[PEIRCE-L] Re: Kaina Stoicheia

Thread: JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14326 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14327 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14329 GF:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14330 Gary, Thanks, I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Kaina Stoicheia 2014

Jon, you might mention that there are at least two complete copies of Kaina Stoicheia on the web, one at Arisbe http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm and one at my site http://www.gnusystems.ca/KainaStoicheia.htm - so again, I don't see the point of posting an exce

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Kaina Stoicheia

Peircers, I found the passage I was looking for: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/2005-November/003190.html I'm thinking it may be worth redoing in a blog post if the graphic gets too mushed over in this format. I don't think it can be possible to sum up the essence of a symbol any more su

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6842] Re: Natural Propositions,

Howard, lists, You snipped a bit too much of what I said. I was talking about mathematics not just in the sense of doing the math, but of the mathematical objects themselves. You switch between the objects that one considers, and one's considering of the objects, and end up comparing apples t

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Kaina Stoicheia 2014

Peircers, A bit more poking around reveals that I created the Wikipedia article on May 7, 2006. It looks like it got absorbed into the main article on C.S. Peirce. http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kaina_Stoicheia&oldid=51937343 It appears that I found this passage to be of primary imp

[PEIRCE-L] Kaina Stoicheia 2014

Peircers, We, at least some of us, have discussed the Kaina Stoicheia on many previous occasions. To save myself some typing I went searching the web and my "ZZZ" sleeper files to see if I could find a few bits that I had copied out before. I discovered that I had actually started a Wikipedi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

> On Sep 25, 2014, at 7:36 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > > But aren't formal and material causes just re-baptized in physics as > constants (of laws), as types of forces or particles, or as boundary > conditions? > Again I think it gets complex due to the different but mathematically iso

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

> On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:48 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > > Stephen, Peirce sees conscious thinking as Thought (i.e. a sign) actively > taking consciousness and directing it, rather than the other way round, as > you here (and most people generally) see it. That’s one reason why Peirce > takes the

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6995] Re: Natural Propositions

Dear Gary, lists - This is correct. This is also why not every phase of thought needs consciousness - even if Peirce was very insistent on thought being self-controlled. But he also realized self-control come in many degrees, not all of them necessarily conscious - even if consciousness probably

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

> On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > >> This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the >> move towards an externalist approach to mind in Heidegger is also made in >> Peirce. And it’s precisely within the proposition (or more expansively the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth - Kant's polar opposition to chemistry

List, Jon: Kant and chemical semiotics are polar opposites. Kant did not accept the possibility of quantification of chemistry. from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-science/ "In the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations Kant claims that chemistry, at least as he understood it in 178

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth: HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14168 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14169 HP:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14177 JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

Signs are sufficiently diffuse and vague as to have an almost spectral entity. I see consciousness as the willed condition in which signs become visible or perceptible and thought as a description of the entire consideration of which this is the start. The next thing that happens is naming. sign >n

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions

Frederik, Lists, You say: "Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were propositions." For the sake of sorting through some of the disagreements that have been voiced about what kinds of signs or representamens may be found in the physical, chemical, biological or social

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

Dear S, lists, Some thought is indeed conscious but we have good reasons to suspect that even large swathes of human thought are not conscious. So, like Peirce, I hesitate to make consciousness part of the definition of thought, also because we have as yet no means to ascertain which animal thou

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear C, B, lists - Scares me as well - is this really so widespread among philosophy students? Why don't they study sociology instead, then? And why should we be "culturally sensitive" at all? We have only reached to where we are now by being INsensitive to a lot of cultural ideas - including th

Re: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

Dear Clark, lists, Den 24/09/2014 kl. 22.17 skrev Clark Goble mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> : On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote: In any event, I'm finding section 4. of "New Elements" of especial interest and want to discuss the passage discussing t

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

Stephen, Peirce sees conscious thinking as Thought (i.e. a sign) actively taking consciousness and directing it, rather than the other way round, as you here (and most people generally) see it. That's one reason why Peirce takes the trouble to criticize psychologism. gary f. From: Stephen C

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions . Selected Passages

Jon, I think it would be better if you would combine the quotes from NP and your comments in a single message. It would also be better if you (and everyone) would send posts only to the list(s), i.e. delete the addresses of individuals from your address field before you send, as that would avoid un

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6976] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.2

Edwina, lists, In the ten-sign list of the Syllabus, the Dicent Symbolic Legisign is but one of three types of Dicisigns. So you can not identify the two. I discuss the other two, Dicent Indexical Sinsign and Dicent Indexical Sinsign, in the chapter. Best F Den 24/09/2014 kl. 15.16 skrev Edwina

RE: [biosemiotics:6973] RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.1

Clark, yes, that's one reason I've been recommending "Kaina Stoicheia" as a supplementary text for this seminar, because it's mostly about propositions but also about the "New Elements" *of the logic of mathematics*. I'm certainly not a mathematician myself, but I don't think one can get a good

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6961] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear John, lists OK, that clarifies things. Best f Den 23/09/2014 kl. 11.35 skrev John Collier mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> : At 10:50 PM 2014-09-21, Frederik wrote: Dear Stan, lists, The problem here is a bit as when Collier thought all the world was "in the head" - for where is that head? in

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6945] Re: Natural Propositions,

Dear Stan, lists Frederick -- replying to The problem here is a bit as when Collier thought all the world was "in the head" - for where is that head? in the world? in another head? The same holds here: "the world will be constructed by each [tradition] via different models" - now, WHERE are th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Beyond the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Dear Clark, lists, I agree. Peirce's notion of iconicity can not be reduced to subjective similarity associations. It is an operational concept: certain operations performed on the icon represent real operations performed on the object of the icon. That is what permit to icons to teach new lesso

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

I see thought as a conscious process that takes a sign and names it and submits it to an index and eventuates in an expression or action. I suppose it amounts to a chain of propositions but it is conscious and it impacts daily living. *@stephencrose * On Thu, Sep

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6952] Re: Natural Propositions

Dear John, lists, I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting points were propositions. Best F Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> : At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote: Dear Sung, lists - To take thought to be but the res

Re: [biosemiotics:6943] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions: revised schedule

Dear E, G, lists I also have no idea as to how Peirce would pronounce it. I chose "dee-see-" for these reasons: The "C" I pronounce as "S" for the reasons Edwina quotes - in the traditional pronunciation of Latin words, "C" is generally "S" before front wovels like "I" The "I" I pronounce as "EE"

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2

Dear Clark, lists - But aren't formal and material causes just re-baptized in physics as constants (of laws), as types of forces or particles, or as boundary conditions? Best F Den 22/09/2014 kl. 15.59 skrev Clark Goble mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> : On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13 PM, Clark Goble

[PEIRCE-L] Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence (FOME)

Fallacy Of Misplaced Essence (FOME) GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14293 CG:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14294 JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14295 GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.pei

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6908] Re: Natural Propositions,

Yes! The remedy for it, as you put well in another message, is to think about what the practical consequences would actually be. Cheers, Cathy -Original Message- From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: Wednesday, 24 September 2014 6:27 a.m. To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject