Alessandro Vesely writes:
> > Actually ARC provides the authentication information that can be used 
> > to create authorization in the final recipients email filters.
> 
> The authorization data that can be derived from authentication cannot 
> cover indirect mail flows.

I think I disagree on that. I myself do trust iki.fi because I know
the other adminstrators of that service. I know iki.fi will be doing
its best to correctly generate ARC-Authentication-Results headers, and
I know I can trust them as much as I can trust my local mail service
providers Authentication-Results. This trust only applies directly to
me, and that authentication information from iki.fi will be derived to
authorization information by me when I say that trust those headers.
But even in that case the authentication cannot say anything about the
actual contents of the email, only whether the authentication
information as provided by DKIM/DMARC/SPF was correct at that point.

Every user has to make their own trust decisions. There is no global
trust, and there is no global mapping from authentication information
from the ARC-Authentication-Results to authorization of the emails.

> > Lets say ietf list would add ARC header before the mailing list email
> > is modified.
> 
> 
> An ARC Set must be added /after/ any modifications, otherwise it will 
> not validate.

Of course, but the ARC-Authentication-Results header checks must be
before modifications, as mailing lists usually do break DKIM, and we
are interested in the status of the email when it was received by the
system when generating ARC-Authentication-Results header.

> The AAR is derived from any trusted 
> Authentication-Results header fields present at that time:

Yep, this is what my incorrrect text "before the mailing list email is
modified" text was trying to say (I.e., I was only concentrating on
the ARC-Authentication-Results not on the
ARC-Seal/ARC-Message-Signature headers).

> > Currently I do this by rule that says
> >
> > * ^List-Id:.*(\.ietf\.org)
> > * ^Precedence:.*(list|bulk)
> > $DEFAULT
> 
> 
> The fact that you have this rule suggests that the authorization 
> decision is being derived from sources other than ARC Sets —presumably 
> your knowledge of the IETF and of the mailing lists to which you
> subscribe.

Yes.

I as a user is the only person who has knowledge of which mailing
lists or forwarding services I am willing to trust.

Email forwarding etc does not happen randomly, users do set them up,
and they should be able to decided whether they trust the service they
are setting up.

If they trust it they can add it to trusted forwarders list and trust
the ARC-Authentication-Results that service generated. 

> In addition, this is only one side of the authorization 
> relationship: ietf.org has no way to know which recipients are willing 
> to accept list-modified messages despite a resulting DMARC failure, and 
> therefore must still munge From: header fields for some domains.

Ietf.org does not have to do that, and I think it is bad idea that it
does. This mungling was caused because people started complaing about
DMARC, and the correct solution should have been to implement ARC in
ietf.org mailing lists and users who subscribe the ietf.org mailing
list should just configure to trust ARC-Authentication-Results of the
ietf.org for ietf mailing lists.

Or ietf.org should reject all subscription requests where there is
dmarc p=reject...

Ietf decided to do bit more user friendly thing and decided that
mangling headers is causing least problems for people...

> > I think ARC header generation is very useful and provides information 
> > to the final recipients filters that really can help them.
> 
> 
> However useful, it does not by itself solve the mailing-list problem, 
> which was ARC's primary motivation.  Whitelisting subscribed mailing 

It can be used as a part of the solution for mailing lists, but I
think the problem is that some mailbox provides wanted to have global
solution instead of per user solution, and for that it will not work. 

> lists is a time-honored practice, but it is inherently one-sided.  An 
> authorization layer would also provide mailing lists with knowledge of 
> which recipients are willing to accept list-modified messages despite 
> DMARC failure, allowing From: munging to be avoided for those recipients.
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