On Jan 28, 2008 7:56 AM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > X:Of course this is a variation on "the grounding problem" in AI. But > do you think some sort of **absolute** grounding is relevant to > effective interaction between individual agents (assuming you think > any such ultimate grounding could even perform a function within a > limited system), or might it be that systems interact effectively to > the extent their dynamics are based on **relevant** models, regardless > of even proximate grounding in any functional sense? > > Er.. my body couldn't make any sense of this :). Could you be clearer giving > examples of the agents/systems and what you mean by absolute/ proximate > grounding?
I see that you're talking about interaction between systems considered to be "minds", and highlighting the question of what is necessary to form a shared basis for **relevant** interaction. I agree that a "mind" without an environment of interaction is meaningless, in the same way that any statement (or pattern of bits) without context is meaningless. However, I would argue that just as context is never absolute, nor is there ever any need for it to be absolute, indeed for practical (functional) reasons it can never be absolute, embodiment need not be absolute, complete, or ultimately grounded. I use the term "system" to refer as clearly as possible to any distinct configuration of inter-related objects, with the implication that the system must be physically realizable, therefore it models neither infinities or infinitesimals, nor could it model a Cartesian singularity of Self. I use the term "agent" to refer as clearly as possible to a system exhibiting "agency", i.e. behavior recognized as intentional, i.e. operating on behalf of an entity. It may be useful here to point out that recognition of agency inheres in the observer (including the case of the observer being the agent-system itself), rather than agency being somehow an objectively measurable property of the system itself. Further, the "entity" which is the principal behind any agency is entirely abstract (independent of any physical instantiation.) [Understanding this is key to various paradoxes of personal identity.] I distinguish between "absolute" and "proximate" grounding in regard to the functional (and information-theoretic) impossibility of a system modeling it's entire chain of connections to "ultimate reality", while in actuality any system interacts only with its proximate environment, just as to "know" an object is not to know what it "is" but to know its interface. To presume to know more would be to presume some privileged mode of knowledge. So in short, I agree with you that "embodiment" is essential to meaningful interaction, thus for there to be agency, thus for there to be a "Self" for the mind to know. But I extend this and emphasize that it's not necessary that such "embodiment" be physical, nor that it be logically grounded in "ultimate reality", but rather, that interaction is relevant and meaningful to the extent that some (necessarily partial and arbitrarily distant from "reality") context is shared. ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=90632239-135dac
