On 10/09/07, Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> As a final paradoxical example, if implementation Z is nothing, that
> is it comprises no matter and information ar all, there still is a
> correspondence function F(Z)=S which supposedly asserts that Z is X's
> upload. There can even be a f
Monday, September 10, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
MM> --- Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes
>> vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it
>> at description level.
MM> If you can't define wh
On 10/09/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> --- Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes
> > vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it
> > at description level.
>
> If you can't defi
--- Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes
> vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it
> at description level.
If you can't define what subjective experience is, then how do you know it
exists?
Monday, September 10, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
MM> Perhaps I misunderstand, but to make your argument more precise:
MM> X is an implementation of a mind, a Turing machine.
No. The whole argument is about why turing machine-like implementation
of uploaded brain doesn't seem to do the trick. X is
--- Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sunday, September 9, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
>
> MM> Also, Chalmers argues that a machine copy of your brain must be
> conscious.
> MM> But he has the same instinct to believe in consciousness as everyone
> else. My
> MM> claim is broader: that
Sunday, September 9, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote:
MM> Also, Chalmers argues that a machine copy of your brain must be conscious.
MM> But he has the same instinct to believe in consciousness as everyone else.
My
MM> claim is broader: that either a machine can be conscious or that
consciousness
MM>
