On 3/2/07, Eugen Leitl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Fri, Mar 02, 2007 at 07:30:42PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Why that last phrase? There is a great elegance and simplicity in the > idea that all mathematical structures exist necessarily, with the > anthropic principle selecting out those structures with observers. How is that a good theory? Which falsifyable predictions does it produce? Do you have a set of equations into which I can plug those parameters for our universe (empirically measured to a very high degree of precision) to obtain predictions other theories can't produce? > There is also an inevitability to it, even if you believe that as a > matter of fact there is a real physical world out there. All it takes What is a "real physical world"? The theories don't make that particular distinction. They don't leak any information about any underlying metareality. > is one infinite computer to arise in this physical world and it will "infinite" and "this physical world" don't mix. The only infinities appear in some theories, and are more a problem of the particular theories than that of the underlying reality. E.g. infinite spacetime curvature singularities go away in a number of TOE candidates. > generate the mathematical Plenitude. How can you prove that the Moon is not made from green gorgonzola, when we're not looking?
You're a hard positivist. There's nothing really wrong with that: if we had to choose between killing all the scientists and killing all the metaphysicians, killing the metaphysicians would be the better option. Nevertheless, I think it's interesting to speculate on such unfalsifiable ideas as the interpretation of quantum mechanics and multiverse theories, and such speculation may guide future scientific work. After all, the verifiability/ falsifiability principle is *itself* metaphysics by its own criterion. Stathis Papaioannou ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?list_id=11983
