I'm not sure that I follow you here, Frederik. If the "lower" sciences provide data for the "higher" ones, how can they fail to function as tests for the "higher" ones? I'm not talking about conclusive tests, of course. Surely there's plenty of mediation by auxiliary hypotheses, and so one could maintain claims from the "higher" sciences even if they seem to conflict with results from the "lower" ones. More importantly, it can be very difficult to get the lower-level data to bear on higher-level claims. But I think Ben's earlier post nicely brought out Peirce's challenge to himself and to other logicians to find ways to do just that, and that certainly sounds like testing to me. Perhaps Peirce's ordering of the sciences has the consequence that an idealized intellect would not need lower-level data in order to test higher-level claims, but we're not such intellects, and I share Ben's sense that Peirce felt significant doubt about some of his logical claims in the absence of lower-level confirmation of those claims.(I leave as an aside for now the interesting questions this raises about the notion of a "positive reason" for doubting; I find this notion intriguing and unclear myself.) I don't think that your example of mathematics is persuasive, since the gap between mathematics and positive sciences seems to me different in kind than that between "higher" and "lower" sciences of positive fact. But I might just be misunderstanding you. Do you perhaps want to deny that the special sciences actually provide data for logic? One might think that all of the relevant data is cenoscopic rather than idioscopic? I think that fits some of the most important cases well; Peirce wasn't talking about the special science of psychology when he talked about tracing the pragmatic maxim back to "psychological" claims like the ones in "Fixation" connecting belief and action. He was talking about cenoscopic psychology, not idioscopic. But you seem in your message below to permit logical sciences to learn from special sciences and to have their claims confirmed by results in special sciences. And it seems to me that there's no confirmation w/o the possibility of disconfirmation, and again that sounds like testing. As we now approach the heart of your book, I'll understand if you're too busy to reply, but I'll be interested to get some clarification from you if you get a chance.
Best to all, Jeff K. ________________________________________ From: Frederik Stjernfelt [stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: Friday, September 19, 2014 6:42 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List Subject: [biosemiotics:6882] Re: Natural Propositions, Dear Ben, Jeffs, Gary, lists - Sorry for being away from the list - am at the Semiotics World Conf. in Sofia. The claim that logic and theory of science are independent of psychology does not at all imply they can not learn from psychology - or from other special sciences. Especially methodeutic in all its shades presupposes a vast and continually updated knowledge of as much of the special sciences as possible. The aid from special sciences, however, is not one of principles, rather delivering data (such as particular scientific explanations in methodeutics) for generalization or ideas for abductions. But I think the picture that the "lower" sciences in P's classification as tests of the "higher" ones is not the right one. Math - the uppermost science - is not tested by other sciences. P's idea as far as I recall is that the lower ones depend upon the higher ones for principles, vice versa for material. This seems to indicate that inspiration may run both ways, even if different types of inspirations. Best F Den 17/09/2014 kl. 21.23 skrev Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com<mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>> : Two or three corrections, sorry, in bold red. - Best, Ben On 9/17/2014 3:11 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: Jeff D., Jeff K., Gary F., lists, I agree with much of what you say, Jeff D., and with what Peirce says, although I think he underplays the extent to which his methodeutic was generalized from his own experience and expertise. Peirce's restatement "The Categories" (MS 403 of 1893http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm ) of his "On a New List" has a bit of the kind of impurity that you discuss. [ http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/categories.htm#93s8 Quote] §8. The Second Intermediate Conception: Relation, which Occasions the Third E [§23] The study of psychology, from which we find it convenient to borrow a few principles, shows us that we can never know, or even think, that a thing has a quality without thinking or having thought of other things partaking that quality and of still others wanting it, or at least possessing it in smaller measure. This is the natural, common-sense belief of the mass of men; and it seems to be confirmed by careful observation. There are only a few thinkers who do not accept it. [....] [End quote] It's just incredibly difficulty to stay on a general cenoscopic level and not rely on idioscopic experience's instances to provide material for generalization and for the attempt to base the generalization in purely cenoscopic considerations ('pulling the ladder up' after oneself). There's an extreme where it seems hopeless to avoid reliance on the actual for corroboration of seemingly philosophical ideas. That's why I suggest looking at the actual dependences among successful sciences in order to help build a systematic classification of them, and indeed Peirce places the whole subject of research classification in the 'Sciences of Review' a.k.a. 