Paul Brandon wrote:
> I don't agree that the solution is to become 'comfortable
> with uncertainty'. I'd say that the discomfort with uncertainty is a prime
motivator of
> scientists. What distinguishes them (us) is that the
> scientist actively seeks to reduce uncertainty by gathering data and
deriving general
> principles from it, rather than by denying (and avoiding)
> uncertainty by dismissing science.
This is probably splitting hairs, but I would say that the prime motivator
is not discomfort with uncertainty, but rather discomfort with not knowing.
If "knowing" is equated with "certainty" (ala Descartes, or the relativists)
then of course it's the same thing. But my motivation is my discomfort with
not having any reasonably defensible knowledge, rather than with not having
_certain_ knowledge. I am comfortable with some of my explanations despite
my recognition that I could be wrong, and in those cases, I'm not all that
motivated to pursue better explanations.
> While acknowleging that perfect certainty is impossible in
> the real world, we nonetheless hold that our goal is to reduce uncertainty
as
> much as we can.
In that light, I'm clearly splitting hairs. However, note that the
pre-evaluativist epistemological stages described by Kuhn all believe that
perfect certainty is possible, and furthermore, that they have it with
respect to a wide variety of explanations. This is the teaching challenge,
in my opinion.
Paul Smith
Alverno College
Milwaukee
