Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Jon, I like your diagram, Figure 1, which differs somewhat from mine, Figure 2. As you can see both these diagrams are 4-node networks. One of the differences between Figures 1 and 2, however, is that S is located at the periphery in the former while it is at the hub in the latter. This topologi

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194 JA:http://permalin

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,

Stan, If you think that five minutes' investigation would likely at best reach a trivial truth about a kind of phenomenon, then substitute 'five days' or 'five months' or 'five decades', etc. The point is the sooner or later, not an incompletable long run. You're simply not distinguishing be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Jon wrote: "For another thing, the technical use of the tern (092114-1) "network" tends to lead techies and others to read the line between O and R as referring to a dyadic relation, and similarly for the other two lines, and to think that the triadic relation denoted by "R" is someho

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

Dear Jon, Tom, lists Well spoken Jon, I think this also covers my position. The pre-semiotic world is full of connections, causal, morphological, formal, which may be taken, in the semiotic processes of biology, as a basis for signs. Best F Den 19/09/2014 kl. 20.10 skrev Jon Awbrey mailto:jawb..

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6895] Re: Physics & Semiosis

Dear Koichiro, lists At 9:54 PM 09/19/2014, Frederik wrote: In intellectual history I think the idea that cyclic, self-sustaining processes may play a special role in biology goes at least back to Kant (in the latter half of the 3rd Critique). Philosophically, it could be okay. In practice,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions

great! F Den 20/09/2014 kl. 05.01 skrev Jon Awbrey mailto:jawb...@att.net>> : A nominalist in name only would be a nominal nominalist. But a real nominalist would be a contradiction in terms. Checkmate ... Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Repl

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Dear Jon, Howard, lists, As far as I can make out, there are important relation between Hertz' basic ideas and Peirce's. To Peirce, the relation of similarity connecting a diagram to its real-world object is not necessarily easy to grasp - on the contrary, in many cases it requires protracted

Re: [biosemiotics:6915] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

Then why, if these connections: causal, morphological, formal, 'may be taken as a basis for signs'...then why is this considered a 'pre-semiotic world'? My view is that morphology = semiosis; therefore, any process that 'makes forms' is a semiosic process - and that goes on within the physico-ch

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Icons & Indices

List: On Sep 21, 2014, at 10:04 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > With that understanding, let's focus again on this central piece of the > picture: > >S > / > O-- \ >I > > I would avoid calling that a "4-node network". My training in graph theory > gives the word "network"

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194 JA:http://permalin

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

Edwina, you're ignoring (or denying?) the distinction between a process or connection that may be taken as semiosic and one that actually functions semiotically (i.e. must be taken as a sign if it is to be recognized at all). This kind of distinction can be made at many levels. For instance, c

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6901] Re: Natural

Dear Howard, Ben, lists, At 10:31 PM 9/19/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote: Howard, lists, Epistemologies are not claims about special concrete phenomena in the sense that they and their deductively implied conclusions would be directly testable for falsity by special concrete experiments or experienc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Dear Jon, lists, I think Jon has an important point here. Too many people confuse the idea that diagrams are iconic, on the one hand, with the idea that iconic signs should be immediately interpretable, on the other. It is the latter which is false. Most if not all diagrams require symbolic con

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6900] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear Ben, Stan, lists I agree Stan's interpretation of fallibilism here is far too colored by radical constructivism. Fallibilism is not equal to scepticism or constructivism at all, nor does it imply that all "knowledge" will change completely over time. Science is growing by the day, we achie

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear Stan, lists, The problem here is a bit as when Collier thought all the world was "in the head" - for where is that head? in the world? in another head? The same holds here: "the world will be constructed by each [tradition] via different models" - now, WHERE are those traditions? Seems to

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

Dear E, lists- Den 21/09/2014 kl. 20.01 skrev Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> : My view is that morphology = semiosis; I know. It is not mine. F - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Dear Jon, lists This is indeed a problem. So much literature appears now - partially due to bibliometric imperatives like "publish or perish" - that many papers are now never really read by anyone but editors and peer reviews - among them undoubtedly many good or even great papers. So those p