'Synthetic Philosophy', posterior to the special and other discovery sciences. The mathematician Dieudonné (a member of Bourbaki) said in his encyclopedia article on the classifications of mathematics that those classifications tend to arise from what is useful to working mathematicians and not from a systematist's pre-conceived notions. The city of successful researches may, in its layout below, come to reflect the constellations of the studied realities above, without any city planners having provided the specific scheme in advance. Or, take a less romantic image, a pattern of molds in a petrie dish may reveal the distribution of nutrients placed along the bottom of the dish. Those are metaphors, but there is an actual system of actual researches into many spheres of the real. The mental opens the door for general considerations, intellectually and imaginationally accessed real generals, to affect the actual, sometimes in non-pre-conceived yet enlightening ways. It might be discovered, in applying a philosophical normative science to special sciences, that more of that philosophical normative science belongs in 'Synthetic Philosophy' or at least idioscopically applied philosophy than we thought. You wrote, > [JD] [...] in what way is our normative theory of the principles of logic put > to the test in the special sciences—such as the science of psychology? Do > any of the conclusions that we draw in the special science of psychology > confirm or disconfirm our logical explanations of what is necessary for an > inference to be valid? Or, does the process of inquiring in the special > sciences put the normative theory to the test? That is, do we test the > normative theory of logical inference by examining the extent to which we are > better able to detect errors in the way we’ve analyzed the special > observations, or in the way it helps us see more clearly what makes the > inferences we are trying to draw from those observations valid or invalid? I > tend to think that the tests of our normative theory of logic take the latter > form (and not the former). [End quote] Your first statement of the alternative doesn't seem equivalent to your second statement of the alternative. It seems part of the purpose of general statistics, for example, to help us "detect errors" (by the general statistical study of errors) "in the way we've analyzed the special observations," and the general study of statistics, or at least the study of inferential statistics, seems part of the normative theory of inference. It helps us see what inferences would be sound. But maybe there's merely something about your wording that's going over my head, and the possibility of my failing to get something that most people get should not be underrated. So, I'll take your first statement of the alternative as the one clearer to me at this point. I agree that the special-scientific tests of our normative theory of logic tend to consist in how it helps us see more clearly what makes the inferences we are trying to draw valid or invalid (or sound or unsound, or as having or lacking whatever character is, in a normative light, to be prized in the given kind of inference). Yet a difficulty of a normative theory in application could point to any number of problems. It might be that difficulties in application could lead us to see a logical problem in the normative theory that _ought_ to have been seen at the general normative level, but somehow it escaped our attention, because we're fallible. Another possibility, because we're fallible, is that ideas of how to apply the normative doctrine became mistakenly attached to doctrine itself; the doctrine, say, was expressed partly in terms of those potential applications, etc., and some of those ideas turned out to be mistaken. Mathematics has been taken to such heights of rigor that one doesn't really expect mathematical errors to be discovered through in an application of math to special science, the far likelier explanation of a difficulty is that one is applying math that is valid mathematically but unsuitable for the specific application. But comparatively trivial examples are quite possible, suppose somebody miscalculates pi and this results in problems in manufacturing. The normative philosophical sciences have not all been taken to such heights of rigor. It's not all the study of syllogistic forms. Be it (according to Peirce) in philosophical logic or in maths of logic (I wish I knew), even Aristotelian logical quantification turned out, after thousands of years, to be a special case of Boolean logical quantification (I like to think that Boole discovered it by pure thought, but I don't know). Some of Fourier's math was regarded as non-rigorous but its success in real-world applications buoyed it for people, and if I remember correctly it's been generally made rigorous. None of this should reduce us to psychologism or sociologism. It just means that sometimes our errors turn up in application, but we should still seek to make our general-level corrections on the basis of better-understood general considerations ('pull the ladder back up' after ourselves). Best, Ben On 9/17/2014 1:21 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Ben, Jeff K., Gary F., Lists, Consider the following analogy between Peirce's normative theory of logic and Kant's normative theory of ethics. In the Grounding, Kant makes a distinction between a pure theory of ethics and an impure theory. The pure theory articulates the conditions necessary for a principle of morality to be objectively valid and what is necessary for any act of reasoning to satisfy the conditions specified in such laws of reason. An impure theory, on the other hand, draws on psychological and anthropological considerations about how we do act and do think in order to understand how we might overcome some of our biases and prejudices and better live up to the standards of morality. As such, a pure theory is an entirely theoretical inquiry, while an impure theory is more of a matter of practical considerations. Peirce seems to have a similar kind of division in mind when he makes the following point: "In coming to Speculative Rhetoric, after the main conceptions of logic have been well settled, there can be no serious objection to relaxing the severity of our rule of excluding psychological matter, observations of how we think, and the like. The regulation has served its end; why should it be allowed now to hamper our endeavors to make methodeutic practically useful? But while the justice of this must be admitted, it is also to be borne in mind that there is a purely logical doctrine of how discovery must take place, which, however great or little is its importance, it is my plain task and duty here to explore. In addition to this, there may be a psychological account of the matter, of the utmost importance and ever so extensive. With this, it is not my business here to meddle; although I may here and there make such use of it as I can in aid of my own doctrine." (CP 2.107) Peirce seems to be describing three different ways that we might inquire about the nature of inference. There is the cenoscopic science of logic, which studies the laws of valid reasoning and what is necessary for any scientific intelligence to employ such laws in the search for truth. There is the special science of psychology, which studies the habits that govern how creatures such as human beings actually do tend to think. There is also a practical inquiry of how better to apply standards of reasoning in our lives so as to improve the ways in which we think about one or another kind of practical problem. Peirce suggests that there are a number of differences between these three modes of inquiry concerning the nature of inference. Let me summarize some of the differences. 