❦ 22 avril 2020 12:51 -04, Andrey Kostin:
> BTW, has anybody yet thought/looked into extending RPKI-RTR protocol
> for validation of prefixes received from peer-as to make ingress
> filtering more dynamic and move away prefix filters from the routers?
It could be used as is if the client
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 11:45 AM Danny McPherson wrote:
>
> On 2020-04-21 12:36, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
> > On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 1:10 PM Matt Corallo via NANOG
> > wrote:
> >
> >> That’s an interesting idea. I’m not sure that LACNIC would want
> >> to issue a ROA for RIPE IP space after RIPE
but if
> > > it would be possible to make such test it'd be more useful than that
> > > RPKI test.
> > >
> > > BTW, has anybody yet thought/looked into extending RPKI-RTR protocol
> > > for validation of prefixes received from peer-as to make ingress
> >
On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 1:32 PM Danny McPherson wrote:
>
> On 2020-04-22 12:51, Andrey Kostin wrote:
>
> >
> > BCP38 website doesn't proclaim anybody in person to be unsafe, but if
> > it would be possible to make such test it'd be more useful than that
> > RPKI t
On 2020-04-22 12:51, Andrey Kostin wrote:
BCP38 website doesn't proclaim anybody in person to be unsafe, but if
it would be possible to make such test it'd be more useful than that
RPKI test.
BTW, has anybody yet thought/looked into extending RPKI-RTR protocol
for validation of prefixes
Jay R. Ashworth писал 2020-04-22 11:02:
Well, given how little the BCP38 website below has moved that football,
you're
not likely in much danger... :-)
Cheers,
-- jra
BCP38 website doesn't proclaim anybody in person to be unsafe, but if it
would be possible to make such test it'd be more
On 2020-04-21 12:36, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 1:10 PM Matt Corallo via NANOG
wrote:
That’s an interesting idea. I’m not sure that LACNIC would want
to issue a ROA for RIPE IP space after RIPE issues an AS0 ROA,
though. And you’d at least need some kind of time delay to give
> From: "Andrey Kostin"
>
> Would be interesting to hear your opinion on this:
> https://isbgpsafeyet.com/
>
> We have cases when residential customers ask support "why is your
> service isn't safe?" pointing to that article. It's difficult to answer
> correctly considering that the asking
Baldur Norddahl писал 2020-04-21 02:49:
My company is in Europe. Lets say an attacker joins the IX in Seattle
a long way from here and a place we definitely are not present at. We
do however use Hurricane Electric as transit and they are peering
freely at Seattle. Everyone there thus sees our
Sure. This kinda falls under my point that we should be talking about basic
mitigation, then. I’m not aware of any previous discussion of creating policy
that instructs RIRs to do so. Again, with a basic step like that, plus a
validator-enforced time delay between when a RIR can remove a ROA
On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 1:10 PM Matt Corallo via NANOG
wrote:
> That’s an interesting idea. I’m not sure that LACNIC would want to issue a
> ROA for RIPE IP space after RIPE issues an AS0 ROA, though. And you’d at
> least need some kind of time delay to give other RIRs and operators and
> chance
On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 12:17 PM Matt Corallo via NANOG wrote:
>
> Not sure how this helps? If RIPE (or a government official/court) decides the
> sanctions against Iranian LIRs prevents them from issuing number resources to
> said LIRs, they would just remove the delegation. They’d probably
Not sure how this helps? If RIPE (or a government official/court) decides the
sanctions against Iranian LIRs prevents them from issuing number resources to
said LIRs, they would just remove the delegation. They’d probably then issue an
AS0 ROA to replace out given the “AS0 ROA for bogons”
Right until RIPE finishes deploying AS0 ROAs for bogons, which I recall is
moving forward :p.
> On Apr 21, 2020, at 03:01, Mark Tinka wrote:
>
>
>
>> On 21/Apr/20 08:51, Matt Corallo via NANOG wrote:
>>
>> Instead of RIRs coordinating address space use by keeping a public list
>> which is
That’s an interesting idea. I’m not sure that LACNIC would want to issue a ROA
for RIPE IP space after RIPE issues an AS0 ROA, though. And you’d at least need
some kind of time delay to give other RIRs and operators and chance to discuss
the matter before allowing RIPE to issue the AS0 ROA, eg
>> essentially agree. my pedantic quibble is that i would like to
>> differentiate between the RPKI, which is a database, and ROV, which
>> uses it.
>
> And I think that is a very important distinction to be clear about.
