>> >> If that is the case, having a set of policy objects expressing AS >> relationship should do the same >> thing and more with less overhead? (yes, I know that data integrity becomes >> an issue, but data >> integrity is always an issue.)
I was deliberately keeping away from participating in this conversation, but I have researched this topic in some depth in recent times (http://www.potaroo.net/papers/BGP_Security_Literature_Review.pdf), and I think that I have some familiarity with this topic that may be helpful to others who are also watching this and trying to understand what is being debated here. What I see here is a dichotomy between two distinct architectural approaches, and the conversation appears to flip from one to the other when we discuss path validation. One view is that we are securing the operation of a particular protocol, namely BGP. This protocol operates in a standard distance vector mode of AShop-by-AShop, where information is propagated outward from the causal point. If you want to secure this protocol, then there are two fundamental attributes of the protocol's transitive data objects that are securable, namely the address prefix and the AS path. The AS path is constructed incrementally in this protocol, and the most direct mechanism that would allow it to be secured is for each AS to be able to demonstrate the validity of what it received and what it added. I.e. incremental signing of elements of the AS path as the basic unit of routing information propagates across the inter-AS network. To the extent that this is an accurate reflection of the underlying inter AS connection topology, EBGP multi-hop notwithstanding, this is an accurate reflection of a subset of the interAS topology, and it allows a BGP speaker the ability to validate, in the context of the operation of BGP the protocol, information that is being propagated by BGP. The other view I see is a reflection of the observation that BGP, like any other inter-domain routing protocol, is a mechanism that "discovers" the inter-AS topology of the network. If you already "know" the "real" topology via some other mechanism, then you can use this information as a filter for information being passed to you in the routing protocol. i.e. In this instance if you had complete information of all "valid" AS adjacencies then you could use this as an information filter for AS paths that you are being presented with via BGP. If an AS path contains an assertion of an AS adjacency that is not in your local "map then you have grounds to doubt that the information you are be presented with in this particular update is in fact "valid" Superficially, this second approach is seductively attractive: its simple to conceptualise, relatively lightweight and probably fast in terms of processing overheads, and makes the minimum of assumptions as to the way the protocol itself operates. This decoupling of the propagation of the security credentials from the protocol operations also appears to be consistent with the approach being taken to securing origination - the security credentials are flooded via some other mechanism and they are used locally to maintain a local route filter which is then used to pass / reject incoming route updates in BGP based on the implicit AS adjacencies that are being asserted in the AS Path. But this is a superficial attraction as I see it. This decoupled approach still admits lies in routing. It limits the extent to which one can lie, but it still admits lies. However, I don't think this aspect of the issue of AS Plausibility vs AS Path Provability is the core of the issue _for me_ (others see it differently and want a stricter condition). More importantly for me at any rate, is that this decoupling of topology information from the operation of the protocol potentially stops the operation of the routing protocol to be a topology discovery tool. If AS 1 and AS2 bring up a peering session, then no one else will believe that adjacency (or the routes that use that adjacency) until the security credentials of the pairwise adjacency of AS1 and AS2 has already flooded the network. And how does this association get flooded? Equally, how do you inform everyone else that a peering session has been torn down? Or that this AS adjacency has some policy constraints that are intended to limit the scope of its visibility? As long as you are prepared to limit your concept of the scope of a routing protocol to be one of best path computation over a relatively fixed topology that all players know of in advance then this idea of a decoupled approach to propagation of AS adjacencies and the operation of the protocol itself could well be a viable approach to securing the outcomes of the operation of the protocol, or at least limiting the range of potential ways to lie in the protocol. But if you also want some level of dynamic discovery of the underlying topology as well as path computation in the scope of the operation of the protocol, then you are asking a lot of this form of decoupling of securing the underlying inter-AS topology from the operation of the routing protocol, because at some point you need to distribute the information of a new AS adjacency at the same time as you want to pass the routing protocol packet. I.e. If you want to secure what BGP is telling you in the AS Path then it makes sense to use a mechanism that is directly associated with the manner of the construction of the AS Path itself, within BGP itself. And if you couple the security credentials to the protocol not only do you get dynamic behaviour of topology discovery, you also get AS Provability in so far as you are now back to being able to validate that the path of propagation of the update matches the path describes in the update. (I note that the same argument of using in-band security credentials to enable dynamic discovery of routing information could be applied to origination security credentials and their manner of distribution, and I also note that the WG decided not to go down that path for securing origination. But having made that decision, I don't think that this decision for the manner of securing origination necessarily precludes the WG from using the BGP protocol mechanisms to bind the AS Path and the AS Path security credentials together. I do however think that sBGP, which as I recall bundles both origination and path security credentials into the BGP protocol payload together with the routing data that the credentials relate to, still strikes me as an approach that has an attractive level of architectural consistency. :-) ) The above is all my own opinion, naturally! Now to clamber off this soap box and head back to hide in my corner! regards, Geoff
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