1. The cenoscopic science of logic is a normative theory, while the special science of psychology is a descriptive theory. The cenoscopic science draws on a scientific method, but one that draws heavily on analysis and is tailored for use in examining what can be inferred from observations drawn from our common experience. Many of these observations involve de jure claims. The special science of psychology draws on a scientific method, but one that draws heavily on inductive forms of inference and what can be inferred from observations that are empirically grounded. These observations are treated as de facto claims. The methods used in the cenoscopic science of logic are designed to help us discover and articulate what is necessary for any scientific inquirer to pursue the aim of finding the truth. The methods used in the special science of logic are designed to help us discover and articulate habits that tend to govern the actual thinking patterns of one or another kin d of cr eature—such as a human being or a dolphin. Different beings may, in fact, follow somewhat different patterns of thought because the patterns may have a more or less contingent character. 2. The cenoscopic science of logic is a pure theory, where the central aim is discovering the fundamental truths concerning the laws of reason that govern valid inference. Finding such truths requires a willingness to persist in such inquiry for as long as it takes. As a matter of principle, that may be a very long run. The practical science of logic is an attempt to apply our current understanding to our current practical problems. As we attempt to solve these practical problems, we may profitably draw from our current theories in the cenoscopic science of logic and our current theories in the special science of psychology. As such, this inquiry involves a mixture of different kinds of conceptions that have been formed using different methods and in the pursuit of practical aims—and we could call such “inquiry” impure because of this mixing of different aims and approaches. That is a quick and incomplete summary of some of the differences that Peirce stresses between these three ways we inquire about inference. As such, I’m more than willing to admit that the practical application of logic may involve conceptions drawn from the special science of psychology. Having said that, let me ask: should we draw on the specialized observations and the descriptive conceptions used in the special science of psychology when we are developing the normative theory of logic? I want to press the point that, due to the de facto character of the special observations made in the science of psychology, they seem to have little relevance for our inquiries in the normative science of logic. Such evidence will not enable us to determine what is necessary for an inference to be valid. Peirce makes this kind of point in the following way: “The book is only intended to be pure theory. In like manner, if Normative Science does not in the least tend to the development of skill, its value as Normative Science remains the same. It is purely theoretical. Of course there are practical sciences of reasoning and investigation, of the conduct of life, and of the production of works of art. They correspond to the Normative Sciences, and may be probably expected to receive aid from them. … Nor again is Normative Science a special science, that is, one of those sciences that discover new phenomena. It is not even aided in any appreciable degree by any such science, and let me say that it is no more by psychology than by any other special science. … In like manner, and in just about the same degree, the fact that men for the most part show a natural disposition to approve nearly the same arguments that logic approves, nearly the same acts that ethics approves, and nearly the same works of art that esthetics approves , may b e regarded as tending to support the conclusions of logic, ethics, and esthetics. But such support is perfectly insignificant; and when it comes to a particular case, to urge that anything is sound and good logically, morally, or esthetically, for no better reason than that men have a natural tendency to think so, I care not how strong and imperious that tendency may be, is as pernicious a fallacy as ever was.” (CP 5.125) Let me pose the following question. We are accustomed to thinking about Peirce’s architectonic ordering of the sciences in the following way. The principles articulated in the normative science of logic are tested in the science of metaphysics. In turn, the principles articulated in the science of metaphysics are tested in the special sciences. As such, the principles of in our normative theory of logic are tested—at least indirectly—in the special science of psychology. Given what Peirce says in the last sentence of what I’ve quoted above (at CP 5.125), in what way is our normative theory of the principles of logic put to the test in the special sciences—such as the science of psychology? Do any of the conclusions that we draw in the special science of psychology confirm or disconfirm our logical explanations of what is necessary for an inference to be valid? Or, does the process of inquiring in the special sciences put the normative theory to the test? Tha t is, d o we test the normative theory of logical inference by examining the extent to which we are better able to detect errors in the way we’ve analyzed the special observations, or in the way it helps us see more clearly what makes the inferences we are trying to draw from those observations valid or invalid? I tend to think that the tests of our normative theory of logic take the latter form (and not the former). --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 ________________________________________ From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com<mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>] Sent: Tuesday, September 16, 2014 3:44 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee<mailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee>; 'Peirce List' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
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