On 11/05/2026 16:48, Tero Kivinen wrote:
Alessandro Vesely writes:
In that sense, ARC may have attempted to address an authorization
problem using only authentication primitives.
Actually ARC provides the authentication information that can be used
to create authorization in the final recipients email filters.
The authorization data that can be derived from authentication cannot
cover indirect mail flows.
Lets say ietf list would add ARC header before the mailing list email
is modified.
An ARC Set must be added /after/ any modifications, otherwise it will
not validate. The AAR is derived from any trusted
Authentication-Results header fields present at that time:
Because there is only one AAR allowed per ARC Set, the AAR MUST
contain the combined authres-payload with all of the authentication
results from within the participating ADMD, regardless of how many
Authentication-Results header fields are attached to the message.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8617#section-4.1.1
Your message had DKIM signature, but it of course got broken by the
mailing list. The mail2.ietf.org already checked that as it added
header saying:>
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1152-bit key)
header.d=tana.it
If it would have added also ARC header saying:
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mail2.ietf.org; dkim=pass ...
The information conveyed is the same in both cases. Having it signed is
a matter of authentication, not authorization. Indeed, a malicious
forwarder can insert arbitrary data into an AAR header field.
then when the email ends at my final filters, I could have configured
that to say that for "List-Id: <*.ietf.org>", I do trust ARC
Authentication results from *.ietf.org, and those results should
be considered while decideding whether to filter the email or pass it
to my mailbox.
Currently I do this by rule that says
* ^List-Id:.*(\.ietf\.org)
* ^Precedence:.*(list|bulk)
$DEFAULT
The fact that you have this rule suggests that the authorization
decision is being derived from sources other than ARC Sets —presumably
your knowledge of the IETF and of the mailing lists to which you
subscribe. In addition, this is only one side of the authorization
relationship: ietf.org has no way to know which recipients are willing
to accept list-modified messages despite a resulting DMARC failure, and
therefore must still munge From: header fields for some domains.
If forwarding semantics actually require explicit authorization
relationships between participants or mail streams, then that would
also explain why ARC struggled to produce stable evaluation
semantics across independent operators.
I think ARC header generation is very useful and provides information
to the final recipients filters that really can help them.
However useful, it does not by itself solve the mailing-list problem,
which was ARC's primary motivation. Whitelisting subscribed mailing
lists is a time-honored practice, but it is inherently one-sided. An
authorization layer would also provide mailing lists with knowledge of
which recipients are willing to accept list-modified messages despite
DMARC failure, allowing From: munging to be avoided for those recipients.
Best
Ale
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