I appreciated Marty's arguments in favor of considering how
most circumcised adults view their parents' decision to circumcise them as
babies, and perhaps there is something to them. I have two reservations,
though, about this (albeit ones that I might be persuaded out of).
Fir
Eugene: Without regard to what "adult subjects" generally think of the
procedure having been done (or not done) to them? Shouldn't we defer to
parents at least until such time as there are many adults who are outraged
that the state didn't step in?
On Fri, Jul 6, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene
As I mentioned, I think that statutory law on this is quite a
mix. The best way to characterize it, I think, is that
(1) there's a broad consensus that, for overdetermined reasons (practical to
some, moral to others), most decisions about children are left to parents,
(2) there's
From what I understand, think the health arguments for
circumcision are substantial, and, as I've noted before, to the extent that
parents are making a medical choice in favor of circumcision, I think it makes
sense to defer to their judgment, just as it does for other medical ch
And that “non-Jewish standard of ‘Jewishness’” – that newborn
males aren’t Jewish – is, I think, precisely the standard that our government
must adopt. Our law cannot (with some excepts related to political
distinctions, such as membership in an Indian tribe) accept a notion of
But that is invoking a non-Jewish standard of "Jewishness" (and I speak as someone intensely exasperated by refusal to acknowledge any distinction between "ethnic" and "religious" Jewishness.*) Someone can say "I spit on G_d, I spit on Torah, I spit on halakhah."; He can spend Sabbath behind a de
Yes (to Marty.) I'm someone inclined toward Marty's view, and I think the
empirical question of regret is very important. Regret either way is
important. If most circumcised men regret their infant circumcisions,
then infant circumcision becomes harder to justify. Similarly, if most
uncircumcis
Eugene's tattoo example is very helpful for teeing up what has seemed to me
to be the important distinction here (one I've tried to stress in my
earlier posts):
I think one big reason that most of us, unlike Eugene, are opposed to an
anti-circumcision law is because most men who were circumcised a
I don't think that such "agnosticism" is generally sound, or
even possible. Maybe God did command Jews to circumcise their children, or
command Sikhs to wear turbans in a way that makes it impossible for them to
wear motorcycle helmets, or command Rastafarians to smoke marijuana
I think that accurately captures the rule - and likely the
right rule - with regard to decisions made for medical reasons, when the
decisions are within the range of plausible medical decisions. (As I've said
all along, I think circumcision decisions may well fall in this catego
I agree with Chris entirely when it comes to questions having
to do with what to teach the child, whom to expose the child to, where to live
with the child, and similar child-rearing questions: There, in an intact
family, a court may not intrude simply on the grounds that some o
I think some guidance on relative rights of parents and children to make a
decision that could arguably either harm the child or be in the child's best
interest are found in the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Parham v. J.R. on
parental commitment of a minor to a state mental hospital. While t
Mark asks me whether Yoder was correctly decided. In some ways, this is a
very difficult question for me. I think the grounds on which Yoder
explicitly rests (communitarian view of free exercise, not a parental right
generally) cannot be justified. If parents have a constitutional right to
home
Yes, I'm feeling some of the same confusion as Paul.
I don't know much at all about family law. But my understanding was that
the "best interest of the child" standard was emphatically not the
standard for judicial or legislative interference with parental decisions.
It is the standard for w
I am with Paul in my confusion, and will add only a further question. If
we accept the principle that the best interests of the child prevails, does
that mean that judges and not parents will always have the decisive say?
(As a parent, for example, I think I am always acting in the best interest
o
This has been a very interesting discussion. I confess that at this point, I am
quite confused about the meaning of "best interests of the child." I understand
it is a complex, context-driven, and multivalent test. But it would certainly
help to understand the foundational values and defaults
Courts routinely rule that such an environment is in the best interests of the
child. But specific practices need to be vetted under the standard. It is a
fact question.
Shared values and age-old historic traditions do not cut it, however. The
Muslims who engage in genital mutilation satis
But we do know-- the best interests of the child is based on a totality of the
circumstances. A one-time sip of beer does not harm a child A full beer
would. Most of these cases are just common sense. Your example is a straw man
Marci
On Jul 5, 2012, at 10:44 PM, Eric Rassbach wrote:
>
This kind of act-specific discussion on this thread misses the point in my
view. There is a universe of existing law already can protect children and
should be capable of being brought to bear against parents or guardians who
negligently/recklessly/intentionally/knowingly harm/injure/kill their
Chip, setting aside whether the Court in Smith adequately distinguished Yoder,
was Yoder decided incorrectly? If it was correctly decided, how does it fit
with a regime under which we are to be indifferent to religious motivations and
are to ignore historically-recognized religious practices?
M
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