--- Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Sunday, September 9, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote: > > MM> Also, Chalmers argues that a machine copy of your brain must be > conscious. > MM> But he has the same instinct to believe in consciousness as everyone > else. My > MM> claim is broader: that either a machine can be conscious or that > consciousness > MM> does not exist. > > While I'm not yet ready to continue my discussion on essentially the > same topic with Stathis on SL4, let me define this problem here. > > Let's replace discussion of consciousness with more simple of 'subjective > experience'. So, there is a host universe in which there's an > implementation of mind (a brain or any other such thing) which we as a > starting point assume to have this subjective experience. > > Subjective experience exists as relations in mind's > implementation in host universe (or process of their modification in time). > From this it supposedly follows that subjective experience exists only as > that relation and if that relation is instantiated in different > implementation, the same subjective experience should also exist. > > Let X be original implementation of mind (X defines state of the > matter in host universe that comprises the 'brain'), and S be the > system of relations implemented by X (the mind). There is a simple > correspondence between X and S, let's say S=F(X). As brain can be > slightly modified without significantly affecting the mind (additional > assumption), F can also be modification-tolerant, that is for example > if you replace in X some components of neurons by constructs with different > chemistry which still implement the same functions, F(X) will not > change significantly. > > Now, let Z be an implementation of uploaded X. That is Z can as well > be some network of future PCs plus required software and data > extracted from X. Now, how does Z correspond to S? There clearly is > some correspondence that was used in construction of Z. For example, > let there be a certain feature of S that can be observed on X (say, > feature is D and it can be extracted by procedure R, > D=R(S)=R(F(X))=(RF)(X), D can be for > example a certain word that S is saying right now). > Implementation Z comes with a function L that enables to extract D, > that is D=L(Z), or L(Z)=R(S). > > Presence of implementation Z and feature-extractor L only allow the > observation of features of S. But to say that Z implements S in the > sense defined above for X, there should be a correspondence S=F'(Z). > This correspondence F' supposedly exists, but it is not implemented in > any way, so there is nothing that makes it more appropriate for Z than > other arbitrary correspondence F'' which results in a different mind > F''(L)=S'<>S. F' is not a near-equivalence as F was. One can't say > that implementation of uploaded mind simulates the same mind or even in > any way similar mind. It observes behavious of original mind using > feature-extractors and so is functionally equivalent, but it doesn't > exclusively provides an implementation for the same subjective > experience. > > So, here is a difference: simplicity of correspondence F between > implementation and the mind. We know from experience that > modifications which leave F a simple correspondence don't destroy > subjective experience. But complex correspondences make it impossible > to distinguish between possible subjective experiences implementation > simulates, as correspondence function itself isn't implemented along > with simulation. > > As a final paradoxical example, if implementation Z is nothing, that > is it comprises no matter and information ar all, there still is a > correspondence function F(Z)=S which supposedly asserts that Z is X's > upload. There can even be a feature extractor (which will have to implement > functional simulation of S) that works on an empty Z. What is the > difference from subjective experience simulation point of view between > this empty Z and a proper upload implementation? > > -- > Vladimir Nesov mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Perhaps I misunderstand, but to make your argument more precise: X is an implementation of a mind, a Turing machine. S is the function computed by X, i.e. a canonical form of X, the smallest or first Turing machine in an enumeration of all machines equivalent to X. By equivalent, I mean that X(w) = S(w) for all input strings w in A* over some alphabet A. Define F: F(X) = S (canonical form of X), for all X. F is not computable, but that is not important for this discussion. An upload, Z, of X is defined as any Turing machine such that F(Z) = F(X) = S, i.e. Z and X are equivalent. Then the paradox in your last example cannot exist because F(nothing) != S, because S is the shortest program that implements X and |nothing| < |S|. The other problem is that you have not defined "subjective experience". Presumably this is the input to a consciousness? If consciousness does not exist, then how can subjective experience exist? There is only input to the Turing machine that may or may not affect the output. A reasonable definition of subjective experience would be the subset of inputs that affect the output. -- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=39997455-26ef5f
