As a pragmatist, I'm not sure that we differ significantly.
In either case, we're saying that increasing our ability to make
predictions (making our predictions more accurate in more situations) is
reinforcing to scientists.
At 7:15 PM -0600 11/21/99, Paul C. Smith wrote:
>Paul Brandon wrote:
>
>> I don't agree that the solution is to become 'comfortable
>> with uncertainty'. I'd say that the discomfort with uncertainty is a prime
>motivator of
>> scientists. What distinguishes them (us) is that the
>> scientist actively seeks to reduce uncertainty by gathering data and
>deriving general
>> principles from it, rather than by denying (and avoiding)
>> uncertainty by dismissing science.
>
> This is probably splitting hairs, but I would say that the prime
>motivator
>is not discomfort with uncertainty, but rather discomfort with not knowing.
>If "knowing" is equated with "certainty" (ala Descartes, or the relativists)
>then of course it's the same thing. But my motivation is my discomfort with
>not having any reasonably defensible knowledge, rather than with not having
>_certain_ knowledge. I am comfortable with some of my explanations despite
>my recognition that I could be wrong, and in those cases, I'm not all that
>motivated to pursue better explanations.
>
>> While acknowleging that perfect certainty is impossible in
>> the real world, we nonetheless hold that our goal is to reduce uncertainty
>as
>> much as we can.
>
> In that light, I'm clearly splitting hairs. However, note that the
>pre-evaluativist epistemological stages described by Kuhn all believe that
>perfect certainty is possible, and furthermore, that they have it with
>respect to a wide variety of explanations. This is the teaching challenge,
>in my opinion.
>
>Paul Smith
>Alverno College
>Milwaukee
* PAUL K. BRANDON [EMAIL PROTECTED] *
* Psychology Dept Minnesota State University, Mankato *
* 23 Armstrong Hall, Mankato, MN 56001 ph 507-389-6217 *
* http://www.mankato.msus.edu/dept/psych/welcome.html *
