Andrew, Comment below.
Sriram > -----Original Message----- > From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of > Andrew Lange > Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 6:17 PM > To: Sandra Murphy > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [sidr] SIDR ReCharter - to capture/cover path validation work > --- snip --- > > From a work item perspective, it would be useful to have a relationship > object signed that > says "I'm AS_A, and I have AS_B and AS_Q as legitimate connections." This > information, > combined with AS_A's signed route-objects means that downstream ASes would be > able to > verify that a route 1.2.0.0/16 coming in with an AS PATH of [AS_A, AS_B] or > [AS_A, > AS_Q] would be AS PATHs that could be authorized. Effectively solving the > Origin + > Upstream issue would solve most of the problems. Yes, someone could then > spoof an > announcement of origin+upstream+self, but then we're looking at a minimum of > a 3-AS > path and the likelihood of that being best drops. We can also do this with a > simple route- > filter and does not require on-system crypto calculations. > > Andrew > Yes, the path length goes up by 2. But normally an adversary would spoof an announcement with a subprefix (more specific) of the prefix that the legitimate prefix owner has announced (while still trying to keep within the maxlength as specified in the ROA). I that case the increased path length would not matter. The spoofed announcement would be accepted and propagated widely. Sriram _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
