I said "operational definitions" are crucial to experiments and that's virtually by definition. You, yourself, admitted it when you tried to escape from an operational definition of intelligence by using art as a proxy and then you went ahead and found yourself providing an operational definition of art.
On Wed, Jul 3, 2013 at 10:57 PM, Eric Walker <eric.wal...@gmail.com> wrote: > On Wed, Jul 3, 2013 at 8:41 PM, James Bowery <jabow...@gmail.com> wrote: > > They are necessary so you can perform experiments. If you don't like an >> operational definition then you need to say why. >> > > It seems like it is possible to make progress on a question like this > without requiring a formal definition. Perhaps a similar question to > whether artificial intelligence is possible is whether computers can create > art. A well-conceived experiment might involve a panel of judges who use > their experience and intuition, perhaps along with some guidelines, to > judge submissions of "art," who then try to decide whether the submissions > were from from a person or from a computer. A formal definition might seek > to spell out exactly what art is so that we can tell with great assurance > whether a computer has produced it. But art is something that is hard to > define, and many people produce very poor art. > > I remember reading about a contest where they had a person who served as a > judge on one side of a terminal and either a computer or a person on the > other, and the judge had to decide whether he or she was interacting with a > computer. This seems like a test and one that can sort out whether > artificial intelligence has been achieved to a certain extent (the computer > fools most of the judges over a period of trials), without weighing down > the challenge with the need to spell out what intelligence is. > > Eric > >
