Monday, September 10, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote: MM> --- Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> I intentionally don't want to exactly define what S is as it describes >> vaguely-defined 'subjective experience generator'. I instead leave it >> at description level. MM> If you can't define what subjective experience is, then how do you know it MM> exists? It exists in the same sense anything else exists. All objective world theories can be regarded as invariants of subjective experience. Objective world theories are portable between agents of the same world. MM> If it does exist, then is it a property of the computation, or does MM> it depend on the physical implementation of the computer? How do you test for MM> it? It certainly corresponds to physical implementation (brain) and it is a property of relations between its parts (atoms/neurons). If it's a property of computation is what I'm trying to find out. MM> Do you claim that the human brain cannot be emulated by a Turing machine? Functionally equivalent implementation can be built. But physical world doesn't know system's design to find that certain relations between certain states in emulating computer correspond to relations between neurons in original brain. Main thesis is that subjective experience is a property of physical implementation, not of arbitrary mathematical model of that implementations. Two can be the same if that mathematical model is derivable purely from physical implementation, though. -- Vladimir Nesov mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=40046899-85db61
