Ben and list,
Thank you for the links to Peirce. I follow his logic and diagrams,
and I have no problem with any of it. Formal logic is clear. It's the
natural language expressions that cause confusion. It seems to me
that it is also natural language that has produced most of the
well-known
Howard, list,
Peirce said /"there is some one individual of which one or other of two
predicates is true"/ ABOUT a specific proposition that he was
discussing. So you need to read that specific proposition in order to
understand what Peirce meant by "there is some one individual" etc.:
"There
At 02:57 PM 2/17/2015, Sungchul Ji wrote:
Howard wrote Statements (021715-1) and (021715-3) which seem to me
to focus on only one aspect of the irreducibly triadic process known
as 'semiosis':
HP: Yes. I was focusing one aspect -- the syntactic communication of
information. All other aspects
Jerry, List,
FYSMI, just last month I named my new computer "Woodstock".
http://farm3.static.flickr.com/2070/1794990046_36e9fbb752.jpg
Cheers,
Jon
On 2/17/2015 3:23 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
List Sung, Jon:
On Feb 17, 2015, at 1:57 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
"For example, the moment I type
List Sung, Jon:
On Feb 17, 2015, at 1:57 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
> "For example, the moment I typed "Ben" it became a (021715-1)
> sequence of 24 0s and 1s,
citing Howard's post.
Does your strange post commit your belief system to account for the conclusion
of Howard's calculat
Howard wrote Statements (021715-1) and (021715-3) which seem to me to focus
on only one aspect of the irreducibly triadic process known as 'semiosis':
"For example, the moment I typed "Ben" it became a
(021715-1)
sequence of 24 0s and 1s, and such sequences are all
that is ever manipulated and tr
Ben and list,
I don't see that any of your examples correspond to Peirce's first
clause: "there is some one individual of which one or other of two
predicates is true." My point was that this statement does not imply
a second individual. Even if you assume that this "one individual" is
a memb
Howard, list,
Two statements of the kind that Peirce _/describes/_ with "There is some
one individual" etc., etc., are equivalent. You can see this in the
example of *A*: 'There is something round or blue' and *B*: 'There is
something round or there is something blue' by recognizing that their
Ben and list,
I agree that Poincaré's complaints about logic
were excessive, probably because he was irritated
more by Russell's attitude than by logic itself;
but I'm still missing something about that strange theorem.
Peirce says: "The logical Principle is that to
say that there is some o
List, Ben:
citing HP:
>> HP: This "strange rule" illustrates Poincaré's criticism of logic as an
>> impoverishment of natural language that can neither count nor tell time.
>>
With respect to the contrast between mathematics and logic, a sharper argument
is possible.
A priori, mathematicians
Howard,
It's not just my instinct, it's Peirce's that there's something strange
about an equivalence between where one _/seems/_ to formulate talk of
one thing and where one _/seems/_ to formulate talk of possibly two things.
The problem is that symbolic logic requires us to contract ideas in
At 09:30 PM 2/14/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
The strange rule really isn't so strange. In CP
4.569 Peirce (without calling it the 'strange
rule') says: "The logical Principle is that to
say that there is some one individual of which
one or other of two predicates is true is no
more than to s
eem to do that to me. :-\
(That last comment is iconic, but not optimally … )
gary f.
*From:* Benjamin Udell
*Sent:* 13-Feb-15 4:19 PM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce in 1913 on existential graphs
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "
seem to do that to me. :-\
(That last comment is iconic, but not optimally … )
gary f.
From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: 13-Feb-15 4:19 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce in 1913 on existential graphs
List,
I've found by Goo
List,
I've found by Googling sufficiently, that Don D. Roberts discussed the
1913 Peirce-to-Woods passage on existential graphs, starting on page 109
in _The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce
Page 109:
https://books.google.com/books?id=Q4K30wCAf-gC&pg=PA103&lpg=PA103&dq=%22as+I+did,+I+s
List,
I Googled around to see whether anybody had commented on Peirce's 1913
remark to F.A. Wood, and found that Gary Fuhrman at his website had
incorporated the remark as a note to 4.569
http://www.gnusystems.ca/ProlegomPrag.htm#4569 (once there, scroll down
a little).
I didn't know about
List,
While we're waiting for the Natural Propositions seminar to recommence,
I thought I'd send this on an oddity that I've found. I think I've
mentioned at peirce-l in the past that I couldn't track down a certain
correction that Peirce made to a graph in "Prolegomena" - I don't mean
Peirc
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