Sriram,

Why would you accept a route de-aggregated by an upstream?  If signed 
route-object says AS_A owns and announces only the route 1.2.3.0/20 and I'm 
seeing 1.2.3.0/21 from AS_B, the route filter should be configured not to 
accept more specifics.   If AS_A wants to de-aggregate, it can split it's 
route-objects into the more specifics and register them.

Andrew

On Feb 24, 2011, at 3:51 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote:

> Andrew,
> 
> Comment below.
> 
> Sriram
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of 
>> Andrew Lange
>> Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 6:17 PM
>> To: Sandra Murphy
>> Cc: [email protected]
>> Subject: Re: [sidr] SIDR ReCharter - to capture/cover path validation work
>> 
> --- snip ---
>> 
>> From a work item perspective, it would be useful to have a relationship 
>> object signed that
>> says "I'm AS_A, and I have AS_B and AS_Q as legitimate connections."  This 
>> information,
>> combined with AS_A's signed route-objects means that downstream ASes would 
>> be able to
>> verify that a route 1.2.0.0/16 coming in with an AS PATH of [AS_A, AS_B] or 
>> [AS_A,
>> AS_Q] would be AS PATHs that could be authorized.  Effectively solving the 
>> Origin +
>> Upstream issue would solve most of the problems.  Yes, someone could then 
>> spoof an
>> announcement of origin+upstream+self, but then we're looking at a minimum of 
>> a 3-AS
>> path and the likelihood of that being best drops.  We can also do this with 
>> a simple route-
>> filter and does not require on-system crypto calculations.
>> 
>> Andrew
>> 
> Yes, the path length goes up by 2.
> But normally an adversary would spoof an announcement with a subprefix (more 
> specific) 
> of the prefix that the legitimate prefix owner has announced 
> (while still trying to keep within the maxlength as specified in the ROA).
> I that case the increased path length would not matter. 
> The spoofed announcement would be accepted and propagated widely.
> 
> Sriram
> 

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