comwrote:
Some people are going to have to step and add a few thousand more
frequent flier miles and get out to various
An important question...
I recall a peering panel at an ISPCON in 1996 when the current
Peering Badguys, BBN, were represented by John, who listened
to a ton of bitching for an hour about the unfairness of it all and
said (paraphrasing)...
I understand you all have your opinions and desires
On 3/26/13, Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
On Mar 26, 2013, at 9:51 PM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
Perhaps you should reframe your strategy as security problem, and
show how providers have implemented BCP38, how it is such a common
practice, that not implementing BCP38 may fall short of
I am afraid you are right.
It is going to cost us money and time, but unfortunately I do not see
another way out.
/as
On 3/27/13 6:19 PM, Paul Ferguson wrote:
As I mentioned on another list earlier today, let's face it -- this is
going to require a large-scale, very public,
The BBC has a similar story:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21963100
On Mar 27, 2013, at 6:41 PM, Neil J. McRae n...@domino.org wrote:
Via renesys
On Wed, 27 Mar 2013 16:59:16 -0500, Jack Bates said:
On 3/27/2013 4:49 PM, Tony Finch wrote:
Jack Bates jba...@brightok.net wrote:
3) BCP38 (in spirit)
That should be deployed as well as RRL.
Tony.
If BCP38 was properly deployed, what would be the purpose of RRL outside
of
On Mar 28, 2013, at 6:01 AM, Mark Andrews wrote:
Secondly you reduce your legal liability.
IANAL, but this has yet to be proven, AFAIK.
One approach that hasn't been tried, to my knowledge, is educating the
insurance companies about how they can potentially reduce *their* liability for
On Wed, Mar 27, 2013 at 9:18 PM, Dobbins, Roland rdobb...@arbor.net wrote:
On Mar 28, 2013, at 6:01 AM, Mark Andrews wrote:
Secondly you reduce your legal liability.
IANAL, but this has yet to be proven, AFAIK.
One approach that hasn't been tried, to my knowledge, is educating the
On Mar 28, 2013, at 11:42 AM, Paul Ferguson wrote:
Actually, I do know someone who is in the digital insurance (for lack of a
better term) business, and although I just met them a few weeks ago, somehow
I get the feeling that it is a growth industry.
I think this concept applies to
91 matches
Mail list logo