> Right now, it's not completely arrest-worthy to use RPKI and ROV
>
On 21/Apr/20 12:46, Randy Bush wrote:
> essentially agree. my pedantic quibble is that i would like to
> differentiate between the RPKI, which is a database, and ROV, which
> uses it.
And I think that is a very important distinction to be clear about.
Right now, it's not completely
> Anyhow I think some people think about RPKI in a way too binary manner
> 'because it is not secure, it is not useful'. Yes, AS_PATH
> authenticity is an open problem, but this doesn't mean RPKI is
> useless. Most of our BGP outages are not malicious, RPKI helps a lot
> there and RPKI creates a
On 20/Apr/20 20:21, Andrey Kostin wrote:
>
> So this means that there is no single source of truth for PRKI
> implementation all around the world and there are different shades,
> right? As a logical conclusion, the information provided on that page
> may be considered incorrect in terms of
On 21/Apr/20 08:51, Matt Corallo via NANOG wrote:
> Instead of RIRs coordinating address space use by keeping a public list which
> is (or should be) checked when a new peering session is added, RPKI shifts
> RIRs into the hot path of routing updates. Next time the US government
> decides
> On 21 Apr 2020, at 11:09, Baldur Norddahl wrote:
>
>
>
> On 21.04.2020 10.56, Sander Steffann wrote:
>> Hi,
>>
>>> Removing a resource from the certificate to achieve the goal you describe
>>> will make the route announcement NotFound, which means it will be accepted.
>>> Evil RIR would
On 21.04.2020 10.56, Sander Steffann wrote:
Hi,
Removing a resource from the certificate to achieve the goal you describe will
make the route announcement NotFound, which means it will be accepted. Evil RIR
would have to replace an existing ROA with one that explicitly makes a route
There are in fact five anchors. I am not sure ARIN would be able to stop
anyone holding RIPE space provided the resource holder uses RIPE RPKI
anchor for publishing his ROAs.
Regards,
Baldur
On 21.04.2020 08.51, Matt Corallo via NANOG wrote:
I find it fascinating that in this entire thread
Hi,
> Removing a resource from the certificate to achieve the goal you describe
> will make the route announcement NotFound, which means it will be accepted.
> Evil RIR would have to replace an existing ROA with one that explicitly makes
> a route invalid, i.e. issue an AS0 ROA for specific
tir. 21. apr. 2020 07.38 skrev Saku Ytti :
> On Tue, 21 Apr 2020 at 01:02, Baldur Norddahl
> wrote:
>
> > Yes but that makes the hijacked AS path length at least 1 longer which
> makes it less likely that it can win over the true announcement. It is
> definitely better than nothing.
>
> Attacker
On Tue, 21 Apr 2020 at 01:02, Baldur Norddahl wrote:
> Yes but that makes the hijacked AS path length at least 1 longer which makes
> it less likely that it can win over the true announcement. It is definitely
> better than nothing.
Attacker has no incentive to honor existing AS path,
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 8:47 PM Denys Fedoryshchenko <
nuclear...@nuclearcat.com> wrote:
> If i am not wrong, for most routers implementing RPKI means spinning up
> VM
> with RPKI cache that need significant tinkering?
> I guess it is a blocker for many, unless some "ready made" solutions
>
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 9:09 PM Randy Bush wrote:
> but it provides almost zero protection against malicious attack. the
> attacker merely has to prepend (in the formal, not cisco display) the
> 'correct' origin AS to their malicious announcement.
>
>
Yes but that makes the hijacked AS path
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020, at 21:54, Amir Herzberg wrote:
> Randy said, > From a practical standpoint, this doesn't actually tell
> the whole truth
> >
> > indeed. route origin validation, while a good thing, does not make
> > bgp safe from attack. this marketing fantasy is being propagated;
> > but
or datacenters. On the other hand,
the impact of such "BGP safety" test is completely the opposite. For big
guys it is the most effective to implement, but being "not BGP safe yet"
- "yeah, who cares!" or in best case add to the plan for the next fiscal
year. But
Randy said,
>
> > From a practical standpoint, this doesn't actually tell the whole truth
>
> indeed. route origin validation, while a good thing, does not make
> bgp safe from attack. this marketing fantasy is being propagated;
> but is BS.
>
> origin validation was designed to reduce the
On 2020-04-20 22:01, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 3:37 PM Denys Fedoryshchenko
wrote:
There is simple use case that will prove this page is giving false
positive
for their "name" strategy.
