Why is Tor wasting time in implementing secure hidden services? Why not copy from here if they are doing it right:
Tor I2P Cell Message Client Router or Client Circuit Tunnel Directory NetDb Directory Server Floodfill Router Entry Guards Fast Peers Entry Node Inproxy Exit Node Outproxy Hidden Service Eepsite or Destination Hidden Service Descriptor LeaseSet Introduction point Inbound Gateway Node Router Onion Proxy I2PTunnel Client (more or less) Relay Router Rendezvous Point somewhat like Inbound Gateway + Outbound Endpoint Router Descriptor RouterInfo Server Router Why not distributed directory authorities and hardcoded? Why not secure tunnels independent of guards? Or does Tor want to remain less secure? -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
