On Tue 02/Jun/2026 15:27:28 +0200 Tero Kivinen wrote:
Alessandro Vesely writes:
Actually ARC provides the authentication information that can be used to create authorization in the final recipients email filters.

The authorization data that can be derived from authentication cannot cover indirect mail flows.

I think I disagree on that. I myself do trust iki.fi because I know the other adminstrators of that service. I know iki.fi will be doing its best to correctly generate ARC-Authentication-Results headers, and I know I can trust them as much as I can trust my local mail service providers Authentication-Results. This trust only applies directly to me, and that authentication information from iki.fi will be derived to authorization information by me when I say that trust those headers.


This boils down to the definitions of authentication and authorization. Authentication can confirm that the message passed through iki.fi. Authorization (and any trust decisions derived from it) are then applied according to policies that existed beforehand. In other words, successful authentication does not establish authorization; it merely provides the identity information needed to evaluate it.


[...]

In addition, this is only one side of the authorization relationship: ietf.org has no way to know which recipients are willing to accept list-modified messages despite a resulting DMARC failure, and therefore must still munge From: header fields for some domains.

Ietf.org does not have to do that, and I think it is bad idea that it does. This mungling was caused because people started complaining about DMARC, and the correct solution should have been to implement ARC in ietf.org mailing lists and users who subscribe the ietf.org mailing list should just configure to trust ARC-Authentication-Results of the ietf.org for ietf mailing lists.


It's that "should just configure". Until the list has some way to know whether a recipient has configured trust for the list's ARC assertions, it cannot rely on that trust being present and therefore cannot generally avoid From: munging. Without a mechanism to communicate or confirm the recipient's authorization policy, the mailing-list problem remains unsolved.


This is independent of the authentication technology used. Whether the signal comes from SPF, DKIM, ARC, a hypothetical DKIM2, PGP, or S/MIME, authentication alone provides no information about which authenticated identities the recipient is willing to authorize.


Or ietf.org should reject all subscription requests where there is dmarc p=reject...


This was considered too.


Ietf decided to do bit more user friendly thing and decided that mangling headers is causing least problems for people...


It is the simplest non-cooperative option, numbered 1.3 in
https://wiki.asrg.sp.am/wiki/Mitigating_DMARC_damage_to_third_party_mail

(Note that /Authorization approaches/ on that page somewhat blurs the distinction, w.r.t. the two-sided nature of authorization we are discussing.)


Best
Ale
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