Any AS owner with default route only (yes it happens a lot) users
will
get:
"YOUR ISP
I remember having this discussion more than 20yrs ago, minus the ARIN bit,
couldn't get every to agree to it it then either :(. We don't need more
rules, we just need to start with basic hygiene. Was a novel idea :)
On Mon., Apr. 20, 2020, 2:41 p.m. Christopher Morrow, <
morrowc.li...@gmail.com>
> From a practical standpoint, this doesn't actually tell the whole truth
indeed. route origin validation, while a good thing, does not make
bgp safe from attack. this marketing fantasy is being propagated;
but is BS.
origin validation was designed to reduce the massive number of problems
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 3:37 PM Denys Fedoryshchenko <
nuclear...@nuclearcat.com> wrote:
> There is simple use case that will prove this page is giving false
> positive
> for their "name" strategy.
> Any AS owner with default route only (yes it happens a lot) users will
> get:
> "YOUR ISP
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 2:32 PM Alex Band wrote:
>
> On 20 Apr 2020, at 19:39, Christopher Morrow wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 12:25 PM Tom Beecher wrote:
> >>
> >> Technical people need to make the business case to management for RKPI by
> >> laying out what it would cost to
On 2020-04-20 19:24, Tom Beecher wrote:
Technical people need to make the business case to management for RKPI
by laying out what it would cost to implement (equipment, resources,
ongoing opex), and what the savings are to the company from protecting
themselves against hijacks. By taking this
There is simple use case that will prove this page is giving false
positive
for their "name" strategy.
Any AS owner with default route only (yes it happens a lot) users will
get:
"YOUR ISP TERRIBLE, HIS BGP NOT SAFE!".
But he have nothing to validate! His BGP is implemented safely,
its just
On 20 Apr 2020, at 19:39, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 12:25 PM Tom Beecher wrote:
>>
>> Technical people need to make the business case to management for RKPI by
>> laying out what it would cost to implement (equipment, resources, ongoing
>> opex), and what the
Mark Tinka писал 2020-04-20 12:57:
On 20/Apr/20 18:50, Tom Beecher wrote:
I (and Ben, and a few others) are all too familiar with the ARIN
madness
around their TAL.
Simple - we just don't accept it, which means our networks will be
unsafe against North American resources. Highly doubtful my
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 12:25 PM Tom Beecher wrote:
>
> Technical people need to make the business case to management for RKPI by
> laying out what it would cost to implement (equipment, resources, ongoing
> opex), and what the savings are to the company from protecting themselves
> against
On 20/Apr/20 19:01, Andrey Kostin wrote:
> Thank you Mark, Tom and Chris for your responses that confirmed my
> "mixed feelings" about this tool.
> As a side note, I mentioned from https://bgp.he.net/AS13335#_prefixes
> that AS13335 advertises a bunch or prefixes without RoA and even one
>
CloudFlare?
—
Chris Cummings
FROM: NANOG on behalf of Tom Beecher
DATE: Monday, April 20, 2020 at 10:35
TO: Andrey Kostin
CC: Nanog
SUBJECT: Re: "Is BGP safe yet?" test
( Speaking 100% for myself. )
I think it was tremendously irresponsible, especially in the context
of cur
On 20/Apr/20 18:50, Tom Beecher wrote:
>
> Work on a technical level, yes. But there are legal concerns in the
> ARIN region with that, some of which are spelled out here, by ACTUAL
> lawyers.
>
>
>
> We've seen that validators are free, and work very well.
>
Work on a technical level, yes. But there are legal concerns in the ARIN
region with that, some of which are spelled out here, by ACTUAL lawyers.
On 20/Apr/20 18:24, Tom Beecher wrote:
> Technical people need to make the business case to management for RKPI
> by laying out what it would cost to implement (equipment, resources,
> ongoing opex), and what the savings are to the company from protecting
> themselves against hijacks. By taking
On 20/Apr/20 17:31, Tom Beecher wrote:
> ( Speaking 100% for myself. )
>
> I think it was tremendously irresponsible, especially in the context
> of current events, to take a complex technical issue like this and
> frame it to the general public as a 'safety' issue.
>
> It's created articles
On 20/Apr/20 17:31, Mark Tinka wrote:
> On count two, my experience with doing the RPKI deployathon in Melbourne
> during this past APRICOT led to some random news web site talking about
> how "I would be shedding all invalid routes blah blah", which while not
> untrue, had locals all the way
On Sat, Nov 02, 2019 at 09:18:36AM -0700, Mike Bolitho wrote:
> The very fact that there are
> AWS/Azure/Google Cloud data centers located around the globe makes anything
> hosted there even more resilient, not less (and for the most part, I still
> prefer on prem DC so I'm not even pushing "To
Sean Donelan wrote on 02/11/2019 19:32:
Has anyone compared the network resiliancy and reliability in countries
with centralized control with similar situated countries with
decentralized networks?
