That is a most decorous note you've struck Jonathan. Thank you for your words. I thought I had bought your book, but I was mistaken. I shall order it straight away. Take care Lincoln
On Sunday, February 26, 2017 at 7:19:32 PM UTC+13, chateaust...@att.net wrote: > > I think our thanks are to you for bringing the topic up. The discussion > has been (in my sage and well-considered opinion) most fruitful and I have > appreciated all the insights. Well played, gentlemen! > > Jonathan Hayes > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Grimsdyke <lincol...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > *To:* ChurchillChat <church...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>> > *Sent:* Saturday, February 25, 2017 9:37 PM > *Subject:* [ChurchillChat] Re: Churchill’s treatment at the hands of > ‘Churchill Scholars’ > > From the amount of interest it has sparked, this seems to be indeed a > worthy topic; I’m now glad I began it. These are great comments so far, and > their greatest fascination for me is to see how and in what form many > people approach the life of this great man. I hope the others on this forum > will forgive me my habit of dipping in only on weekends, because to my > great regret weekdays deprive me of even the smallest chance to indulge in > Churchillian and other delightful fare. > > It’s quite right, I think, to say that history is rarely so simple as to > be reducible to ‘superhero thwarted by dullards’ narratives. But Churchill > (I cannot think of anyone less suited to being pictured as an unnaturally > muscled individual with sloping brow, flashing teeth and coloured cape) at > his energetic best was much more impressive than an ordinary superhero, and > thwarted he certainly *was* – if one would read the numerous accounts of > the campaign with all its details exposed. As I said before, many accounts > are equally instructive, but I find that among the most readable and > consecutive of these are the accounts by William Manchester (*The Last > Lion*), Violet Bonham Carter (*Winston Churchill as I knew him*) and > Michael Shelden (*Young Titan*). Michael Shelden’s book is particularly > interesting, and illuminating far beyond even some of the best biographies > of Churchill that I have read (and I have read more than 30), and > meticulously researched. I shouldn’t spoil it for those who would like to > buy the book – which I can’t recommend too highly; but pages 306 to 322 > cover the Dardanelles imbroglio with zest and superlative perspicuity, and > you couldn’t possibly rise from reading the book without realising how much > there was about Churchill that one hadn’t known before. > > I think I’m inclined to agree with you, Chris Bell; 3 minutes is a > suspiciously short time to allot to something as climactic in the Churchill > record as the Dardanelles, and Martin Gilbert was hardly the man to > overlook this. > > I don’t think I could disagree much with Jonathan, although I have grave > reservations about ‘not being able to fault Kitchener’ for his part in > depriving the campaign of troops, and supplying too little too late. > Michael Shelden is brilliant on this, as is William Manchester. Violet > Bonham Carter, who had the almost unedited confidence of her father, Prime > Minister Asquith, expresses a perspective deeper and more intimate and > often more direct than any of the others, although her objectivity is > somewhat vitiated by her loyalty to Asquith - as concerns the special > sphere in which the Prime Minister's treatment of Winston bears on these > events when things began to go wrong. Also, his almost treacherous lack of > decisiveness is given scant exposure by his daughter, who not surprisingly > obfuscates it. For all that, hers is a tremendously valuable book; superbly > written, and *readable* in the extreme. > > Violet makes it plain that Kitchener, after receiving an urgent appeal > from Grand Duke Nicholas for the British to make a naval or military > demonstration to draw off Turkish forces and ease the Russian position, had > then commended the Dardanelles as the decisive place for such a > ‘demonstration’ to Winston Churchill on the one hand, and made a > corresponding pledge to Nicolas on the other. At the War Council on January > 5 and 8th 2015, “Lord Kitchener once again expressed his preference for > the Dardanelles as an objective”, and Col Maurice Hankey, whose brainchild > the Dardanelles campaign had been originally, had minuted the practically > unanimous agreement of the War Council upon this. “It seems strange” she > writes, “that no one should have questioned the decision to ‘take the > Gallipoli Peninsula’ without troops when Lord Kitchener had estimated that > 150,000 would be sufficient for that purpose and yet had made it clear that > no troops were available.” Later on, when troops became available for the > Middle East, Col Hankey expressed to Prime Minister Asquith his strong view > that naval