On Thu, Nov 13, 2008 at 2:39 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > For honesty, then, we have to know which are the two best candidates. This > sounds like a proportional representation problem with a "council" of two; > however, such methods cannot be invulnerable to cloning, since the Droop > proportionality criterion and clone independence contradict each other (by > http://www.mcdougall.org.uk/VM/ISSUE3/P5.HTM , "clone-no-harm").
I disagree, a PR method is not what you want here. If the best candidate is cloned, then both clones should be picked as the top-2. This will not happen with PR. In the linear policy case, the best candidate is at the 50% mark. PR will likely elect candidates at the 33% and 67% marks. Neither of those candidates is optimal. In fact, I think that picking one of the 2 would be give roughly the same result as the plurality system. > Also, if we want to retain the properties of the first-round election > system, and that election system is Condorcet, then one of the candidates in > the runoff must be the CW (when it exists). I would go further and say that > there's no need for a runoff if there's a CW, but others may disagree. In a condorcet election, the top 2 candidates would be at the 50% mark in the 1d policy space. The runoff would held the voters decide from 2 pretty good candidates. > The former > destroys any chance of passing the DPC, since Droop proportionality is > incompatible with Condorcet (by example given in the Voting Matters article > linked to above). I don't see why you want them picked by a PR method, the idea shouldn't be to pick 2 candidates who each represent half of the community, it should be to pick 2 that represent the whole community, > Then where should you put the other candidate? Not to the right, because > that would be biased against the left-leaning voters. Not to the left, > because that would be biased against the right-leaning voters. So it must be > another centrist, a clone. But what choice is that? It is a choice. First, there are more than 1 dimension in politics and second, even if there wasn't it allows the voters pick the most capable of the 2 candidates who both have similar policy views. > Call the candidate that's retained from the first round to pass criteria, > the retained candidate. Perhaps we could then say that if the retained > candidate is off-center in n-space, then the right thing would be to pick > the viable candidate closest to its antipode (reversed coordinates) as the > other candidate. But what's a viable candidate? You could deweight the votes that voted for the first winner. This would shift the winning point away from the centre. >> 40: A1>A2>B>C >> 08: A2>A1>B>C >> 07: A2>B>A1>C >> 25: B>A2>C>A1 >> 20: C>B>A2>A1 >> A2 would be eliminated first in IRV but here A1 and A2 form a party >> (with 55 first preference votes) and therefore C will be eliminated >> first, B next, and then A2 will win. > > This seems to be more of a problem with IRV, and so I'd say that a better > solution would be to switch to another voting system rather than try to > patch it up with party lists. Also, the A2>B>A1 voters cannot be considered members of the A party. This highlights a problem with the party list system, it assumes voters are rock solid supporters of their first choice's party. ---- Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info