Sriram, Why would you accept a route de-aggregated by an upstream? If signed route-object says AS_A owns and announces only the route 1.2.3.0/20 and I'm seeing 1.2.3.0/21 from AS_B, the route filter should be configured not to accept more specifics. If AS_A wants to de-aggregate, it can split it's route-objects into the more specifics and register them.
Andrew On Feb 24, 2011, at 3:51 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote: > Andrew, > > Comment below. > > Sriram > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of >> Andrew Lange >> Sent: Wednesday, February 23, 2011 6:17 PM >> To: Sandra Murphy >> Cc: [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [sidr] SIDR ReCharter - to capture/cover path validation work >> > --- snip --- >> >> From a work item perspective, it would be useful to have a relationship >> object signed that >> says "I'm AS_A, and I have AS_B and AS_Q as legitimate connections." This >> information, >> combined with AS_A's signed route-objects means that downstream ASes would >> be able to >> verify that a route 1.2.0.0/16 coming in with an AS PATH of [AS_A, AS_B] or >> [AS_A, >> AS_Q] would be AS PATHs that could be authorized. Effectively solving the >> Origin + >> Upstream issue would solve most of the problems. Yes, someone could then >> spoof an >> announcement of origin+upstream+self, but then we're looking at a minimum of >> a 3-AS >> path and the likelihood of that being best drops. We can also do this with >> a simple route- >> filter and does not require on-system crypto calculations. >> >> Andrew >> > Yes, the path length goes up by 2. > But normally an adversary would spoof an announcement with a subprefix (more > specific) > of the prefix that the legitimate prefix owner has announced > (while still trying to keep within the maxlength as specified in the ROA). > I that case the increased path length would not matter. > The spoofed announcement would be accepted and propagated widely. > > Sriram >
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