Harry Chesley wrote:
I'm trying to get an idea of how our minds handle the tension between identity and abstraction, and it occurs to me that there have probably been human subject experiments that would shed light on this. Does anyone know of any?

The basic issue: On the one hand, we identify two objects as being the same one (having the same identity), even when encountered at different times or from different perspectives. At least a part of how we do this is very likely a matter of noticing that the two objects have common features which are unlikely to occur together at random. On the other hand, over time we make abstractions of situations that we encounter repeatedly, most likely by removing details that are not in common between the instances. Yet it's these very details that let us derive identity.

So how do we remember abstractions that are dependent on identity? It seems that there must be experiments or evidence from brain-damaged individuals that would give clues.

Example: I may notice over time that whenever object A is smaller than object B and object B is smaller than object C, then object A is smaller than object C. Note that I have to give them names in order to even state the problem. Internally, we might do likewise and assign names, in which case there might be a part of the brain that performs the naming and could be damaged. Or we might go back to the original cases (case-based reasoning). Or we might store references to the original object instances from which we abstracted the general rule, which would provide unique identity. The later two may be distinguishable experimentally by choosing clever instances to abstract from.

Anyone know of any research that sheds light on this area?

It is impossible to answer your question the way it is posed, because it needs to become more specific before it can be answered, and on the way to becoming more specific, you will find yourself drawn into an enormous maze of theoretical assumptions and empirical data.

There are indeed parts of the brain that are involved in naming, but what we know could fill an entire book (or several) and it is organized according to our observations of what kinds of behaviors occur when some thing goes wrong, or when a particular experimental manipulation is performed. Those behaviors do not, by themselves, answer your astract questions about the underlying structures and mechanisms ... those structures and mechanisms are the subject of debate.

Essentially, you are asking for cognitive science to be more mature than it is at the moment.

There are certainly experiments that might address some of your concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a direct answer.



Richard Loosemore



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