Hi Ben,
Yes, and the key issue is how to get from 3 to 4, it seems to me. By this
question I mean to be staying within formal logic, not broaching Howard's
issue about levels of abstraction from natural language.
Cheers, Cathy
On Wed, Feb 25, 2015 at 2:49 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Argh, err
Howard, Cathy, list,
I've been advised off-list that the post of mine below was quite
unclear. I was talking, likewise as Howard and indeed Peirce in
"Prolegomena" CP 4.569 were
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/prolegomena.htm#Paragraph569
, about how the ordinary-language sense of
Howard, Cathy, list,
Howard, at first I thought you were making a point that I had made in a
previous thread on the subject, when I said that Peirce disbelieved that
the seeming meaning of the ordinary language was captured by the formal
logic, and I started talking about veiled constants, mod
List, Ben:
On Feb 24, 2015, at 6:45 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Anyway:
> "Wxy" ≡ "xy are wife and husband together" (two people uniquely paired in
> ordered relation)
Did you really mean this?
Or, is a married couple the same couple if they are not an ordered pair in the
sense of set theory?
Argh, error, I said "How to get from 3. to 4.?" I meant "How to get from
2. to 3.?" Corrected below. - Best, Ben
On 2/24/2015 7:45 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Cathy, list,
Sometimes Peirce speaks of lines of identity as crossing a cut.
Elsewhere he insists that a line of identity can only abut a
Ben, Catherine and list,
At 04:29 PM 2/24/2015, Catherine Legg wrote:
I'm confused though about Peirce's big announcement about now being
able to give a meaning to graphs which cross a cut.
[snip]
I once tried to prove Peirce's famous two statements about the
suiciding wife and the man who fail
Cathy, list,
Sometimes Peirce speaks of lines of identity as crossing a cut.
Elsewhere he insists that a line of identity can only abut a cut,
meeting up with another line of identity from the cut's other side. In
those cases the line of identity is a graph, and the ligature formed of
the abu
Hello all - sorry to come late onto this thread.
I'm very interested to hear about Peirce's late shift in view as to
the meaning of his cut - from simple univocal falsity, to varieties of
possibility (which may divide into further kinds). I am reminded to
Wittgenstein's Tractatus where logical spa
Negations are very, very troublesome in logic. I think it would serve a purpose
to return to the meanings of the terms. - Contradictories apply to statements
only. To what is claimed. Contraries apply to empereia, too.
Kirsti
Kirsti Määttänen [kirst...@saunalahti.fi] kirjoitti:
Leading princ
Leading principle(s) may not be fixed. The principle of triadicity contains
Mediation, thus change. Anything organic stays changeable, still with some
continuity. This is something empirical and valid in all cases. - Is it not?
Kirsti
Jerry LR Chandler [jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] kirjoitti:
B
Ben, John, List:
Thank you for the stimulating perspectives. As you both know, I am interested
in the logic of chemistry as it relates to biology and mathematics.
The discussion under this thread illustrates the differences between the
foundations of chemical logic and classical logic in an
e, or anther woman. committing suicide.
Jim W
Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2015 13:55:36 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of sem
'non-local space and progressive time'.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard"
To: "'Peirce List'" ;
Sent: Monday, January 19, 2015 11:16 PM
Subject: RE: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propo
nt: January 20, 2015 7:08 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jerry,
I was posting about a hexagon and a hexadecagon (not really, two of its corners
were internal) of opposit
Jerry,
In 2006, I posted this
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/messages?id=199707#199707 with an image of an
Aristotelian hexagon of opposition (which I'd thought up years before,
figuring that I probably wasn't the first)
http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/attachment/199707/2/HexOpp.gif
As to contradictor
Jerry,
I was posting about a hexagon and a hexadecagon (not really, two of its
corners were internal) of opposition many years ago at peirce-l before I
learned that they had all been found as obvious many years before. The
hexadecagon (which looks like a shadow of a tesseract) were covered by
List, Ben:
Let's look at the history of your posts on this topic:
Jan. 17: I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense.
Jan. 17: I guess I should have said 'diametrical opposite' instead of
'diametrical contrary' which is an atypical phr
Gary F., Lists,
You’ve provided a sketch of some of the developments you see in Peirce’s
account of how we should interpret the two sides of the sheet of assertion.
One amendment I’d like to add to your sketch is that, as early as the Lowell
Lectures of 1903, Peirce described a book of multipl
Jeff, you've put your finger on the crucial point that remains mysterious to
me, and doesn't seem to be addressed in Ben's posts, helpful as they
certainly are. It's about the verso of the sheet of assertion. Here I'll try
to outline the steps leading to Peirce's "new discovery", as near as I can
m
ate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 11:55 AM
To: Peirce List; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On t
cide" if the two
men are identical. Thus, back to the first problem. Importantly, I am
changing quantifiers and not simply adding or subtracting the same
one. Secondly, I am curious about the previous role of "a man."
Jim W
----------------------------
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -050
Jim W
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jim, list,
Expos
Dear Frederik, lists,
In your example, (A) 'Something is blue AND round' and (B) 'Something is
blue AND something is round' are indeed non-equivalent in standard
logic. (A) implies but is not implied by (B), so that does not seem to
be what raises the question for Peirce. What troubles him is
Dear Ben -
The Gamma graph paper where P discusses these things is pretty late (1908) - I
do not think he ever finalizes this revision. But of course, giving up the
"strange rule" is equivalent with Beta becoming different from FOL with rules
of passage (as the strange rule is such a rule).
Ahti
Dear Frederik, lists,
Thank you. My questions are: does Peirce revise the Beta graph system to
remove the "strange rule", and wouldn't that render the Beta graph
system non-equivalent to first-order logic? Or is it only the Gamma
graph system that's affected? If he did revise the Beta system
Dear Ben, lists -
Thank you for good illustrations of the issue.
I discuss the example with suicide and banrkuptcy from "An Improvement of the
Gamma graphs" towards the end of ch. 8. Here Peirce denies the rule of passage
- the "strange rule" as he has it - granting the equivalence between your
EIRCE-L] Natural
Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Jim, list,
Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to
logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then
Peirce's example
Jim, list,
Here's a plainer case of a rule of passage.
Best, Ben
On 1/17/2015 6:20 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jim, list,
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list
Jim, list,
Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to logical
criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then Peirce's examples of
inference modes don't work any more than my examples with 'John'.
As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some examples.
Note
Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do not seem to carry enough
information to decide the question.
On the other hand, if "John" lacks reference, the statements "John is blue "
and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial empty) Further, one may tempted
to treat these as Universal
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