John, To reply to my own message, after reading through the rest of this chain.
Is all we're trying to do here is to establish a "custodial chain" of a route to prevent some ill-behaving AS in the middle attempting to hijack a route, effectively by pretending that the source AS is behind it, since we're origin-validating, and hoping that its neighbors end up preferring it's longer-AS announcement over other, likely preferred routes, from legitimate sources? If that is the case, having a set of policy objects expressing AS relationship should do the same thing and more with less overhead? (yes, I know that data integrity becomes an issue, but data integrity is always an issue.) Andrew On Feb 28, 2011, at 8:16 PM, Andrew Lange wrote: > John, > > But wouldn't a record of an existing announcement also show that AS_B did in > fact announce which of AS_A's routes and in what form? Why does it need to > be signed if all we want to do is record what happened? Perhaps I'm missing > something.... > > Andrew > > On Feb 24, 2011, at 5:27 AM, John G. Scudder wrote: > >> Andrew, >> >> On Feb 24, 2011, at 1:17 AM, Andrew Lange wrote: >>> Given the thread, I can understand your frustration. And, I could have >>> made myself more clear. I'll try: given the policies that AS_B might be >>> implementing, we cannot know for certain, without AS_B publishing their >>> policies, if AS_B should in fact be announcing which of AS_A's routes or in >>> what form, hence the use of the term "Plausible." >> >> Assume a model where the AS path is signed such that the recipient is able >> to verify that for each arc in the path, the further AS did sign it to the >> closer AS. To take your example and extend it, suppose we have >> >> AS_A --> AS_B --> AS_C --> AS_D >> >> (A announces a route to B announces it to C announces it to D.) If D is >> able to verify the signature on the (B, C) arc, then it knows (for some >> value of "knows" of course :-) that B did actually send the route to C. >> Whether that fulfills "AS_B should in fact be announcing which of AS_A's >> routes or in what form" I leave it to you to interpret -- it doesn't protect >> against a policy misconfiguration on the announcing router of AS_B. An >> abstract representation of AS_B's policy could do that, but functionality >> like that is beyond the scope of the proposed charter item. The fact that >> systems to provide exactly this kind of abstract policy publication have >> fallen into disrepute doesn't fill me with optimism about this approach, >> despite my own personal history with it. >> >> I interpret the proposed charter item to be asking not "if AS_B *should* in >> fact be announcing which of AS_A's routes or in what form" but rather >> roughly "if AS_B *did* in fact announce which of AS_A's routes and in what >> form". >> >> --John > > <smime.p7s>_______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
smime.p7s
Description: S/MIME cryptographic signature
_______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