US-EU connectivity is curious. E.g. how many active transatlantic EU-US
cable systems are
On Sat, 02 Nov 2019 14:49:58 -0400, Christopher Morrow said:
> I think the disconnect idea is actually a good one... I don't know
> that I want to DO IT, but :) it certainly seems like a reasonable
> disaster recovery planning exercise :) (likely doing it is the only
> way to really suss out the
On Fri, 1 Nov 2019, Fred Baker wrote:
This has nothing to do with cables, and everything to do with
information control and politics.
I agree with Fred, but trying to keep this on a technical list.
Has anyone compared the network resiliancy and reliability in countries
with centralized
ur own email? All
>> these things may seem silly, until you actually encounter the situation
>> where you're offline, and it's too late to do anything.
>>
>> C.
>>
>> On Fri, 1 Nov 2019 at 18:04, Scott Weeks wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
Peace,
On Sat, Nov 2, 2019 at 7:20 PM Mike Bolitho wrote:
>> I would imagine that the internet is a whole less resilient today in 2019
>> than it was back in the day before the cloud takeover.
> It's far more resilient now than it has ever been. More sub-sea cables.
> Multiple routes across
; C.
>
> On Fri, 1 Nov 2019 at 18:04, Scott Weeks wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> --- sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
>> From: "Scott Weeks"
>>
>> Anyone got any technical info on how Russia plans to execute
>> a disconnection test of the internet?
Peace,
On Sat, Nov 2, 2019 at 3:16 AM Constantine A. Murenin
wrote:
> If somehow all the transatlantic (and/or transpacific) cables are offline
...then probably a horrific global disaster has occurred, and a sudden
degradation of the Internet connectivity would be about the least of
your
> On Nov 1, 2019, at 8:15 PM, Constantine A. Murenin wrote:
>
> If somehow all the transatlantic (and/or transpacific) cables are offline;
> will the whole internet outside of the US stop working, too?
This has nothing to do with cables, and everything to do with information
control and
; --- sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
> From: "Scott Weeks"
>
> Anyone got any technical info on how Russia plans to execute
> a disconnection test of the internet?
>
>
>
> Got crickets, so now I have to respond to my own post on
>
On Fri, 1 Nov 2019, John Von Essen wrote:
The thing that I always wonder about is the ability for citizens to
bypass the restriction via satellite internet nowadays. I guess they
need a law to make that illegal too, if found purchasing satellite
internet gear, off to the gulag!
Essentially
>
> Got crickets, so now I have to respond to my own post on
> what I just found out about it. Is that like talking to
> yourself? :)
Not when others are listening.
Thanks for the update.
eks wrote:
>
>
>
> --- sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
> From: "Scott Weeks"
>
> Anyone got any technical info on how Russia plans to execute
> a disconnection test of the internet?
>
>
>
> Got crickets, so now I
--- sur...@mauigateway.com wrote:
From: "Scott Weeks"
Anyone got any technical info on how Russia plans to execute
a disconnection test of the internet?
Got crickets, so now I have to respond to my own post on
what I just found
Anyone got any technical info on how Russia plans to execute a
disconnection test of the internet? I am starting to see this
on web sites again:
https://slate.com/technology/2019/10/russia-runet-disconnection-domestic-internet.html
and started wondering how they plan to do that? DNS
This is being covered on local San Francisco Bay Area media, but if
network engineers aren't paying attention to the local news. Here is an
opportunity for tech folks in the Oakland area to participate in the
Earthquake Early Warning Test.
TEST INFORMATION
Date: Wednesday, March 27th, 2019
It's likely worth noting that this specific test was of IPAWS (Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System), a system designed to integrate the
Emergency Alert System, National Warning System, Wireless Emergency Alerts,
and NOAA Weather Alerts.
It's not intended to be cell phone only or replace
I agree 100% and also have noticed that severe weather systems tend to more
severe in rural areas due to either open spaces (the plains) or trees (forested
areas) doing more damage. I can tell you from living the in Midwest that the
storms in Iowa and Nebraska are way worse than the ones that
I am wondering if this seems common to most of you on here. In my area it
seems that all cellular sites have backup generators and battery backup. Seems
like the biggest issues we see are devices remote from the central offices that
lose power and cause disruptions, like RSTs and SLCs.
