On 09/17/2014 03:04 PM, bm-2cuqbqhfvdhuy34zcpl3pngkplueeer...@bitmessage.ch wrote: > Why is Tor wasting time in implementing secure hidden services? Why not > copy from here if they are doing it right: > > Tor I2P > Cell Message > Client Router or Client > Circuit Tunnel > Directory NetDb > Directory Server Floodfill Router > Entry Guards Fast Peers > Entry Node Inproxy > Exit Node Outproxy > Hidden Service Eepsite or Destination > Hidden Service Descriptor LeaseSet > Introduction point Inbound Gateway > Node Router > Onion Proxy I2PTunnel Client (more or less) > Relay Router > Rendezvous Point somewhat like Inbound Gateway + Outbound Endpoint > Router Descriptor RouterInfo > Server Router > > Why not distributed directory authorities and hardcoded?
Huh? Tor uses distributed directory authorities, and the main ones are hardcoded in the software. > Why not secure tunnels independent of guards? Using entry guards protects against Sybil attacks. > Or does Tor want to remain less secure? ;) See http://tor.stackexchange.com/questions/27/how-does-tors-threat-model-differ-from-i2ps-threat-model. -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
