On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 11:22 AM, Perry E. Metzger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
> > > Well, this is an entirely new argument, and not an unreasonable > one. Given the incredibly high standard of the discussion on this issue, I have to thank you for tolerating my slightly crackpot view on this :) > Your claim, summarized, is that the reason to hold on to Kashmir > is not based in any sort of abstraction but merely in the concrete > strategic importance of the territory as a buffer zone with a hostile > power. > > I would still question this. > > First, in a situation where both powers are nuclear armed, is there > any realistic possibility that the Pakistani government would believe > it could invade and conquer Delhi without large sections of the > country becoming radioactive wastelands? Further, given the significant > disparity in per capita income, population and consequent military > strength, would it be reasonable of the Pakistani government to > believe that India would lose such a war even in the unlikely event > that it remained conventional rather than nuclear? In short, wouldn't > the impossibility of winning deter a war? > I agree that the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides, especially with the weak command structure surrounding the delivery of such weapons is worrying. At the same time, I urge you to consider the history of the US-Russia nuclear war documented by Richard Rhodes in his trilogy. Reading that series, a few things become apparent: 1. The military argument was always in favour of strategic nukes - it kept soldiers away from battle; the invention of MIRVs allowed for precise predictable targeting much favoured by military planners (boosted to absurd levels in the McNamara era). Related, the military-industrial establishment milked the enormous expenditure required to maintain strategic nukes for some very nice empire building and additionally, given the difficulty of actually establishing how many weapons the other side possessed, easily justified endless increases in military spending. 2. Tactical nukes were always looked upon in disdain by military commanders. Their effects were too unpredictable in their effects to allow for the type of careful planning that most military commanders, schooled in more traditional warfare preferred. 3. The enormous cost and effect of strategic nukes therefore inevitably lead to political oversight - and every single leader of the US/USSR dreaded the cost of actually pushing the button and commented on the futility of stockpiling such weapons.. even Khrushchev/JFK during the heights of the cuban missile crisis. Despite this insight amongst those ultimately responsible, the fog of disinformation and the paranoia of hawks (like Edward Teller) kept the US and USSR in expensive stalemate. Does any of the above work against a rogue commander actually launching a nuke as a desperate attempt to claim victory? Of course not, but I would argue that the (admittedly short) history of nuclear weapons indicates otherwise. > > Second, is not a major reason to fear a war, in itself, the > possession of the buffer zone in question? It would seem to be > somewhat unreasonable to try to prevent a war by maintaining a > situation that has been the cause of major conflict. > I agree it seems unreasonable, but the political elite might deem it a bloody, expensive form of insurance. On Wed, Aug 20, 2008 at 11:26 AM, Suresh Ramasubramanian <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: [e&oe sensible military strategists rather than religious fanatics, on both > sides] My own thought on religious fanatics using a-bombs is that the knowledge required to defeat normal safeguards on portable tactical nukes without damaging the intricate electronics required for a chain reaction is not yet fully within thier grasp. Also, given the far easier access to conventional explosives and the presence of their enemy in locations where they have the geographic advantage to attack at will argues against full-blown nuclear strikes by terrorists. Dirty bombs on the other hand are a different ballgame altogether [1] [1] Shameless self-linking: http://blog.balaji-dutt.name/2008/02/10/what-we-owe-to-the-a-bomb/ -- Balaji
