Alessandro Vesely writes: > > I think I disagree on that. I myself do trust iki.fi because I know > > the other adminstrators of that service. I know iki.fi will be doing > > its best to correctly generate ARC-Authentication-Results headers, and > > I know I can trust them as much as I can trust my local mail service > > providers Authentication-Results. This trust only applies directly to > > me, and that authentication information from iki.fi will be derived to > > authorization information by me when I say that trust those headers. > > > This boils down to the definitions of authentication and authorization. > Authentication can confirm that the message passed through iki.fi. > Authorization (and any trust decisions derived from it) are then applied > according to policies that existed beforehand. In other words, successful > authentication does not establish authorization; it merely provides the > identity information needed to evaluate it.
Yes, and that is the main value of the ARC. > >> In addition, this is only one side of the authorization > >> relationship: ietf.org has no way to know which recipients are willing > >> to accept list-modified messages despite a resulting DMARC failure, and > >> therefore must still munge From: header fields for some domains. > > > > Ietf.org does not have to do that, and I think it is bad idea that it > > does. This mungling was caused because people started complaining about > > DMARC, and the correct solution should have been to implement ARC in > > ietf.org mailing lists and users who subscribe the ietf.org mailing > > list should just configure to trust ARC-Authentication-Results of the > > ietf.org for ietf mailing lists. > > > It's that "should just configure". Until the list has some way to > know whether a recipient has configured trust for the list's ARC > assertions, it cannot rely on that trust being present and therefore > cannot generally avoid From: munging. Without a mechanism to > communicate or confirm the recipient's authorization policy, the > mailing-list problem remains unsolved. Mailing lists have all kind of per user configurations already, i.e., whether you want to get digests of the mailing list discussion or not, etc. Adding one more configuration paratermer which can disable From mangling for that recipient would not be that difficult. Then when user do add that list server to trusted forwarders list he could also go and turn off the list mangling option in the mailing list for him, and get emails without extra From address manglings. -- [email protected] _______________________________________________ dmarc mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