operations should be supported by a military force; on February > 16 the War Council agreed that the 29th division should be sent to Lemnos > as the foundation of the military attack on the Dardanelles. “But it was > not, alas, adhered to by Lord Kitchener”. The War Council did not accept > the doctrine that sending men to ‘chew barbed wire on the Western front was > the way to achieve victory, and Churchill was foremost among those who > deplored the carnage and waste intrinsic to the ‘Western school of > thought’. > > At the request of Churchill, Asquith arranged an interview between Lord > Kitchener and Winston in his presence, where Winston asked Kitchener > whether he took full responsibility for the military operations and the > strength of the forces needed to achieve success. “Lord Kitchener had once > replied that he did and the Royal Naval division was handed over to his > command.” > > On March 18 when the whole Allied fleet of 14 British and 4 French > battleships advanced to the Narrows and 3 battleships struck mines and > sank, Admiral de Robeck refused to move without the army and the naval > chiefs of staff refused to order him to renew the attack. Although Asquith > agreed with Winston and Kitchener that the Navy ought to make another big > push, he shrank from overruling the old Sea dogs. Sheldon is scathing on > Asquith’s handling of the war (quite deservedly), and leaves us in no doubt > as to how far he fell short of the qualities required of a wartime Prime > Minister. Lloyd George’s perfidy has an equally bright light shone upon it! > > Although Roger Keyes had pleaded with Admiral de Robeck to reverse his > decision because waiting for the army would be fatal, the Admiral seemed to > be (as Asquith said) ‘in rather a funk’. If the 29th division had been > sent in February as originally intended, the landing of troops would have > taken place* before* the Turks had time to pour in reinforcements and > cover the Peninsula with a network of entrenchments. Within a day of the > army’s landing in Gallipoli on April 25, the slaughter began — on the beach > where, as Alan Moorhead writes, “the Marines walked in perfect safety 2 > months before”. Even then Kitchener continued complacent; but, writes > Violet, “Winston did not share Kitchener’s complacency. He was rightly > disturbed by our tremendous losses, and took Fisher with him to the War > Office where they both entreated Lord Kitchener to send immediate > reinforcements from Egypt. Lord Kitchener began by doubting whether these > were needed, but he yielded in the end and ordered an Indian Brigade and > Territorial division to be sent from Egypt…. Had they been made available > for the landing they would have been ready to follow up the advance on the > 28th — when the Turks, exhausted and discouraged, were retreating. Now > Ian Hamilton was obliged to wait until 6th May to start his new > offensive. By then opportunity had passed, and though we threw in all our > forces we gained only a few hundred yards. Trench warfare had begun.” There > seems no doubt about Kitchener’s role in the debacle. > > Michael Shelden writes, “As the situation went from bad to worse in the > next few months, mistake after mistake was made, by both the Navy and > especially the army, which tried to clear Gallipoli of Turkish troops who > proved to be far more disciplined and determined than the British had been > willing to believe. Beginning on 25 April, Australian and New Zealand > troops joined…, and though both sides showed extraordinary bravery, they > found themselves bogged down in the same kind of stand-off that prevailed > on the Western Front. Tens of thousands died as the fighting dragged > through the rest of the year. The rugged terrain, harsh weather and > military incompetence turned Asquith’s ‘unique opportunity’ into one long > misadventure that did nothing to change the course of the war. The blame > for this tragic campaign was widely shared, but it was Churchill who was > made to pay the price of failure.…… This setback was so big that a suitably > big scapegoat was needed, and Winston was it. As soon as things began to go > wrong, little time was wasted in pointing the finger of blame in his > direction. It was in May 1915 that his colleagues and rivals began turning > on him. As Prime Minister, Asquith had been the one to decide that the risk > was worth taking. It was his responsibility to accept the consequences of > failure. But he evaded it, as did Kitchener, who mishandled the Gallipoli > campaign. As for Jackie Fisher, he would later pretend that he had been > opposed to the Dardanelles plan all along.” > > Yes, as Jonathan says, “life isn’t fair”. In Churchill’s case over the > Dardanelles it was more than unfair; it was dastardly. The Dardanelles > *was* a *very good* idea; various military historians have considered it > brilliant. The only imaginative plan of the entire war, as Clement Attlee > wrote. > > Sebastien