Sunday, September 9, 2007, Matt Mahoney wrote: MM> Also, Chalmers argues that a machine copy of your brain must be conscious. MM> But he has the same instinct to believe in consciousness as everyone else. My MM> claim is broader: that either a machine can be conscious or that consciousness MM> does not exist.
While I'm not yet ready to continue my discussion on essentially the same topic with Stathis on SL4, let me define this problem here. Let's replace discussion of consciousness with more simple of 'subjective experience'. So, there is a host universe in which there's an implementation of mind (a brain or any other such thing) which we as a starting point assume to have this subjective experience. Subjective experience exists as relations in mind's implementation in host universe (or process of their modification in time). >From this it supposedly follows that subjective experience exists only as that relation and if that relation is instantiated in different implementation, the same subjective experience should also exist. Let X be original implementation of mind (X defines state of the matter in host universe that comprises the 'brain'), and S be the system of relations implemented by X (the mind). There is a simple correspondence between X and S, let's say S=F(X). As brain can be slightly modified without significantly affecting the mind (additional assumption), F can also be modification-tolerant, that is for example if you replace in X some components of neurons by constructs with different chemistry which still implement the same functions, F(X) will not change significantly. Now, let Z be an implementation of uploaded X. That is Z can as well be some network of future PCs plus required software and data extracted from X. Now, how does Z correspond to S? There clearly is some correspondence that was used in construction of Z. For example, let there be a certain feature of S that can be observed on X (say, feature is D and it can be extracted by procedure R, D=R(S)=R(F(X))=(RF)(X), D can be for example a certain word that S is saying right now). Implementation Z comes with a function L that enables to extract D, that is D=L(Z), or L(Z)=R(S). Presence of implementation Z and feature-extractor L only allow the observation of features of S. But to say that Z implements S in the sense defined above for X, there should be a correspondence S=F'(Z). This correspondence F' supposedly exists, but it is not implemented in any way, so there is nothing that makes it more appropriate for Z than other arbitrary correspondence F'' which results in a different mind F''(L)=S'<>S. F' is not a near-equivalence as F was. One can't say that implementation of uploaded mind simulates the same mind or even in any way similar mind. It observes behavious of original mind using feature-extractors and so is functionally equivalent, but it doesn't exclusively provides an implementation for the same subjective experience. So, here is a difference: simplicity of correspondence F between implementation and the mind. We know from experience that modifications which leave F a simple correspondence don't destroy subjective experience. But complex correspondences make it impossible to distinguish between possible subjective experiences implementation simulates, as correspondence function itself isn't implemented along with simulation. As a final paradoxical example, if implementation Z is nothing, that is it comprises no matter and information ar all, there still is a correspondence function F(Z)=S which supposedly asserts that Z is X's upload. There can even be a feature extractor (which will have to implement functional simulation of S) that works on an empty Z. What is the difference from subjective experience simulation point of view between this empty Z and a proper upload implementation? -- Vladimir Nesov mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=39991599-a151a9
