Marccu s, Gary F., Janos, list,
One problem here is that many people are probably working with different
notions of what is cognition, what is perception. For my part I take
perception as a mode of cognition, but I don't know what others think
and I'm unsure what Peirce thought.
Marccu,
Hello Janos,
I know you are talking about a process, and specifically about the order of
events in it. But since you are posting on the Peirce list, we assume that you
are trying to use Peircean terms such as triadic relation, object,
interpretant, Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in
Subjectivity or subject is a kind of mode of being like firstness, secondness
and thirdness. Those modes of being includes continuous information formation
within subject which can recognize himself as real. This mode of being called
subject, human being, is in relation to other subjects and
markku, Janos,
I used the term generated thought because Janos used it, and I was
trying to explain the point in his own terms. As such it's different
from Peirce's Thought, which is more generator than generated.
I'm not sure I understand your question well enough to answer it, but .
you
Janos, list
I can see a large bowl of soup with many ingredients determining a continuous
range of qualities and flavors, some of which overlap and legislate the
subsequent flavors for an interpretant which moves to stir the bowl a bit or
inhale through the nostrils, recognizing that the
For exmple Locke is thought to be an originator of the idea of the
tabula rasa - a blank slate. In his Essay Concerning Human
Understanding he also had an idea of the nature of associationism. I use
the term I have learnt from Peirce-list; disagree.
But now, you
tell to us that the
Janos, now I see what your problem is.
A stimulus has to be *second* to whatever responds do it. A quality, as a
manifestation of Firstness, cannot be a stimulus. The response must *also* be
second to the stimulus. In other words, a stimulus-response event is an
instance of Secondness.
What
Dear list,
Thank you for your reactions so far. Unless I missed something, as yet
the nature of a relation between triadic sign and qualitative change has
not been fully explained. On 01/29/15 John wrote: irreducible triads as
not fully computable, and hence inherently open-ended, which
John,
Much as I admire your expertise in philosophy, I am afraid you missed the
key point of the diagrams in my previous post you refer to:
The commutative triangle representation of communication diagrammed
(012915-1)
in Figures 1 and 2 of my previous post embodies both Saussurean
I find this a bit weird, Gary and Edwina. Perhaps it is just the fine details.
I once published
This requires a triadic production of what Peirce calls the interpretant, a
relation in which the sign (representamen) bears some variety of correspondence
to its reference through the immediate
List, Sung,
This diagram is not of a Peircean triad, but of reducible dyadic Sausserian
communication. Of course in this system it works out as Sung describes, but it
is not relevant to Peircean semiotics.
John
From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of
John - that's a very nice outline and I agree with it. The representamen is a
'dynamic state' in that its evolved and evolving abstractions function as a
mediative processing of input data from the Object to the Interpretant. And
yes, since it is, in itself, an evolved powerful 'set' of
John, Gary R, Edwina, Jeff, lists,
I wan to address the question whether or not the representamen can be
viewed as a process. To do this, I will use the communication between the
utterer and the hearer (which Peirce often used) as a concrete model of
semiosis:
Gary R, Jeff, Edwina, Lists,
I was recently thinking about Peirce's definition of sign Gary quoted, in
connection with the complementarity principle and the Moebius strip that I
discussed yesterday on these lists.
*The sign stands for something*, its object. It stands for that object, *not
in
Janos, Edwina, list,
There are those of us who do indeed see the representamen as Peirce refers
to it as a First, that is as categorial firstness. This interpretation
is, in good part, based on Peirce's analysis of what it is that the
representamen can represent, and at times--notably in the *New
Dear list,
If you want to look at the representamen as dynamical (which I am pretty sure
that Perice sanctions (I don't have relevant quotes handy), then it is, I would
think, a state, not a process. To be a process it has to change its state, but
it does not. I am pretty sure that Edwina has
Janos - I think that it might help if you defined your use of the terms:
representamen and sign. Without this definition, I am puzzled by your
comment.
A representamen is, in the Peircean framework, the mediative aspect of the
semiosic triad. Therefore, it doesn't 'exist per se' on its own as
Edwina:
In my view any representamen can be interpreted as a sign, and can be
interpreted as a sign of any one of the 10 sign types. Which one of
those types the arising sign will have depends on the interpreting
system's state, knowledge, etc. From this I conclude that, in sign
generation, a
Gary R wrote:
The Representamen functions. . . as a process? *Semiosis* may perhaps be
seen as a process, but the Representamen? Maybe this is required by your
input-mediation-output wff version of semiosis, but I know of no one else
who sees it like this, the representamen as an active. .
Edwina, list,
Just a few comments interleaved. I was only commenting on one of the
questions brought about by Janos' post, so I'll only address that below:
ET: 2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - which
is how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The
Gary R - I view all your bold analogies as indicative descriptions of
'qualia'i.e., as 'simply in itself', present, immediate, fresh, new..can't
be thought...etc and etc. These are all attributes of the experience of
'qualia'.
But the Platonic idea, which is a universal Form, is none of
Sung wrote, remarking on a disagreement Edwina and I are having:
Would this perhaps support the suggested PIRPUS (Principle of the
Insufficiency of Reading Peirce for Understanding Signs) ?
While it is true that Edwina and I apparently disagree on *some* basic
semiotic principles, both of us
Janos: I don't agree that the triad requires the representamen to be always
'interpreted as a quality', i.e., in the mode of Firstness. If you take a
look at the ten classes of signs (2.256 as outlined in 1903), you will see
that in only one of these ten classes is the Representamen in a mode
Dear Janos,
In general, there is no difference at all between a qualitative change and
a change in the third. However, this concept is not entirely worked out by
Peirce. It is important not to see the third as a passive state of qualia
but as a non-local physical state that directly related to
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