--- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> On 09/09/07, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> 
> > Your dilemma: after you upload, does the original human them become a
> > p-zombie, or are there two copies of your consciousness?  Is it necessary
> to
> > kill the human body for your consciousness to transfer?
> 
> I have the same problem in ordinary life, since the matter in my brain
> from a year ago has almost all dispersed into the biosphere. Even the
> configuration matter in my current brain, and the information it
> represents, only approximates that of my erstwhile self. It's just
> convenient that my past selves naturally disintegrate, so that I don't
> encounter them and fight it out to see which is the "real" me. We've
> all been through the equivalent of destructive uploading.

So your answer is yes?

> 
> > What if the copy is not exact, but close enough to fool others who know
> you?
> > Maybe you won't have a choice.  Suppose you die before we have developed
> the
> > technology to scan neurons, so family members customize an AGI in your
> > likeness based on all of your writing, photos, and interviews with people
> that
> > knew you.  All it takes is 10^9 bits of information about you to pass a
> Turing
> > test.  As we move into the age of surveillance, this will get easier to
> do.  I
> > bet Yahoo knows an awful lot about me from the thousands of emails I have
> sent
> > through their servers.
> 
> There is no guarantee that something which behaves the same way as the
> original also has the same consciousness. However, there are good
> arguments in support of the thesis that something which behaves the
> same way as the original as a result of identical or isomorphic brain
> structure also has the same consciousness as the original.

So if your brain is a Turing machine in language L1 and the program is
recompiled to run in language L2, then the consciousness transfers?  But if
the two machines implement the same function but the process of writing the
second program is not specified, then the consciousness does not transfer
because it is undecidable in general to determine if two programs are
equivalent?

On the other hand, your sloppily constructed customized AGI will insist that
it is a conscious continuation of your life, even if 90% of its memories are
missing or wrong.  As long as the original is dead then nobody else will
notice the difference, and others seeing your example will have happily
discovered the path to immortality.

Arguments based on the assumption that consciousness exists always lead to
absurdities.  But belief in consciousness is instinctive and universal.  It
cannot be helped.  The best I can do is accept both points of view, realize
they are inconsistent, and leave it at that.

The question is not what should people do, but what are people likely to do?


-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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