Andrew,

Comment below.

Sriram

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of 
> Andrew Lange
> Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 6:17 PM
> To: Sandra Murphy
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [sidr] SIDR ReCharter - to capture/cover path validation work
> 
--- snip ---
> 
> From a work item perspective, it would be useful to have a relationship 
> object signed that
> says "I'm AS_A, and I have AS_B and AS_Q as legitimate connections."  This 
> information,
> combined with AS_A's signed route-objects means that downstream ASes would be 
> able to
> verify that a route 1.2.0.0/16 coming in with an AS PATH of [AS_A, AS_B] or 
> [AS_A,
> AS_Q] would be AS PATHs that could be authorized.  Effectively solving the 
> Origin +
> Upstream issue would solve most of the problems.  Yes, someone could then 
> spoof an
> announcement of origin+upstream+self, but then we're looking at a minimum of 
> a 3-AS
> path and the likelihood of that being best drops.  We can also do this with a 
> simple route-
> filter and does not require on-system crypto calculations.
> 
> Andrew
> 
Yes, the path length goes up by 2.
But normally an adversary would spoof an announcement with a subprefix (more 
specific) 
of the prefix that the legitimate prefix owner has announced 
(while still trying to keep within the maxlength as specified in the ROA).
I that case the increased path length would not matter. 
The spoofed announcement would be accepted and propagated widely.

Sriram

_______________________________________________
sidr mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr

Reply via email to