Murray S. Kucherawy writes:
> Unless the model has changed since I last worked hands-on in this space, the
> system/operator validates DKIM and ARC and acts on the results. In such a
> world, it's possible for Y to reject mail from X if X develops a sufficiently
> poor reputation. I understand that's a desirable outcome.
That might be true for some systems. My own system does no do that. I
do accept all emails and then filter them using per user filtering
rules. I do know that least some other ESPs for example do allow
setting per user trusted forwarder list, so I assume they do same.
Yes, there are probably lots of systems which do filter emails even
before DATA phase, just by checking the SPF failure, and then
rejecting email when SPF fails (at least people did say they wanted to
do this few years back when we were discussing of removing SPF and
only using DKIM in DMARC).
I do not think there is anythng in the ARC RFC that describes that
kind of model, i.e., that describes that model.
RFC 8617 says:
The end result of this validation algorithm SHOULD be included within
the Authentication-Results header field for the ADMD.
As with a DKIM signature ([RFC6376], Section 6.3) that fails
verification, a message with an Authenticated Received Chain with a
Chain Validation Status of "fail" MUST be treated the same as a
message with no Authenticated Received Chain.
_INFORMATIONAL_: Recipients of an invalid or failing Authenticated
Received Chain can use that information as part of a wider handling
context. ARC adoption cannot be assumed by intermediaries; many
intermediaries will continue to modify messages without adding ARC
seals.
and
5.2.2. Responding to ARC Validation Failures during the SMTP
Transaction
If an ARC Validator determines that the incoming message fails ARC
validation, the Validator MAY signal the breakage through the
extended SMTP response code 5.7.29 ("ARC validation failure") and the
corresponding SMTP basic response code. Because ARC failures are
likely only to be detected in the context of other underlying
authentication mechanism failures, Validators MAY use the more
general 5.7.26 ("Multiple authentication checks failed") instead of
the ARC-specific code.
It does say that ARC validation vailures MAY be signaled during SMTP
transaction, but also that failed ARC validation "MUST be treated the
same as a message with no Authenticated Received Chain."
> But you're saying user@X and user@Y can assert a trust relationship that the
> operator is expected to honor.
Yes. If I forward [email protected] (or [email protected], or
[email protected]) to my real mailbox at [email protected], I say that
acr.fi operator can trust the ARC headers generated by those
intermediate servers when processing emails to [email protected].
> This might preclude the idea that Y can reject mail from X without
> inspecting the user-specific identities involved.
>
> This seems contradictory to me. DKIM and ARC act at the domain level.
> Involving user-specific logic seems like complexity that belongs at a layer
> above where those two operate.
ARC and DKIM act on the domain level, but the forwardin and filtering
happens on the user-specific level, thus receive filters for the user
(which have been told the trusted forwarders for that user) can trust
for that user those ARC headers which user says it should trust.
--
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