Haffner wrote, “the strategic concept was grandiose. Turkey, > allied with Germany since October 1914, was relatively weak. The maritime > location of the capital, Constantinople, rendered it vulnerable to attack > by superior naval forces. If Constantinople fell, Turkey herself would > probably collapse. This would at least establish a secure sea route to > Russia, whose already depleted offensive strength could be restored by > means of massive arms shipments. In addition, however, Serbia was still > holding out, Bulgaria had yet to ally herself with Germany, and powerful > political forces in Greece and Rumania were ready to side with the Allies > if they won a victory in the region. The fall of Constantinople would > provide the awaited signal, and the Balkans would burst into flames like a > forest fire. From there, Austria could be brought to her knees, completely > isolating Germany and threatening her with a war on 3 fronts instead of 2! > This was strategy on a Napoleonic scale. It was also *made to measure for > Britain*, with her vast naval forces and small but efficient army – far > more suitable than the slow recruitment and training of immense armies > destined for insertion in the *bone-mill* operated by static battles on > the Western Front. > > Also, it is incredible how swiftly the Little Men turned against > Churchill. He was the ablest and most courageous of them, but their > littleness paradoxically made them more powerful because they constituted > the majority. As Sebastien Haffner says: “Churchill had no real backers. > Kitchener was universally trusted and forgiven for all his failures. > Churchill, in contrast, was regarded as untried and undependable. He needed > successes in order to hold his ground, even with Prime Minister Asquith, > the ultimate authority, who initially let him have his head with a kind of > sceptical, amused benevolence – not unappreciative of his talent and > originality and not without hope, but also coolly prepared to drop him at > any time. Such was the position from which Churchill set out to direct the > First World War. He took no trouble to secure or reinforce that position, > and he upset his closest colleagues and assistants…. In their opinion, he > behaved as if he knew it all. They were not so wide of the mark: he did > indeed behave like that, but the tragicomic fact was *he really did know > it all*.” > > Bob, I take your point about a work that presents ALL the evidence leaving > it up to the reader to form an opinion which is out of the hands of the > author. But in most cases, we *are* dealing with works that do *not *present > *all* the evidence; in fact most authors tend to present evidence > *selectively* to bolster their particular viewpoint. We are aware of this > essential characteristic of authors from the works of such as John > Charnley, David Irving etc. etc. Of course, Martin Gilbert is a million > miles away in the opposite direction from such folk as Charnley and his > tribe, but the point is that the BBC programme to which I refer presents > *anything > but* all the evidence, and is as tendentious and slanted as it can be on > the Dardanelles campaign – which is why I found it so baffling that it > could have originated from Martin Gilbert. If anything, he would be fully > aware of all the intricacies of the campaign from his voluminous research, > and to be made to appear as the presenter of such a partial and biased > account is a libel on the man. Of course, I cannot know what the terms of > his contract with the BBC were; but if ‘intellectual integrity’ counts for > anything, biased editing of a historian’s production should be > challengeable in court. I’m surprised that this did not happen. I am > grateful to Richard Langworth for the light he has thrown on this subject > (22nd of February). That is indeed the explanation that makes greatest > sense. > > Richard, thank you for your caution about your recent book; I prefer to > wait until the hardback edition becomes available, and I look forward > extremely eagerly to reading it, as I do anything from your pen. > > Grimsdyke > > On Sunday, February 19, 2017 at 3:48:01 PM UTC+13, Grimsdyke wrote: > > In general, bone fide Churchill scholars have been fairly consistent in > the way they handle his record, and what comes down to us is the image of a > fiercely pugnacious, infinitely creative man of genius, with an > incandescently brilliant mind who made both mistakes and their decided > opposite, but whose motives throughout were gallant, noble, magnanimous > ……and a host of other adjectives, none of which have any truck with > mean-spiritedness, littleness, or spite or malevolence, or any of those > characteristics that belong to lesser men. However, I have been puzzled > beyond words by the treatment of certain parts of his record at the hands > of some who had always seemed to be among the most discerning of ‘Churchill > Scholars’. > > A few years ago