Harry Chesley wrote:
I'm trying to get an idea of how our minds handle the tension between
identity and abstraction, and it occurs to me that there have probably
been human subject experiments that would shed light on this. Does
anyone know of any?
The basic issue: On the one hand, we identify two objects as being the
same one (having the same identity), even when encountered at different
times or from different perspectives. At least a part of how we do this
is very likely a matter of noticing that the two objects have common
features which are unlikely to occur together at random. On the other
hand, over time we make abstractions of situations that we encounter
repeatedly, most likely by removing details that are not in common
between the instances. Yet it's these very details that let us derive
identity.
So how do we remember abstractions that are dependent on identity? It
seems that there must be experiments or evidence from brain-damaged
individuals that would give clues.
Example: I may notice over time that whenever object A is smaller than
object B and object B is smaller than object C, then object A is smaller
than object C. Note that I have to give them names in order to even
state the problem. Internally, we might do likewise and assign names, in
which case there might be a part of the brain that performs the naming
and could be damaged. Or we might go back to the original cases
(case-based reasoning). Or we might store references to the original
object instances from which we abstracted the general rule, which would
provide unique identity. The later two may be distinguishable
experimentally by choosing clever instances to abstract from.
Anyone know of any research that sheds light on this area?
It is impossible to answer your question the way it is posed, because it
needs to become more specific before it can be answered, and on the way
to becoming more specific, you will find yourself drawn into an enormous
maze of theoretical assumptions and empirical data.
There are indeed parts of the brain that are involved in naming, but
what we know could fill an entire book (or several) and it is organized
according to our observations of what kinds of behaviors occur when some
thing goes wrong, or when a particular experimental manipulation is
performed. Those behaviors do not, by themselves, answer your astract
questions about the underlying structures and mechanisms ... those
structures and mechanisms are the subject of debate.
Essentially, you are asking for cognitive science to be more mature than
it is at the moment.
There are certainly experiments that might address some of your
concerns, but I am afraid you will have to acquire a general knowledge
of what is known, first, to be able to make sense of what they might
tell you. There is nothing that can be plucked and delivered as a
direct answer.
Richard Loosemore
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agi
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