Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/8/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-08, 04:46:38
Subject: Re: Racism ? How's that implied ?
On 07 Sep 2012, at 15:00, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Racism ? How's that implied ?
Do you accept that your daughter marry a man who has undergone an
artificial brain transplant?
But I do agree that perception and Cs are
not understandable with materialistic concepts
at least as they are commonly used.
Instead they are what the mind can sense,
OK.
as a sixth sense.
Hmm...
The mind is similar to driving a car through
Platoville and watching the static events
in passing.
OK.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 14:12:37
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
On 05 Sep 2012, at 18:12, Roger Clough wrote:
I don't think that life or mind or intelligence
can be teleported. Especially since nobody knows what
they are.
I also don't believe that you can download
the contents of somebody's brain.
This is just restating that you don't believe in comp.
OK, develop your theory, and predict something testable, and we will
better understand what you mean.
If not it looks just like a form of racism based on magic.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/5/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-05, 11:04:53
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
On 05 Sep 2012, at 06:14, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/4/2012 7:19 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Sep 04, 2012 at 06:48:58PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
*yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up
the entire
thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your
brain
function and that your brain function can be replaced by the
functioning of
non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human
individuality is
a universal commodity.
Calling it a sleight of hand is a bit rough. It is the meat of the
comp assumption, and spelling it out this way makes it very
explicit. Either you agree you can be copied (without feeling a
thing), or you don't. If you do, you must face up to the
consequences
of the argument, if you don't, then you do not accept
computationalism, and the consequences of the UDA do not apply to
your
worldview.
I suppose I can be copied. But does it follow that I am just the
computations in my brain. It seems likely that I also require an
outside environment/world with which I interact in order to remain
conscious. Bruno passes this off by saying it's just a matter of
the level of substitution, perhaps your local environment or even
the whole galaxy must be replaced by a digital representation in
order to maintain your consciousness unchanged. But this bothers
me. Suppose it is the whole galaxy, or the whole observed
universe. Does it really mean anything then to say your brain has
been replaced ALONG WITH EVERYTHING ELSE? It's just the assertion
that everything is computable.
That's a good argument for saying that the level of substitution is
not that low. But the reasoning would still go through, and we would
lead to a unique computable universe. That is the only way to make a
digital physics consistent (as I forget to say sometimes). Then you
get a more complex "other mind problem", and something like David
Nyman- Hoyle beam would be needed, and would need to be separate from
the physical reality, making the big physical whole incomplete, etc.
yes this bothers me too. Needless to say, I tend to believe that if
comp is true, the level is much higher.
*Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of
resources,
supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a
theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from
realism from
the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does
data enter
or exit a computation?
It is necessarily an abstract mathematical thesis. The latter two
questions simply are relevant.
*Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self
justifying
independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in
the dark.
Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the
beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of
that.
AR is not just about internal consistency of mathematics, it is an
ontological commitment about the natural numbers. Whatever primitive
reality is, AR implies that the primitive reality models the natural
numbers.
ISTM that Bruno rejects any reality behind the natural numbers (or
other system of computation). If often argues that the natural
numbers exist, because they satisfy true propositions: There exists
a prime number between 1 and 3, therefore 2 exists. This assumes a
Platonist view of mathematical objects, which Peter D. Jones has
argued against.
? I would say that the contrary is true. It is because natural numbers
exists, and seems to obeys laws like addition and multiplication that
true propositions can be made on them. 2 exists, and only 1 and 2
divides 2, so 2 is prime, and thus prime numbers exists. 2 itself
exists just because Ex(x = s(s(0))) is true. Indeed take x = s(s(0)),
and the proposition follows from s(s(0)) = s(s(0)).
Bruno
Brent
In fact, for COMP, and the UDA, Turing completeness of primitive
reality is
sufficient, but Bruno chose the natural numbers as his base reality
because it is more familiar to his correspondents.
Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the
pull toward
arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come
from?
Again, these two questions seem irrelevant.
Craig
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