the BBC put out a 4-episode programme on Churchill which > was written and presented by Martin Gilbert: it is available on YouTube at > https://www.youtube.com/watch? > v=oVQg_ehSu6A <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVQg_ehSu6A> > > From 21:39 to 24:39 on the first episode, he deals with Winston > Churchill's involvement with the Dardanelles campaign. These 3 minutes > seemed to me, as I’m sure they would seem to anybody with a sound reading > of the intricacies of that episode in World War I, a travesty consisting of > half-truths and deliberate omissions of crucial facts to achieve a result > that places the blame unfairly and almost slanderously on Churchill. > > We all know, of course, that serious researchers from Alan Moorhead to > Basil Liddell Hart and numerous other biographers have found that Churchill > had little to do with the failures of the campaign, and in fact had been > made the scapegoat of a debacle that owed everything to the blunders and > mismanagement of others (Kitchener and Fisher particularly, and of course > Asquith at a political level) and little, if at all, to any actual mistakes > on Churchill's part. In fact the origin of the idea wasn't actually his: it > was Hankey's first, and then enthusiastically taken up by a host of others > – including Fisher, Gray, Asquith, and even Kitchener, and later Lloyd > George with some initial misgivings. Subsequently, Churchill was exonerated > by the Dardanelles Commission, although that Commission was, “struck by the > atmosphere of vagueness and want of precision which seems to have > characterised the proceedings of the War Council”. > > Thus, Alan Moorehead: “*in 1925, when Roger Keyes was in command of the > Mediterranean fleet, he’s steamed through the Dardanelles and, according to > Aspinall, who was with him, he could hardly speak for emotion. ‘My God’, he > said at last, ‘it would have been even easier than I thought; we simply > couldn’t have failed…… And because we didn’t try, another million lives > were thrown away and the war went on for another 3 years.*’ > > Thus, Clement Attlee: “*in the whole of the First World War, there was > only one great strategic idea, and that was Winston’s*”. Attlee had been > a soldier at Gallipoli. > > Thus, Alastair Cook (from Keynote Speech, Churchill Society International > Conference, New Hampshire, 27 August 1988): “*Kitchener had seemed an > Eisenhower-Montgomery-Nimitz, all rolled into one. He wasn’t, but we > thought he was. We didn’t know then that his power was declining > drastically, or that he was more than anyone morally responsible for the > failure of the Dardanelles: he would not support the original expedition – > would not produce the manpower or the materiel. But as you may have > noticed, the deaths of a famous leader, especially by assassination, > confers a halo. Kitchener was drowned and he got the halo. Churchill got > the blame*.” > > However, all this (and countless other testimonials to the mistakes and > blunders made by other men, but not Churchill, and the difficulties ‘on the > ground’ caused by the fatal delays during that campaign) is seemingly > completely ignored by the writer and presenter, Martin Gilbert. The icing > on the cake is Gilbert’s inclusion of statements by AJ Silvester (principal > private secretary to Lloyd George....... as if he would be impartial!) > and Jimmy Page (British Army, Dardanelles 1915) and we hear them speak > words that have virtually no other purpose than to drive home the message > that it was Churchill’s vaulting ambition that made him not only careless > of lives, but completely bullheaded and arrogant, and that he bore > unmistakably the responsibility for the whole failure. > > As I say above, this is scarcely believable from such a man as Sir Martin > (Winston may well intone from the grave, “et tu Brute?”) — which makes me > ask myself if this is in fact the result of some ‘creative editing’ by the > BBC – who, with their traditional hostility to Churchill (which seems to > have begun with John Reith), may well have omitted several minutes of > counterbalancing argument and statement that might have been included in > the original footing by Sir Martin. I’d be grateful if anybody on this > forum can throw some light on this. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "ChurchillChat" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to churchillcha...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > To post to this group, send email to church...@googlegroups.com > <javascript:>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/churchillchat. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "ChurchillChat" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to churchillchat+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to churchillchat@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/churchillchat. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