The challenging part for government is creating a public warning
system inexpensive enough, its available to everyone, not just people
who can afford private airplanes.
We could use the one that was already built for this: The NOAA All
Hazards radio network (http://www.nws.noaa.gov/nwr/). It
On Tue, 9 Oct 2018, Scott Weeks wrote:
--- a...@andyring.com wrote:
From: Andy Ringsmuth
Yeah, this thread is getting somewhat removed from the
original question, so what the heck. I’ve often thought
that vehicle radios should have a location-based weather
radio built in
On Tue, 9 Oct 2018, Aaron C. de Bruyn wrote:
Sure--I totally agree. But we don't build smoke detectors into our
cell phones because that's not a very good use case. And I'm not
aware of weather alerts being broadcast to cell phones without having
an app installed, and it's unreliable.
Related:
Handy - I have two little boxes I bought at radio shack many years
ago. One converts from the car lighter plug (or whatever they call it
these days) to a three-prong (5-15R, ok?), the other converts from a
regular 120V house plug to a "12V car lighter" which actually was very
handy
Many of those lightweight UPS units have a very small battery in
them and are really designed to 1) carry the computer across a power
flicker, or 2) provide a few minutes to shut down the computer in
a controlled manner.
Units with much bigger batteries to last a day are much more expensive
and
A good home investment people don't immediately think of (I'm sure
some here have) is one of those inexpensive computer UPS's. An
off-the-shelf 1500VA is usually under $200 or thereabouts.
One can run anything off one, like a radio or lamp. Not a lot but I'd
imagine 1500VA would keep a small
Once upon a time, Aaron C. de Bruyn via NANOG said:
> And I'm not
> aware of weather alerts being broadcast to cell phones without having
> an app installed, and it's unreliable.
The same part of the phone that was used for the Presidential Alert can
also be used for weather alerts (it is used
--- a...@andyring.com wrote:
From: Andy Ringsmuth
Yeah, this thread is getting somewhat removed from the
original question, so what the heck. I’ve often thought
that vehicle radios should have a location-based weather
radio built in
---
On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 9:19 PM Sean Donelan wrote:
> A company already made a combination smoke alarm/weather radio.
> Halo Smart Labs went out of business earlier this year.
> https://www.smartthings.com/products/halo-smart-labs-halo-smoke-and-carbon-monoxide-alarm-plus-weather-alerts
*click*
.
My weather alert radio did not activate during this test last week. I don’t
know if it was supposed to or not, but it certainly does go crazy any time
there’s a weather warning issued and for the weekly tests.
Yeah, this thread is getting somewhat removed from the original question, so
what
On Mon, 8 Oct 2018, Aaron C. de Bruyn wrote:
Google solved these problems with ~$120 smoke alarm and a decent cell phone app.
If they released a new version with weather alerts, I wouldn't think
twice about dropping $200 on it.
A company already made a combination smoke alarm/weather radio.
I last hear an alert from it?
Does your smoke alarm have batteries? Are they dead? When did you
last test it?
Google solved these problems with ~$120 smoke alarm and a decent cell phone app.
If they released a new version with weather alerts, I wouldn't think
twice about dropping $200 on it.
On October 8, 2018 at 16:37 s...@donelan.com (Sean Donelan) wrote:
> A nation-wide WEA and EAS system helps warn people in both cities and
> rural areas. But they still depend on carriers and broadcasters. If there
> are no backup batteries in cell towers, or backup transmitters for
>
On Mon, 8 Oct 2018, b...@theworld.com wrote:
I suppose since every life is precious one can measure the
effectiveness based on "land mass" but then one wonders if some sheep
out in a field in Idaho really care that the US was just invaded...put
better: You do what you can!
How quickly we
Just as a small point of contention, if you lose the bread basket and
the agricultural industries, you might as well have never received an
emergency alert in a city where the supplies and fresh food will run out
and people will be fighting and killing each other for a Snickers bar.
