Induction, deduction, logic, inference, reasoning, and all the like are a
bunch of conflicting and overlapping terms and definitions trying to
describe two things, 1) empirical logic which is converging, and 2) rational
logic which is diverging. Both of which must sense, collect, question,
com
On 3/3/07, Mitchell Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I also want to say something
about theories of plenitude, by which I mean theories according to which
all
possible Xs exist, or even that all possible Xs *necessarily* exist.
Stathis, can you tell me *why* it is that all mathematical structur
The whole thing is silly. Suppose you (I mean "you" in the general sense not
you personally) reject logic, and want me to prove it valid. What would you
have of me, a logical proof? But if you reject logic, then you need not
accept a logical proof. We always have to start somewhere.
This stuff is
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
and which is not so
muddled as the crypto-idealist suggestions that any 'mathematical
structure'
or any 'program' defines a possible world.
Why that last phrase? There is a great elegance and simplicity in the idea
that all mathematical str
It looks to me that Russell was pretty much making the same point that I was
making. The lesson is not to confuse a rule of inference (Russell's "p,
therefore q") with another premise (or proposition) to be justified
(including propositions like "p implies q"). If all you had were
propositions and
On 3/2/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
--- Jef Allbright <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 3/2/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Second, I used the same reasoning to guess about the nature of the
> universe
> > (assuming it is simulated), and the only thing we know is
--- Jef Allbright <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 3/2/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Second, I used the same reasoning to guess about the nature of the
> universe
> > (assuming it is simulated), and the only thing we know is that shorter
> > simulation programs are more likely
On Fri, 02 Mar 2007 03:25:58 -0500, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Skeptics are fond of pointing out that no non-circular argument can be
given to support inductive reasoning. That is true, but a century ago,
Lewis Carroll showed through his modern parable of Achilles and the
Tortoise t
On 3/2/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Second, I used the same reasoning to guess about the nature of the universe
(assuming it is simulated), and the only thing we know is that shorter
simulation programs are more likely than longer ones. My conclusion was that
bizarre behavior or
Matt,
When you said (in the text below):
In every practical case of machine learning, whether it is with
decision trees, neural networks, genetic algorithms, linear
regression, clustering, or whatever, the problem is you are given
training pairs (x,y) and you have to choose a hypothesis h
--- Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Matt, I really don't see why you think Hutter's work shows that "Occam's
> Razor holds" in any
> context except AI's with unrealistically massive amounts of computing
> power (like AIXI and AIXItl)
>
> In fact I think that it **does** hold in other c
On Fri, Mar 02, 2007 at 09:41:28PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>You're a hard positivist. There's nothing really wrong with that: if
>we had to choose between killing all the scientists and killing all
>the metaphysicians, killing the metaphysicians would be the better
I'm quite
On 3/2/07, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Fri, Mar 02, 2007 at 07:30:42PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>Why that last phrase? There is a great elegance and simplicity in the
>idea that all mathematical structures exist necessarily, with the
>anthropic principle selec
On Fri, Mar 02, 2007 at 07:30:42PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>Why that last phrase? There is a great elegance and simplicity in the
>idea that all mathematical structures exist necessarily, with the
>anthropic principle selecting out those structures with observers.
How is tha
On 3/2/07, Mitchell Porter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>From: "John Ku" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>I actually think there is reason to think we are not living in a computer
>simulation. From what I've read, inflationary cosmology seems to be very
>well supported.
[...]
Once you admit that you (and yo
I think I am conceiving of the dialectic in a different way from the way you
are imagining it. What I think Bostrom and others are doing is arguing that
if the world is as our empirical science says it is, then the anthropic
principle actually yields the prediction that we are almost certainly liv
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