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6890] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Dear Stan - You're right - let us agree to disagree on this point - and move on. Best F Den 19/09/2014 kl. 16.40 skrev Stanley N Salthe mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu>> : Frederick -- Replying: I think we have projected our viewpoints sufficiently that this need not be pursued further in the pr

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,

Ben, lists, A most excellent post, and one of the strongest arguments against constructivist epistemology that I've read, having the added virtue of being succinct. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University o

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6920] Re: Natural Propositions

Actual nominalists do exist, of course, but only in the fleeting moment. In the next moment, they may be different - maybe realists? - because no law or tendency exists which grants their existence over time - Best F Den 21/09/2014 kl. 21.36 skrev Stanley N Salthe mailto:ssal...@binghamton.ed

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear Ben, Gary R., Gary F., List wich social constructivists with some reputation do hold the position "that the objects or findings of inquiry are unreal and mere figments"? Schütz, Berger & Luckmann, Piaget, von Foerster, Latour, Bloor or Knorr-Cetina? Foucault, Mannheim or Fleck? I wonder..

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

(For undistorted Table 1, see the attached.) Jon, It seems to me that many confusions in semiotic discussions arise because the two kinds of signs that Peirce defined are often conflated. Peirce defined two kinds of signs -- (i) 9 TYPES OF signs (qualisign, icon, rheme, sinsign, index, dicisign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,

Ben, List: (As a preliminary comment, Stan was a long time WESS member and spoke to us on several occasions... He will be excited to renew our decades-old rhetorical dual. :-). (SS =Stan Salthe, BU, Ben U.) On Sep 21, 2014, at 11:28 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Stan, > > If you think that fi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions

Jon wrote: A nominalist in name only would be a nominal nominalist. But a real nominalist would be a contradiction in terms. Sometimes it seems to me that the cleverness of your wit approaches the profound, Jon. Or, as Frederik just wrote regarding the above, great! Best, Gary Gary Richmond

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6920] Re: Natural Propositions

Dear Frederik, Would you agree that the "fleeting moment" nominalist is only half of the picture, that the other half is the nominalist who exists "in name only," nominally, that is, in a social contruct, such as Hobbes's nominalist social contract, or, say, Rorty's relative belief communities, or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6920] Re: Natural Propositions

Any ists with arms and legs and a mind exist regardless of what they think. In this usage ist is a characterization and characterizations are subjective and more than fallible. *@stephencrose * On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 6:27 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > Dear Freder

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

Gary F - see my replies: - Original Message - From: Gary Fuhrman To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; 'Peirce List' Sent: Sunday, September 21, 2014 4:17 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign 1) GF: Edwina, you're ignoring (or denying?) the dis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6919] Re: Being Trivially A Sign

Frederik: - Heh, I know; I accept your view and understand that it's different from mine. That's OK - I believe in exploration and analysis...and we don't all have to agree. Edwina - Original Message - From: Frederik Stjernfelt To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce List Sent:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6901] Re: Natural

At 04:25 PM 9/21/2014, Frederik wrote: [snip] But Howard, this is a different position than the one you presented in the earlier quote just some lines before. There, each foundation of math was legitimized by specific tasks - now they are deemed mere empty epistemological conventions. HP: I d

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Peircers, Here is Kant on the correspondence theory of truth: Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object. According to this mere verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object. Now, I can only compare the object with my kn

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Peircers, Way back when I wasted many weeks vainly vying to add a bit of wit to a bailiwik of the WWW where any hint of wit frightens the wits out of those who inhabit it, I contributed a few paragraphs to the Wikipediot article on the "Pragmatic Theory of Truth". Revisiting those old haunts

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Icons & Indices

Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14182 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14184 SJ:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14187 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14194 JA:http://permalin

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6882] Re: Natural Propositions,

I'm not sure that I follow you here, Frederik. If the "lower" sciences provide data for the "higher" ones, how can they fail to function as tests for the "higher" ones? I'm not talking about conclusive tests, of course. Surely there's plenty of mediation by auxiliary hypotheses, and so one could