>> Suppose someone invented a way to prevent all of that without trying to >> verify what path an update followed? > > As I said, one could try to list all the ways of making bad things > happen by exploiting the vulnerability (munging the semantics), but it > would be hopeless.
Suppose you listed all the problems, and we found one way to resolve all of them without the underlying assumption that the only way to solve the problem is to prove the path the update took. >> Let me ask you something --does IPsec try to verify the path the packet >> takes, or the contents of the packet? If the right solution for IPsec is >> to validate the content of the packet, then why is the right solution >> for BGP to verify the path of the packet? > > The semantics of IP is that the source address is the host that sent the > packet and the contents of the packet are as sent. > > Not much more. Huh? Then why is there anything such as ESP? Shouldn't we only care about the packet header, and just leave the rest of the packet unencrypted? No, IPsec encrypts, and protects, _much_ more than the "protocol semantics." :-) Russ
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