Dear Ben, Jeffs, Gary, lists -
Sorry for being away from the list - am at the Semiotics World Conf. in Sofia.
The claim that logic and theory of science are independent of psychology does
not at all imply they can not learn from psychology - or from other special
sciences. Especially methodeutic
Dear Jeff, lists -
I am sorry you sense dark shades ...
But most of what I say in the NP book does not depend upon these speculations -
which were prompted by somebody, I forgot who, inquiring into the notoriously
murkuy waters of the beginnings of life and semiotics.
What I am thinking of - sp
Frederick, List —
Cf. http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/05/31/definition-and-determination-4/
Sent from my iPad
> On Sep 19, 2014, at 8:42 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
>
> Dear Ben, Jeffs, Gary, lists -
> Sorry for being away from the list - am at the Semiotics World Conf. in
> Sofia.
>
Dear Stan, lists,
S: The studies supported by society -- especially in science -- are often of
longer term interest. SC is not a bugaboo, just a fact.
I think SC is no simple fact - rather it is a host of different things - from
the (trivial) observation that universities and academies and lab
Dear Stan, lists -
Frederick -- replying again to:
Hmmm, I rather think the pie in the sky is the idea that culture might make
truth criteria evolve so as to have no connection with how they are conceived
of today.
S: Possibly, but that might not disturb anyone in that future time because
the
Dear G -
Not at all - I do not think it is a bad analogy - I think it is a great analogy!
As any analogy, it has similar and non-similar parts. But the similar parts of
this one are eye-opening …
Best
F
Den 18/09/2014 kl. 16.38 skrev Gary Fuhrman
mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
:
Frederik,
Every a
Dear Howard, Stan, lists,
I think Stan is right the line has both qualities - the geometric line is
continuous and the arithmetic line is discontinuous.
Some higher animals are capable of rudimentary mathematics (subitizing small
numbers).
But Howard, the claim that human brains do mathematics i
At 01:44 AM 9/19/2014, Jon wrote:
Howard, Ben, All,
Peirce, unlike Hertz, did not stop at a correspondence theory of
truth. And that has made all the difference.
HP: Hertz also did not stop thinking about the correspondence, or
what physics now calls the epistemic cut.
"Outside consciousnes
Dear Ben, lists,
I think you are right in proposing that quasi-inferences are inferences with
less than full self-control.
But self-control comes in many degrees ( I address this a bit in ch. 6 I
think). A very low degree of self-control may be the slow change over
evolutionary adaption - with
List, Jon, Howard:
What is the relation between the chemical sciences and the correspondence
theory of truth?
What are the correspondence relations between mathematical sciences and the
chemical sciences?
At the ground, the same set of astounding facts provide the direct empirical
answer to b
Joseph, List:
I haven't seen an answer to your inquiry, but I, like you, would be
interested in what would be trivial and non-trivial when it comes to an
index.
Tom
On Thu, Sep 18, 2014 at 3:35 AM, Joseph Brenner
wrote:
> Dear All,
>
> I have not commented on the recent exchanges as I was awa
Joseph, Tom, List,
Any thing at all (an embedding context, a moment in time, an active situation,
or whatever it may be) that serves to connect an index with its object may do
that without regard to its possible service as a sign in some other connection.
So it's not so much the existential n
Peircers,
Here's a bit I wrote on indices pursuant to my long-term project on Inquiry
Driven Systems.
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Inquiry_Driven_Systems_:_Part_1#1.3.4.9._Indexical_Signs
Regards,
Jon
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-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on
Joseph, Tom, Jon, lists,
Speaking for myself, Joseph's original question is simply not clear enough that
I would venture an answer. And I can't tell whether Jon's attempt answers the
question either; there just isn't enough context to make exact sense of it. I
would suggest holding the question
Tom,
Having the distinct if not clear sense that we had discussed this or a related
question once or twice before, I went searching through the web and eventually
through my "ZZZ Old Machine ZZZ" files to see if I could find any record of it.
I did find a file dated 6/11/2002 recording a frag
Howard, lists,
Epistemologies are not claims about special concrete phenomena in the
sense that they and their deductively implied conclusions would be
directly testable for falsity by special concrete experiments or
experiences. That's also true of principles of statistics and of
statistical
A nominalist in name only would be a nominal nominalist.
But a real nominalist would be a contradiction in terms.
Checkmate ...
Jon
Benjamin Udell wrote:
So the question is, again, do you think that numbers can be objectively
investigated as numbers? - such that (individually, biologically,
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