No good
On October 8, 2018 at 03:37 snasl...@medline.com (Naslund, Steve) wrote:
> A few cases come to mind. I also think there are lots of alerts
> that will not send people screaming into the streets. 9/11 did not
> really have that effect in most places and it took quite some time
> for word
On Sat, 6 Oct 2018, valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
Since there isn't infinite money to build a system that will reach *everybody*,
the only reasonable approach is to cobble together a set of overlapping systems
on existing technology that covers the most people while staying inside the
funding
A few cases come to mind. I also think there are lots of alerts that will not
send people screaming into the streets. 9/11 did not really have that effect
in most places and it took quite some time for word to spread to people who did
not have full time media access. You also have to
> So I tend not to be in a big rush to look at those alerts, actually I
> think I turned them off which in that case was an option.
i turned them off long ago.
i did get a presidential alert in november '16. turned out to be a very
serious disaster.
randy
On October 7, 2018 at 15:49 fredbaker.i...@gmail.com (Fred Baker) wrote:
>
> > On Oct 7, 2018, at 12:23 PM, b...@theworld.com wrote:
> >
> > That was one advantage of the old air raid siren system, it was difficult
> > to ignore and required nothing special to receive (hearing
> >
On Oct 7, 2018, at 12:23 PM, b...@theworld.com wrote:
> That was one advantage of the old air raid siren system, it was
> difficult to ignore and required nothing special to receive (hearing
> impaired excepted.)
_Wired_ has an interesting history of the various networked and
standalone national
On 10/07/2018 03:49 PM, Fred Baker wrote:
On Oct 7, 2018, at 12:23 PM, b...@theworld.com wrote:
That was one advantage of the old air raid siren system, it was difficult to
ignore and required nothing special to receive (hearing
impaired excepted.)
Where I grew up, the “Civil Defense Warning”
> On Oct 7, 2018, at 12:23 PM, b...@theworld.com wrote:
>
> That was one advantage of the old air raid siren system, it was difficult to
> ignore and required nothing special to receive (hearing
> impaired excepted.)
Where I grew up, the “Civil Defense Warning” was used for air raids, nuclear
ren systems.
>
> Probably a bigger issue which isn't as apparent from a test is do
> people have any reasonable options even if they are completely aware
> that negotiations with the UFOs have collapsed and the death rays have
> started?
>
> In the days when nuclear attack w
and to the nearest shelter. And
people did. If you were a wise guy teen and didn't and a cop saw you
you'd get an earful (don't ask me how I know this.)
Some areas particularly near the shore have similar siren systems.
Probably a bigger issue which isn't as apparent from a test is do
people have
On Sat, 06 Oct 2018 15:09:09 -0700, "Scott Weeks" said:
> Or some live where there is no cell coverage, don't
> watch TV, live where their neighbors are far away
> and no gov't folks are going to knock on doors
> because the driveway is long, locked at the front
> gate and there're dogs in the
--- s...@donelan.com wrote:
From: Sean Donelan
Sometimes people are asleep (disasters don't always
happen at 2pm on a work day), live alone, are not
constantly watching TV or checking social media.
Its unlikely any system will ever be able to reach
everyone.
On 10/05/2018 04:47 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
On Thu, 4 Oct 2018, b...@theworld.com wrote:
Just to try to squeeze something worthwhile out of these reports...
I wonder, if there were a real alert, what the odds are that one
wouldn't hear about it in 1 minute, 5 minutes, etc even if they didn't
On Thu, 4 Oct 2018, b...@theworld.com wrote:
Just to try to squeeze something worthwhile out of these reports...
I wonder, if there were a real alert, what the odds are that one
wouldn't hear about it in 1 minute, 5 minutes, etc even if they didn't
personally get it.
What happens when people
> I wonder, if there were a real alert, what the odds are that one
> wouldn't hear about it in 1 minute, 5 minutes, etc even if they didn't
> personally get it.
>
> Obviously edge cases are possible, you were deep in a cave with your
> soccer team, but there must be mathematical modeling of that
Just to try to squeeze something worthwhile out of these reports...
I wonder, if there were a real alert, what the odds are that one
wouldn't hear about it in 1 minute, 5 minutes, etc even if they didn't
personally get it.
Obviously edge cases are possible, you were deep in a cave with your
Since I know network engineers are geeks, and can't stop themselves from
looking...
On your iPhone (and android, and likely other cell phone OS), there are
detailed diagnostics logs. On your iPhone, look under
Settings->Privacy->Analytics->Analytics Data->awdd-
"awdd" means Apple Wireless
, Oct 3, 2018, at 2:52 PM, Andy Ringsmuth wrote:
> Did anyone on AT or an iPhone receive the test today? I believe it was
> supposed to happen at 2:18 EDT, followed by one on broadcast radio at
> 2:20 EDT.
>
> I’m in CDT, so 1:18 and 1:20 p.m. CDT.
>
> Message was heard on
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