I think the outline of the difference between reality and existence, as
provided below, is only a partial outline and even, suggests nominalism rather
than realism. It suggests that 'the real' can be a 'thing-in-itself', i.e., "a
thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conceptio
Dear Jon, Jerry, Helmut, Kirsti:
This chain of emails is one of the most valuable to me. Among other things,
I am a longtime student of St. Anselm, whom I believe to be much closer to
Peirce than has been noticed.
Jon, I am particularly grateful to you for both beginning this chain with
your quest
Edwina, List:
Your response is based entirely on something that Peirce wrote in 1871, as
if his thought on this subject did not evolve any further in the remaining
43 years of his life. In fact, 21 years later (1892), in "Man's Glassy
Essence" (1892), he specifically referred to "Some Consequence
Dear Edwina:
Your email came while I was writing mine, and thus I did not read it before
sending mine.
But I think that what you quoted from Peirce at the end of yours is what I
am trying to get at, namely, "...Consequently a thing in the general is as
real as in the concrete" 8.14..."It is a rea
Jon, list
Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence that
Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there are plenty
of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
Furthermore, the Three Categories are NOT identical with the terms of
'universal' and 'p
Ben N., List:
BN: While the conceptual framework you give makes great sense ...
Just to be clear, and to give credit where it is due, this conceptual
framework is not "mine," it is Peirce's; or at least, it is my
understanding of Peirce's.
BN: For example, if you tell me that there is a barn
Edwina, List:
ET: Actually, my quotes came from that section, but, there is no evidence
that Peirce discarded the Scotus view of realism in later life and there
are plenty of quotes from elsewhere that support it.
I never claimed that Peirce "discarded the Scotus view of realism." In
fact, Pei
Jon- I consider that you should not hold yourself up as The
Master-Guru-of-Peirce. You are one person, with your own reading and analysis
of Peirce. I am also one person, with my reading and analysis of Peirce. We
have the right and ability to disagree with our interpretations of Peirce.
Theref
Edwina, List:
I trust our fellow List participants to judge for themselves, but I think
that a fair reading of my posts would not come close to suggesting that I
"hold [my]self up as The Master-Guru-of-Peirce," or have been "arrogant,"
or have behaved as if I were "the Ultimate-Master of Peirce."
An exegetical contest seems to be underway with more self-reference than an
effort to say why Peirce is significant today. Significance is why one
might be drawn to this forum. I think there were some who no longer post
here who created at least balance. I keep reading but I wish there was more
att
Jon- you've done it again. The opinions you express on the issues are your
analysis of Peirce; the opinions on these same issues are my analysis of Peirce
- and are not, as you insist, 'my own system of thought' which you declare that
I 'ought to acknowledge'. They are, I repeat, my analysis of
Stephen, List:
Your point is well-taken, and I certainly have no desire or intention to
engage in an "exegetical contest" or attempt to exclude anyone. All I am
asking is that we be careful and honest about distinguishing Peirce's
views, especially those expressed explicitly in his writings, from
Edwina, List:
In accordance with Stephen's gentle admonition, I will attempt to refrain
from engaging in an "exegetical contest" with you. I provided links to
Peirce's various (but largely consistent) definitions of "real" and
"existence"; did you even read through them before replying? He evide
Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see 5.311] is
hardly a nominalistic outline. Indeed, Peirce explains this requirement
repeatedly throughout his works.
I wrote: "And i also consider that we should clarify the terms of 'real',
'reality' and 'realism'. You chasti
Edwina, List:
ET: Jon - the requirement for a community in the analysis of reality [see
5.311] is hardly a nominalistic outline.
Yes, the community is required for the *analysis* of reality; but reality
is whatever it is, *regardless* of that analysis--in fact, regardless of
whether there even
Hi everyone,
Here is a general expression of human nature:
MENO: When you have told me what I ask, I will tell you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: A man who was blindfolded has only to hear you talking, and he
would know that you are a fair creature and have still many lovers.
MENO: Why do you think so?
Jon - you referred to my original quote from 5.311, wherein I referred to
Peirce's notion of 'community' as
Your latest citations for Peirce's "view of reality" are from an 1868 paper,
"Some Consequences of Four Incapacities"; as I already pointed out, Peirce
referenced that very paper in 1892
My sense is that there’s some equivocation (perhaps even by Peirce) over the
term existence.
It seems to me that Peirce’s use of “real” is really about predication. Part of
the confusion is things like mathematical objects. To follow Quine you can
quantify over them but as soon as you start usi
Edwina, List:
ET: Now - you are diverting from your original criticism above of my
reference by talking about it instead as 'analysis'. Why didn't you state
that originally rather than reject the 'very paper' as 'too nominalistic'.
You did not use the word "analysis" originally, and I did not
Clark, List:
Thank you for your comments. I cited the first part of that quote earlier
to show that Peirce considered "Real" and "Reality" to be the adjective and
noun for the same basic concept. The excerpt from Ben is also relevant and
helpful, especially the remark that many people want "real
Jon, list
My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of reality.
i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind is
not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the three
categorical actions of the actions of Mind - but the
Clark, list:
I think your recognition of the polysemic nature of terminologies when
discussing the Existence of God/Reality of God problem is very important.
In fact, I’m not sure if *any* person is capable of talking about this
consistently without external help.
Moreover, in terms of using
> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> Thank you for your comments. I cited the first part of that quote earlier to
> show that Peirce considered "Real" and "Reality" to be the adjective and noun
> for the same basic concept. The excerpt from Ben is also relevant and
> he
Clark wrote: The old joke of 90% of any philosophical argument consists of
coming to agreement over the semantics of terms is all too often true.
And in a logically narrow sense, this is what Peirce suggests is the
purpose and value of the Pragmatic Maxim.
Best,
Gary R
[image: Gary Richmond]
*
> On Sep 8, 2016, at 4:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Clark wrote: The old joke of 90% of any philosophical argument consists of
> coming to agreement over the semantics of terms is all too often true.
>
> And in a logically narrow sense, this is what Peirce suggests is the purpose
> and val
Gary, Clark, list:
You said:
“The old joke of 90% of any philosophical argument consists of coming to
agreement over the semantics of terms is all too often true.”
To think this problem is 90% semantics when talking in context of a
philosopher who invented semiosis, which goes beyond termi
List:
Returning to the four questions in my post that started this thread …
1. To what specifically was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the
nature of thinking"--the three stages of a "complete inquiry" and their
"logical validity," as laid out in sections III and IV of the paper,
Jon, list:
They are all consistent.
What is analogical reasoning but saying one thing in terms of another?
essence and esse
Subject and predicate
Father and Son
Non-being and being
Agent and patient
First and Second
ens originarium and ens necessarium
theologico-physico
name and de
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